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A. James Reichley — The Conservative Roots of the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations

Nelson W. Polsby — Contemporary Transformations of American Politics: Thoughts on Research Agendas

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Juliette L. George
Alexander L. George — *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*: A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link

Book Reviews

Title Page and Index to Volume 96

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Political Science Quarterly

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

A. JAMES REICHLEY argues that there was a definite conservative ideology underlying the domestic and foreign policy decisions of the Nixon and Ford administrations and that this ideology is being carried on in a more developed form by the Reagan administration.

NELSON W. POLSBY discusses significant transformations of American politics over the last thirty years that have changed nearly every institution of American government and politics. Accounting for their causes and effects, he says, challenges the research agendas of social scientists.

PAUL W. SANDERSON looks at the process of implementing scientific-technical innovation in East Germany with particular attention being paid to the roles of economic officials and Communist party *apparatchiki*.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD analyzes Jewish political behavior in interwar Poland as it oscillated between the strategy of forging an alliance with other ethnic minorities to resist Polish hegemonial pressures, on the one hand, and efforts to reach a bilateral understanding with the dominant Poles, on the other hand. He perceives the dilemmas reflected in this oscillation as relevant for today's multiethnic states.

MARK W. HUDDLESTON examines the normative assumptions of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act and the parallel assumptions of academic Public Administration. He argues that present "democratic" administrative dogmas need to give way to truly "republican" principles to protect the integrity of the American higher civil service.

FRASER HARBUTT reviews the crisis in United States-Soviet relations that occurred in early 1946. He argues that this crisis satisfied a number of critical tests that permit us to identify it as the beginning of the cold war.

JULIETTE L. GEORGE and ALEXANDER L. GEORGE find confirmation of their interpretation of Woodrow Wilson in the data that have become available since publication of their book, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*. The Georges' interpretation had been seriously challenged in a 1978 *PSQ* article by Arthur Link and others.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Conservative Roots of the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations

A. JAMES REICHLEY

The Republican administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and now Ronald Reagan are often identified with a "conservative" ideology or point of view. What does conservative in this sense mean?

The term has been used as a political label for only a little more than a century and a half. Edmund Burke, Samuel Johnson, the two Pitts, Alexander Hamilton, and John Adams never thought of themselves as conservatives. In England during the 1820s, political defenders of established institutions began to describe their aims as "conservative" or "conservatory." In 1830 J. W. Croker, writing in the *Quarterly Review*, applied the adjective conservative to the Tory party (which, like its great rival, the Whigs, had first risen out of the controversy over the succession of James II to the English throne in the latter part of the seventeenth century). In 1832 Macaulay, a dedicated Whig, derided "the new cant word . . . Conservative"; and Daniel O'Connell, the champion of Irish liberty, spoke of "the fashionable, the new fangled phrase now used in polite society to designate the Tory ascendancy." The term was quickly taken up by Robert Peel and other Tory leaders, who were glad to find a title for their party less identified with the landed gentry, already a declining class in British politics. Benjamin Disraeli at first preferred Tory to conservative, but finally was persuaded to accept the new term, which made it possible for him to be identified in time as the founder of the modern British Conservative party.[1]

[1] *The Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "conservative"; Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970), p. 26.

A. JAMES REICHLEY, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of *Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations* and other books on American politics. Before going to Brookings, he was a senior editor at *Fortune* and a White House staff consultant to President Ford.

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In the United States, opponents of the Jacksonian hegemony began using the term almost as soon as it became popular in England. In 1832 the platform of the National Republican party—the first party platform in American history—on which Henry Clay was to run for president, promised to maintain the Senate as "pre-eminently a conservative branch of the federal government."[2]

Some writers, including Jefferson as well as Marx, have identified conservatism or its equivalent in earlier societies as simply the party of the rich and powerful.[3] Others, however, perhaps observing that modern conservative parties, though usually based on the middle class, draw support from all economic and social classes, have associated conservatism with more general social values or ideas. Robert Michels, for instance, traced conservatism to belief in "norms, immutable in nature, determined by experience to be the best or least bad, and valid *sub specie aeternitatis*." Hugh Cecil found the origins of conservatism in "distrust of the unknown" and "a faculty in men to adapt themselves to their surroundings so that what is familiar merely because of its familiarity becomes more acceptable or more tolerable than what is unfamiliar." Karl Mannheim linked conservatism with the persistence of "pre-capitalist" social attitudes in modern societies. Daniel Bell associated conservatism with an "authoritarian definition of leadership." Michael Oakeshott found the roots of conservatism in "enjoyment of orderly and peaceable behavior." Samuel Huntington viewed conservatism as a "rationale of the institutional prerequisites of existence."[4]

An important key in sorting out these various suggested meanings is to recognize that, as Martin Seliger has pointed out, conservatism is both positional and ideational.[5] It applies, that is, both to positional emphasis on social order and to a body of fundamental social beliefs and values. These two categories of meaning are in some ways related, but do not completely overlap. A political leader or party, therefore, may be conservative in one sense but not the other.

The positional attitudes and the ideational beliefs and values that characterize modern conservatism can best be understood through examination of the ideas affecting actual policies in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations.

[2] *Nile's Register* (Baltimore, Md.), 26 May 1832, p. 236. The platform was adopted by an "assembly of young men," which met in response to a resolution by the National Republican Convention, held in December 1831. Many historians regard the Democratic platform of 1840 as the first true party platform.

[3] See, for example, Robert G. McCloskey, *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 22; and Michael Walzer, "In Defense of Equality," in *The New Conservatives*, eds. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), p. 107.

[4] Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 44; Hugh Cecil, quoted in William A. Orton, *The Liberal Tradition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 14; Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 118; Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 28; Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 188; Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," *American Political Science Review* 51 (June 1957): 460.

[5] Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 92–94.

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The Nixon and Ford Administrations

Various social ideas influenced the policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations. In foreign affairs, both adminstrations derived their strategic directions from the beliefs that "national interest" is the self-evident goal of foreign policy and that effective pursuit of this interest requires active international involvement. National interest was interpreted by Nixon, Ford, and their advisers, among whom Henry Kissinger was certainly the most influential, to comprise not only military security but also access to foreign resources and markets, the maintenance of a world atmosphere hospitable to American capitalism, and, at a considerably lower level of urgency, an international climate conducive to democratic values. Both administrations felt constrained in their applications of this activist approach by their evaluations of American capabilities and their judgments of the limits set by domestic politics.

Leaders of both administrations regarded the Soviet Union as the United States's chief antagonist in world affairs. They believed that communism is intrinsically evil, smothering economic enterprise and taking away fundamental human rights from people unlucky enough to be caught under its rule. Nevertheless, they based policy toward Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, primarily on calculations of interest and power, rather than on any passion for liberty. Both administrations were prepared to make deals with Communist governments and to aid and support non-Communist authoritarian regimes when such arrangements appeared to serve the national interest of the United States. The newly discovered common security interests of the United States and Communist China were held to supersede all ideological differences.

Nixon, more than Ford or Kissinger, seemed at times to glimpse a future in which the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union might no longer be the single dominating focus of American foreign policy. Neither administration made much serious effort to move, or look, beyond a context in which irreducible national sovereignty is the main organizing principle of the world system.

In economic policy, both administrations subscribed to the belief that as a general principle free-market competition produces the best overall results. Both, however, were prepared to undertake or maintain substantial government intervention to deal with short-run economic problems and to mitigate social inequities not responsive to market forces. Nixon, partly for political reasons and partly because of more flexible economic assumptions, departed more readily than Ford from the pure laissez-faire model. Ford sought to eliminate some government regulations that he and some of his advisers believed were impeding the efficiency of the market.

Both presidents regarded inflation as a more dangerous problem than unemployment. Ford's economists developed with considerable sophistication the argument that rising inflation in the long run *causes* unemployment, so that efforts to combat unemployment by permitting inflation are bound to be self-defeating. Both administrations, thus, were prepared to accept some temporary

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rise in unemployment in order to bring down inflation—Ford being willing to go further along this route than Nixon. Both administrations held that large deficits in the federal budget contribute to inflation, and both therefore sought to keep government expenditures in balance with revenues—at least at "full employment," or over the period of an entire business cycle. Here, too, Ford followed theory more strictly than Nixon (although with no greater success at avoiding deficits).

In domestic policy, both administrations accepted some form of the national welfare state that had evolved since the New Deal. During his first term, Nixon proposed substantial expansion, along with structural reform, of domestic programs in some areas, notably income maintenance and environmental protection. At the beginning of his second term, Nixon set out to cut back on some aspects of the welfare state, but became engaged in the Watergate controversy before he had made much headway. Ford proposed reduction in at least the rate of growth of federal social programs, but stopped well short of the kind of massive cutbacks demanded by some fundamentalist conservatives.

Both administrations promoted the decentralization of administrative control over social programs and the delivery of federal aid to state and local governments through general purpose revenue sharing or "block grants" rather than through narrowly defined "categorical" programs. Nixon favored decentralization because he believed it would lead to more effective management and would give more weight to community values. Ford approved it for these reasons, too, and also because he thought that block grants could more easily be brought under budgetary discipline.

Both administrations supported the elimination of vestiges of government-enforced segregation by race. Nixon and Ford disassociated themselves from Lyndon Johnson's announced goal of "equality of result," but claimed commitment to equality of opportunity—"an equal chance at the starting line."[6]

Both administrations sought to overcome the effects of past discrimination, particularly by requiring affirmative action favoring blacks and women in employment and higher education. Both, however, strongly opposed busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial integration, except for limited times in areas that had been directly involved in deliberate segregation. Their opposition to busing appeared to spring in part from political considerations, but also from convictions that busing violated individual human rights and threatened the solidarity of neighborhoods and communities.

Both administrations were determined to maintain social order and to protect the internal security of the executive branch, especially on matters affecting national defense. Nixon allowed these concerns to carry him and some members of his administration into numerous illegalities and improprieties. In Nixon's view,

[6] *Nixon on the Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Nixon-Agnew Committee, 1968), p. 125.

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all such acts were legitimate, because "when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal."[7]

Most leading officials of both administrations regarded the federal departments and agencies, particularly those dispensing domestic services, as undisciplined governmental monsters, wallowing in waste and inefficiency and supporting vast armies of parasitic bureaucrats. Both administrations made some efforts at structural reform of the executive branch. Neither felt it achieved much success.

The Reagan Administration

The administration of President Ronald Reagan, which took office in January 1981, has given expression to familiar conservative themes: free-market economics; pursuit of national interest in foreign policy; governmental decentralization; and traditional morality. Reagan, however, has called for far more rigorous application of conservative doctrine than was ever attempted by Nixon or Ford.

The Reagan administration takes its philosophic direction in economic policy from the belief that the least possible government intervention, consistent with a stable currency and protection of the public health and safety, will produce the most desirable levels of economic efficiency and growth. Ideas flowing from the new supply-side school of economists are particularly influential.

Supply-side economics, though an offshoot of the free-market ideology, derives less from the robust empiricism of Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith than from the elegant deductive rationalism of the nineteenth-century French school of classical economists, particularly Jean Baptiste Say and Leon Walras. Supply-side economists claim that the fundamental premise on which they base their policies is Say's law: supply creates its own demand.

The inference that advocates of supply-side economics draw from Say's law is that the market, if permitted to operate without government interference, will naturally establish equilibrium between supply and demand at full employment. The truth of this proposition *over the long run* has been accepted by Marx, Keynes, and most other economic theorists. Marxist and modern liberal economists, however, have argued that under conditions of depression or recession, achievement of equilibrium through the unassisted operation of the market entails so much human suffering that the theory breaks down in practice, which leads to massive government intervention and perhaps ultimately to revolution. In the twentieth century, probably the most important difference between conservative and liberal economists has been on the issue of how much suffering is acceptable to promote economic efficiency—a dilemma that some (not all) of the supply-side economists claim to have escaped.

[7] Television interview with David Frost, 19 May 1977; transcript in the *Washington Post*, 20 May 1977.

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The supply-siders' argument that high taxes debilitate the economy was a favorite topic with Say. "Taxation pushed to the extreme," he wrote, "has the lamentable effect of impoverishing the individual without enriching the state." Taxes act as a drain on the economy, Say argued, because "taxes paid to the government by the subject are not refunded by its expenditures—[government] never can replace the value [taken] because it produces no value whatever."[8]

The belief that inflation can be defeated through monetary discipline has a liberating effect on the supply-side economists when they turn to fiscal policy. They use this freedom not like the Keynesians, to stimulate demand, but rather to propose a range of tax-cut incentives that, they claim, will dramatically increase the growth of productivity. "Supply-side economics," Norman Ture, a supply-sider appointed under secretary of the treasury for tax policy by Reagan, has written, "rejects the whole [Keynesian] demand-side approach. . . . Tax cuts alone cannot increase real disposable income and spending. Any such increase will only occur if the tax cuts first affect the incentives to supply labor and capital, resulting in an increase in use of these production inputs, more real output, and hence more real income." Ture calls on policymakers to "recognize that taxes should affect the economy through incentives instead of through rivers of money."[9]

Besides striving to reduce the impact of government on the national economy, the Reagan administration has set out to decentralize control of government services. In his economic policy message to Congress in February 1981, Reagan proposed consolidating about forty-five federal categorical programs (dealing with narrowly defined purposes) in education into two block grants, which would permit the states and local governments to use the money to suit their own priorities. In social and health services, the administration proposed combining forty categorical programs into four block grants dealing with health services, preventive health services, social services, and hardship assistance.

The administration supports governmental decentralization in part as a means for holding down public expenditures. Also, however, Reagan's advocacy of decentralization reflects the conservative beliefs that state and local governments are more responsive to the realities of local needs and conditions and more conducive to preserving or building strong neighborhoods and communities.

The administration's fight against inflation and budgetary expansion will be made more difficult by its commitment to increase spending for defense. Reagan's determination to strengthen the nation's military forces reflects what Vice-President George Bush has called a "somber" view of the intentions of the Soviet Union. It also grows out of the administration's nationalist ideology.

[8] Jean Baptiste Say, *A Treatise on Political Economy*, translated from the 4th edition by C.R. Prinsep (London: Grigg Elliott, 1827), pp. 412 and 378.

[9] Norman B. Ture, "The Department of the Treasury," in *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration*, ed. Charles L. Heatherly (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981), p. 650.

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The nationalism that motivates the Reagan administration, unlike that of the old Taft Republicans, does not lead to isolationism. The United States, Secretary of State Alexander Haig has said, should "seek actively to shape events and, in the process, attempt to forge consensus among like-minded peoples." Richard Allen, Reagan's assistant for national security, has written: "While the United States does not assume global responsibility for international peace and stability, no area of the world is beyond the scope of American interest if control or influence by a hostile power threatens American security."

In the study of American political history, the idea of a strong, activist government is identified with the tradition of Alexander Hamilton, and that of relatively restrained use of federal authority with the tradition of James Madison. Reagan's belief in a Hamiltonian activist foreign policy may seem in some ways incongruous with his Madisonian commitment to internal decentralization. The two approaches, however, have been variously combined in foreign and domestic policies by past administrations and national political leaders. The administration's combination of differing approaches to foreign and domestic policy appears to rise out of three conceptual ideas: first, that the nation is the shield of the Republic, defending internal freedom through skilled diplomacy and a strong military establishment; second, that Americans have important common international economic interests that require vigorous representation all over the world; and third, that in addressing the rest of the world, American diversity should be expressed as a moral unity—"the exemplar of freedom," as Reagan said in his inaugural address.

The final ideological pillar on which the Reagan administration bases its policies is support for traditional moral attitudes on the so-called social issues, such as abortion, school prayer, and militant feminism. From the start of the 1980 campaign, Reagan sought to identify himself closely with traditionalist positions on the social issues. "Traditional Judeo-Christian values, based on the moral teachings of religion," he told a gathering of evangelical Christians in Dallas in August, "are undergoing what is perhaps the most serious challenge in our nation's history." Under a Reagan administration, he said, "traditional moral values" would be "reflected in public policy." The 1980 Republican platform promised support for "a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children" (not quite the total prohibition of abortion demanded by the more extreme antiabortionists), withheld endorsement of the equal rights amendment for the first time since 1940, promised to "restore the right of individuals to participate in voluntary, non-denominational prayer in schools and other public facilities," and pledged legislation to protect "the traditional American family against the ongoing erosion of its base in our society."[10]

During the early months of the new administration, some of Reagan's key White House aides urged that he play down identification with efforts to pro-

[10] *Republican Platform, 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Republican National Committee, 1980), pp. 10–15.

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mote congressional action on contentious issues such as abortion and school prayer. For the duration of the Reagan administration, however, the traditionalists can probably count on at least rhetorical support from the White House's "bully pulpit."

The Role of Social Ideas

These summaries do not include all the social values, beliefs, and attitudes that the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations have applied to national problems, but they do give a fair sample of those that have entered most directly into policy formulation. How important a role have these ideas played in the actual development of policy?

Governmental practitioners and political commentators often claim that American administrations deal "pragmatically" with the nation's social, economic, and geopolitical problems, working out responses on the basis of examination of the relevant "facts" in each case as it comes up. But facts do not provide their own interpretations, nor do problems automatically suggest possible solutions. For these it is necessary for presidents and their advisers to turn, at least in part, to the beliefs, values, and attitudes on which they depend for their understandings of social reality.

Nixon did not get his policies for dealing with the Soviet Union, or for sharing federal revenues with state and local governments, or for reorganizing the executive branch simply by following the news media or studying the Gallup poll. Ford did not arrive at his plan for bringing down inflation, or his energy policy, or his decision to increase military expenditures, on the basis of statistics alone. Nor did Reagan pluck his international, economic, or social policies out of the air. A mix of factors, political and personal as well as substantive, affected the development of all these policies. But at some point all required the introduction of *ideas*—about how the economy works, how nations relate to each other, what the value is of trying to maintain local communities in a modern industrial society, and so forth.

Besides dealing with objective national problems, every administration must be concerned with maintaining a high level of voter support. In many cases, perhaps most, this interest reinforces rather than undercuts the influence of social beliefs and attitudes in the policymaking process. Presidents assume that governmental approaches based on their substantive beliefs will ultimately serve the good of the national public. (If they did not, they could hardly be said to hold such beliefs.) They naturally expect, therefore, that at least over the long run these approaches will win voter approval: "Good government makes good politics." Nixon's China policy, Ford's program for fighting inflation, and Reagan's tax-cut proposal are examples of policies that, while undertaken as responses to objective problems, were expected to produce favorable political results—for the very reason that administration leaders believed these policies would serve the public good.

Sometimes, of course, presidents and their advisers conclude that policies

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they favor on substantive grounds clash with the administration's short-run political interests. When such conflicts occur, presidents sometimes go ahead with the policies anyhow: Nixon ordered the mining of Haiphong harbor in the spring of 1972, even though he expected that this action would probably cause the Soviet leaders to cancel the upcoming Moscow summit and would therefore undermine his image as a master diplomat and peacemaker going into the 1972 campaign; Ford even in 1976 held out against what he regarded as excessive stimulation of the economy, though increased federal spending might have brought down unemployment in the short run, without putting much further pressure on inflation until after the election.

At other times presidents stick with policies they believe in substantively, but compromise or change direction when they decide the political price has become too high—as when Nixon imposed wage and price controls in 1971, though he and almost all his advisers (John Connally being the principal exception) foresaw that controls over the long run would have bad economic effects; or when Ford gave up on SALT II in 1976, though he believed a treaty that would serve American interests might have been achieved. At still other times presidents violate their substantive principles simply to take out political insurance—as when Nixon pumped up federal spending to create an artificial economic boom before the 1972 election.

A president's willingness to take political risks in support of policies that he believes are right may depend to some extent on the amount of background and interest he has in a particular policy area and on the degree of confidence he feels in his own judgment about substance. Nixon was more willing to risk political damage for substantive goals in foreign policy than in economic policy. With Ford it seems to have been the other way around. Neither Republican president was prepared to take large political risks to advance domestic social policy goals. (Nixon proposed the controversial family assistance plan during the first year of his first term, but backed away from it as the 1972 election approached.)

Abandoning substantive positions for political reasons does not necessarily free presidents or their advisers from dependence on social ideas. As a rule, even policies that are undertaken mainly for political purposes must be at least rationalized through some kind of substantive arguments and theories. When Nixon decided in 1971 that the political costs of continuing free-market economic policies had become too high, he turned to the differing theories suggested, through Connally, by economists at the Treasury Department who had been arguing for controls. When Ford concluded that Ronald Reagan's attack on his right flank in 1976 made it impossible for him to go ahead with SALT II, he embraced, at least temporarily, the geopolitical outlook of the Pentagon. Nixon's pumping up of the economy before the 1972 election perhaps was carried out with less attempt at theoretical rationalization or justification; but even this departure was probably made easier by the existence of Keynesian doctrine, which Nixon interpreted as recommending stimulation.

When presidents for political purposes compromise or abandon positions

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they believe in substantively, they often argue, probably to themselves as well as to those who share their beliefs, that such tactical change is justified in order to keep them available to fight on these and other issues another day. Sometimes when the political situation changes, they do indeed return to positions that had been given up out of fear of the electoral consequences: Nixon pursued conservative budgetary policies with a vengeance after his reelection in 1973; Ford had laid the groundwork for renewing efforts to achieve an understanding on nuclear arms with the Soviet Union in 1977 if he had been elected to a full term.

Besides serving the dual goals of developing workable solutions to the nation's objective problems and of maintaining the administration's political strength, every administration's policymaking process is conditioned by the same kinds of personality factors that affect all group activities. Political and governmental practitioners themselves sometimes claim that policy formation is in fact "all a matter of personalities"—who gets along with whom, or, sometimes even more important, who is out to get whom. Former members of the Nixon and Ford administrations interviewed for my study, *Conservatives in an Age of Change,* usually stressed the influence of personal relationships on policy formation, particularly within the White House inner circle.[11]

Participants in day-to-day policy development are likely to be more conscious of their colleagues' personalities than of their underlying beliefs and values, and therefore probably tend to exaggerate the effects of personality alone. Nevertheless, personal relationships undoubtedly play an important part in the evolution of policy: Nixon approved the family assistance plan in part because Daniel Patrick Moynihan was more adept than Arthur Burns at playing up to the president's self-image; Ford replaced James Schlesinger with Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense in part because he felt more comfortable with Rumsfeld.

Over time, however, political ideology is a major factor in determining who gets and who stays in the administration's inner circle and therefore who is available to participate in intragroup relationships. Indeed, ideological agreement may be indispensable in most prolonged intimate political relationships. The Nixon administration at first included representatives who had been drawn from a fairly broad range on the ideological spectrum (though never so broad as has sometimes been suggested); but most of those who did not share the administration's prevailing ideological direction, such as Moynihan or George Romney, eventually either were isolated or dropped away. The Ford administration was ideologically more homogeneous from the start (partly as a legacy from Nixon's last phase) and became increasingly more so during its short time in office. Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller's loss of influence in the Ford White House was due not only to the play of personal relationships, but also to the fact that Rockefeller held social and economic attitudes that were significantly, though not radically, different from those that prevailed within the administra-

[11] A. James Reichley, *Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 413.

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tion's inner circle. The Reagan White House has emphasized ideological compatibility with the president's views in selecting personnel.

Some commentators hold that social values, beliefs, and attitudes are no more than rationalizations for economic interests or, alternatively, inner personality drives, which are held to be the real determining forces in governmental policy formation. Marxists, for instance, maintain that all ideologies (except their own) are simply masks for economic interests, which themselves reflect changes in the means of production. Freudians, on the other hand, assign the chief generative role to instinctual drives and early psychological traumas that have affected individual policymakers. Economic interest and inner personality obviously influence social values and beliefs. But so, apparently, do other factors not easily reduced to simple economic or psychological determinants, such as moral and cultural traditions, political opportunity, the shock of world events, views gathered from books or friends, even deliberate thought—or, as Keynes suggested, "the gradual encroachment of ideas" affecting politicians "who think they hear voices in the air."[12]

Nixon's apparent need for self-justification and his economic situation as a struggling young lawyer might easily have contributed to the formation of a liberal Democrat. But the combined influences of family tradition, reaction against big government during wartime, and exposure to conservative ideas in southern California and in Washington, D.C., helped guide Nixon to the conservative side of the ideological divide. Nelson Rockefeller's political ambition and economic background might have produced a conservative fundamentalist (like the Buckley brothers) or a patrician liberal (like Averell Harriman). But ideas about social responsibility and economic effectiveness, acquired during his formative years, induced Rockefeller instead to channel his personal drives into leading the progressive wing of the more conservative party. Kissinger's passion for order was given philosophic direction by his reading of Kant and Burke during his undergraduate years at Harvard. His association with Rockefeller no doubt gave Kissinger an interest in maintaining alignment with the Republicans. But shared beliefs, in strong executive leadership and a tough but flexible foreign policy, were the chief factors that brought Kissinger and Rockefeller together in the first place. Reagan was for many years a liberal Democrat, before being attracted toward conservatism as a result of his struggles with Communists in the film industry. Ford's beliefs perhaps seem to have risen more inevitably out of his personality and economic situation—but even in Ford's case, there was enough inner flexibility, as a result of experience and reflection, to permit conversion from isolationism to internationalism during World War II.

Social values, beliefs, and attitudes do not by themselves determine the formation of any administration's policy. Neither does any other single set of in-

[12] John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 383.

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fluences, so far as has ever been demonstrated. But social ideas permeate the entire policymaking process, affecting not only substantive judgments but also political strategies and personal relationships.

Conservatism in America

Are the social ideas that have influenced policy in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations related within a "distinct and broadly coherent" ideology called conservatism? Writers like Louis Hartz and Samuel Beer have argued that what goes by the name of conservatism in the United States is in fact merely a variant of Lockean liberalism promoted by businessmen and is little related to the conservative tradition of figures like Burke, Disraeli, Bismarck, and de Gaulle.[13] This view rests primarily on two observations: first, that American conservatives align themselves with market capitalism; and, second, that most contemporary conservatives accept the values of political democracy.

Capitalism, however, early became separated from democracy and secularism, the other two elements in the original triad of eighteenth-century liberalism. The natural affinity of conservatism, both positional and ideational, for the institution of private property, and the dependence of capitalism on social order, helped forge an entente during the nineteenth century, not only in the United States but throughout the West, between conservatism and capitalism. The productive energies unleashed by capitalism, conservatives soon argued, bring economic benefits for entire societies as well as enrichment for the capitalists. Particularly after government welfare and insurance programs had softened the harsher aspects of capitalism during the early decades of the twentieth century, conservatives maintained that the market system provides a means for balancing a high degree of personal autonomy with the order and discipline needed to achieve economic plenty; and that it is far more compatible with the values of traditional conservatism than are its collectivist rivals on either the left or right. Conservatives, therefore, adopted capitalism as the best available means for dealing with the economic side of life. Modern liberalism, on the other hand, reacting against the social and economic inequalities that are endemic to capitalism, has turned increasingly to government regulation of the economy to advance the liberal goal of equality of condition. The original positions of conservatism and liberalism on economic freedom have therefore been largely reversed.[14]

Conservatism originally moved to an acceptance of representative democracy for a more pragmatic reason: once democracy was established, continued resistance against democratic forms by conservatives would only assure loss in

[13] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), esp. pp. 3–20, 71–78, 145–58; Samuel H. Beer, "In Search of a New Public Philosophy," in *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 15, 37–41.

[14] Very recently, some liberals have developed doubts about the effectiveness of some kinds of

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elections (assuming that conservatives were not prepared to support right-wing seizures of governmental power). Over time, however, most conservatives have come to regard democracy operating within a framework of constitutional limits as a positive good in itself. Democracy bestows more legitimacy on social authority than could usually be achieved through the mumbo jumbo of absolute monarchies or feudal nobilities. Popular majorities, moreover, have turned out to be more reliable supporters of traditional social values than have social elites—a discovery expressed by William Buckley's crack that he would rather be governed by the first hundred names in the Boston telephone book than by the Harvard faculty. Conservatives continue to insist that large areas of economic life and personal relationships be kept beyond the reach of democratic governments—but more out of fear of government bureaucracies than of the voters themselves. On many social issues, like the busing controversy and abortion, conservatives have turned to the democratically chosen branches of government to defend traditional values, whereas liberals have sought to advance their objectives through the nondemocratic institution of the courts.

American conservatism, moreover, goes far beyond support for market capitalism and constitutional democracy. Nixon, Ford, and Reagan have all aligned themselves firmly with social order, nationalism, local control of social services, and cultural and moral traditionalism—all properties of modern conservatism. Nixon's landslide victory over George McGovern in 1972, Theodore White has argued, was won largely because of broad support for Nixon's conduct of foreign policy and for his aim "to let the ethnic communities and local governments of the United States lead their own lives with minimal interference by the federal government."[15] Republican publicists in 1972 effectively contrasted Nixon's traditionalism with McGovern's identification with the "three A's: amnesty [for deserters and draft evaders in the Vietnam War], acid, and abortion."[16] Modern American conservatism is not, of course, identical with British conservatism in the 1830s, or with traditional European conservatism of the kind identified with Bismarck and Disraeli, or even with conservatism in the United States during the era of McKinley. Despite much change in the surrounding social environment, however, the essential values of conservatism remain much as they have always been: church, family, personal responsibility, order, country.

It is true that some liberals find worth in some, or even all, of these values. But taken together, they represent a view of life very different from the standard liberal vision.

None of which is to say that the thesis advanced by Hartz and Beer, among

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government regulation, and have even joined efforts to achieve deregulation in limited areas. But broad forms of regulation, like wage and price controls and rent control, remain much more popular among liberals than among conservatives.

[15] Theodore H. White, *Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York: Atheneum, 1975), p. 224.

[16] A. James Reichley, "The McGovern Wave Is No Passing Ripple," *Fortune*, September 1972.

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others, is wholly wrong. Conservatism has taken over elements of liberalism, both traditional and modern, and these elements alter conservatism's approach to objective problems of government. They also create tensions within conservatism itself.

Fundamentalist conservatives derive much of their economic philosophy from the libertarian strain of traditional liberalism. Moderate conservatives, on the other hand, go along part way with modern liberalism's belief in using government to deal with many social problems. Contact with both kinds of liberalism has helped broaden and modernize conservatism. But this very broadening and modernization have created risks that conservatism will lose some of the moral strength that is its legacy from Burke, the Adamses, Lincoln, Disraeli, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Eisenhower, and other, more ancient forebears. Nevertheless, American conservatism as practiced under the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations surely qualifies as an expression of a distinct social ideology.

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Contemporary Transformations of American Politics: Thoughts on the Research Agendas of Political Scientists

NELSON W. POLSBY

Over the long run, two major forces seem to have been most influential in the past and seem most likely to continue to shape the research agendas of social scientists in the future. The first of these is theory, the second practice. By theory I mean the entire stock of ideas, speculations, conjectures, and recommendations making up the great conversations, or the many little conversations, that proceed within the various disciplines of social science and that give structure and coherence to what social scientists at any time think about what is going on in the world. By practice I mean simply what is going on in the world. The notion that this article seeks to explore in a preliminary way is that when the world changes there is an incentive to change the conversations of social scientists too. New problems come into focus and and new opportunities arise to look again at once-settled issues.

Social scientists who seek to understand the workings of the contemporary American political system will have no difficulty in grasping the import of this message. Even a nation that has enjoyed internal stability over the last half-century arguably as great or greater than any on earth—no revolutions, no coups, no armies of occupation, no constitutional upheavals—has nevertheless experienced profound and continuous change not merely in the superficialities

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TABLE 1

Percentages of Total Persons Employed by Sector in the United States

	1870	*1900*	*1930*	*1960*	*1970*	*1978*
Agriculture	47	35	22	7	4	3
Industry	27	34	36	41	39	36
Service	26	32	42	52	57	60

Sources: Victor R. Fuchs, "Economic Growth and the Rise of Service Employment," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 486 (New York, June 1980), p. 5. See also Stanley Lebergott, *Manpower in Economic Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), pp. 100–14 and 421–78.

of politics, in the personalities, issues, and controversies of the day, such as would be expected over the normal passage of time, but beyond that, reaching to underlying institutional regularities and ways of doing business.

Because the United States has had no large, spectacular revolution in modern times, the extent to which the nation has undergone small and medium-sized transformations may be underappreciated. A consolidated look at a bundle of these transformations may provoke thought about what social scientists ought to be doing about making sense of them and their cumulative impact on American politics and society.[1] What follows is by no means the only possible aggregation of medium-term trends and transformations, but it is, perhaps, a list that might occur most readily to a student of American government.[2]

The Growth of the Public Sector

The United States is one among a number of nations in which there has been a general shift in the allocation of resources from agriculture and toward so-called tertiary activities that entail the delivery of services of various kinds.[3] While the industrial sector in the United States has remained more or less stable in this century in its capacity to absorb labor, the farm sector has shrunk to only 3 percent of the labor force, and the service sector has risen to 60 percent (Table 1).

Within the service sector, government looms large (see Table 2). Questions to be investigated include determining—if possible in a comparative way—what

[1] I have made use of the wisdom of several colleagues in compiling this list, including Richard Abrams, Jack Citrin, Robert Kagan, Eugene C. Lee, Arnold Meltsner, William K. Muir, Jr., Martin Shapiro, Percy Tannenbaum, Aaron Wildavsky, and Harold Wilensky. The current version of this article is my own responsibility.

[2] An ambitious discussion of "master trends" of the last fifty years is Morris Janowitz, *The Last Half Century: Societal Change and Politics in America* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978). See also a collection very similar in spirit to this article by a number of leading political scientists under the editorship of Anthony King, *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

[3] One spotter of this trend was Colin Clark in *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1940). See also Stanley Lebergott, *Manpower in Economic Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), esp. p. 100.

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TABLE 2

All Persons Employed in the United States Service Sector (in percentages of service sector work force)

	1929	*1947*	*1965*
Employees of governments (including armed forces)	14.8	23.0	28.3
Retail trade	31.9	30.3	25.0
Professional, personal, business and repair services	17.9	18.1	17.1
Household and institutions	17.4	11.4	13.0
Wholesale trade	9.3	9.9	8.6
Finance and insurance	6.4	4.8	5.9
Real estate	1.9	2.1	1.9

Source: Victor R. Fuchs, *The Service Economy* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968), pp. 18–19.

considerations govern the allocation of various activities to public and to private sectors.[4] What governs the means by which public-sector influence is exercised? What influences, for example, choices between direct regulation, indirect incentives, and ownership as modes of public participation? What are the considerations that determine what level of government performs which functions? How do these influence relations between levels of government? What are gains and costs of the various outcomes of these choices in terms of accountability, efficiency, equality, and equity in the allocation of resources and other desiderata?

The growth of government has raised questions about whether it is mainly responsive to trends in society or to its own activities.[5] The larger government gets, the more programs it pursues, the greater the number of citizens it affects, and the more past action necessitates future responses. As Aaron Wildavsky puts it, policies become their own causes. He instances the urgent mass demand for more equal access to quality health care that in due course led to legislation establishing Medicare and Medicaid, arguing that current medical policy is designed at least in part to deal with the inflationary effects of past policies.[6]

[4] Some of the most imaginative work on this sort of question has been done by Frederic L. Pryor. See his *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1968). One of his findings, for example, is that intimidation of a civilian population in an authoritarian society is less expensive than traffic control in a modern democratic regime (pp. 239–43).

In the summer of 1981, Great Britain had a series of unprecedentedly destructive and alarming urban riots during which, in British fashion, only one person was killed. That the riots occurred at all is, of course, a sign of social change; that there was but a single fatality, of continuity. British leaders complained that parents were not controlling their children, an intimation that riot control in Great Britain is still regarded as a private-sector activity. See also David H. Bayley, *Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

[5] This theme is relentlessly pursued in Aaron Wildavsky, "Policy as Its Own Cause," in his *Speaking Truth to Power* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 62–85.

[6] See Aaron Wildavsky, "Doing Better and Feeling Worse: The Political Pathology of Health Policy," *Daedalus* 106 (Winter 1977): 105–24.

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TABLE 3

Federal Budget Outlays, by Function: 1960–1979
(in billions of dollars)

	1960	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*	*1979**
National Defense	45.2	47.5	78.6	85.5	114.5
Human Resources (Income security, Health, Veterans benefits and services, Education, Training, Employment)	25.5	35.4	73.4	168.7	259.0
	(in percentages of the federal budget)				
	1960	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*	*1979*
National Defense	49.0	40.1	40.0	26.2	23.2
Human Resources	19.8	21.7	27.5	33.3	32.2

* Estimated.

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 257.

Whatever the reasons, the government share of total spending on health care has risen from 24.7 percent in 1960 to 41.6 percent in 1975.[7] This sort of growth has implications for interest groups: in the past they were organized primarily to act on government; today to an increasing extent they form and reformulate their activities in response to governmental initiatives. What are the implications of a change in which government becomes more of a cause and less of an effect of citizen activity?

The Welfare Shift in Federal Appropriations

Within the national political system there has been a notable shift away from the delivery of national defense and toward the delivery of numerous kinds of transfer payments and welfare services: pensions, medical services, food stamps, job training programs, disability, unemployment, income maintenance (see Table 3). Many of the consequences of this so-called welfare shift can be traced through allocations of the federal budget, but not all, since they also frequently entail reallocations in the private sector and among the regulated as well. Large populations that heretofore were generally regarded as special wards of liberal presidents now are organized as clientele groups of newly created or energized bureaucracies. And, as bureaucracies do, these organizations have themselves further elaborated on their missions and have created increasingly complex and capacious domains, enlarging and particularizing the needs that

[7] Richard B. Albritton and Donna Bahry, "Effects of Public and Private Sector Decisions on Health Care Costs," *Policy Studies Journal* 7 (Summer 1979): 762–70. These authors suggest that increases in Medicare/Medicaid costs were the result not of increased demand for services so much as the result of upgraded quality in services delivered.

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TABLE 4

Number of U.S. Government Employees Compared with Federal Budget and U.S. Population

	Total Employees (in thousands)	*Executive Branch*	*Federal Budget Outlays (in billions of dollars)*	*U.S. Population (in thousands)*
1950	2,079	2,052	42	152,271
1955	2,402	2,376	68.5	165,931
1960	2,430	2,403	92.2	180,671
1965	2,539	2,507	118.4	194,303
1970	2,928	2,891	196.6	204,879
1975	2,882	2,834	326.1	213,600
1978	2,875	2,822	450.8	218,500

Sources: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965*, p. 410, and ibid., 1979, pp. 6, 254, 275.

they seek to meet. This phenomenon has loomed large in the initial thinking of the Reagan administration, raising the question: To what extent is this trend capable of being influenced or reversed by presidential initiatives?

Despite the growth in the population of the United States, as well as in the domestic economy and in the federal budget, the number of civilians employed by the federal government has not grown much over the last thirty years, and, indeed, the proportion of federal employees among all governmental employees has actually declined (see Table 4).[8] Rather than providing services directly to people, as do the Post Office, Veterans Administration, or Social Security Administration, the federal government increasingly contracts tasks out to states, localities, universities, and private-sector contractors. Federal government grants-in-aid to state and local governments grew from $2.5 billion in 1952 to $66 billion in 1977, from 4 to 16 percent of total federal expenditures. Only 15 percent of federal government spending is for activities it performs itself, including operations, personnel compensation, and maintenance.[9]

Federal appropriations are thus increasingly administered by other governmental entities, and the central government acts mainly to police conformity to centrally imposed standards. This trend roughly parallels a similar pattern in the private sector, which has seen the growth of large conglomerate corporations conducting many unrelated businesses, controlled from the center only by more

[8] As can be seen by inspection of Table 4, the number of people employed by the executive branch per thousand Americans has actually dropped over the last twenty-five years:

1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1978
14.3	13.1	12.8	14.1	13.3	12.9

[9] See Frederick C. Mosher, *The GAO: The Quest for Accountability* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 295–96. Also, Daniel Guttman and Barry Willner, *The Shadow Government* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976); Barbara Blumenthal, "Uncle Sam's Army of Invisible Employees," *National Journal*, 5 May 1979, pp. 730–33.

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TABLE 5

State and Local Expenditures, 1950–1977

	State Governments			Local Governments		
	Revenues (in billions of dollars)	Expenditures	(Expenditures as a % of Federal Expenditures)	Revenues (in billions of dollars)	Expenditures	(Expenditures as a % of Federal Expenditures
1950	11	11	26.1	12	17	40.4
1960	26	22	24.4	27	39	43.3
1970	69	56	30.2	60	92	49.7
1977	156	129	35.9	119	193	53.7

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*, p. 283.

or less elaborate statistical reporting systems and through the power of the purse.[10]

The conglomerate style of government poses many new problems for American federalism. There is, for example, the problem of insulation from administrative feedback when one entity does the work for which another supplies the money. The relationship between the administrator and the source of finance is thus capable of seriously distorting the relationships between administrators and the target populations to be served. Observers differently situated will have different opinions about the desirability of using program administrators as a buffer between clientele and the source of money. In the Reagan White House this seems to be regarded as politically advantageous in accomplishing the reduction of the overall federal commitment by means of the unrestricted, but diminished, block grant.

The Growth of Subnational Government

In the last decade and a half state and local governments have grown and have become more professional. Legal changes have been in part responsible. Reapportionment and the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 have broadened the constituencies to which state and local governments have been responsive.[11] A bewildering mixture of federal, state, and local revenues has funded the expansion of the responsibilities undertaken by subnational governmental units.[12] Table 5 summarizes the expansion of state and local expenditures from 1950 to 1977.

[10] Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 480–83.

[11] Yong Hyo Cho and H. George Frederickson, "The Effects of Reapportionment: Subtle, Selective, Limited," *National Civic Review* 63 (July 1974): 357–62; and Timothy G. O'Rourke, *The Impact of Reapportionment* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980).

[12] States have actively sought to develop their tax resources. The number of states with a general

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The greatest institutional contrast is provided by state legislatures. Only recently legislatures were moribund institutions that generally met for a short session every two years to ratify the governor's budget. They have become professional, frequently full-time, sometimes well-staffed institutions. As Alan Rosenthal says, "In 1941 [legislatures in] only four states met regularly in annual session; today almost four out of five states constitutionally provide for annual sessions, with as many as 42—by formal or informal arrangement—actually meeting each year."[13]

Only sixteen states limit their legislative bodies to sessions of sixty days or less; thirteen states set limits over sixty days; twenty-one states have no limits. Nineteen states provide year-round personal staff to members of their upper house, and an additional seven provide session-only personal staff to members of their upper house. Twelve states provide year-round personal staff to members of their lower house and seven states provide session-only personal staff to members of their lower house.[14] Moreover, as of 1975, ten states provided some scientific and technical staff for the state legislature as a whole.[15]

Changes at the state level often go undetected because of the pattern of media coverage in this country. National media cover national institutions; local media cover local affairs. The result, as V.O. Key notes, is little knowledge of the state-level changes.

> The American people are not boiling with concern about the workings of their state governments. In the competition for public interest and attention the governments of the American states come off a poor second-best against the performance of the finished professionals who operate in Washington. The salience of national issues, the magnitude of federal undertakings, and the stature of national leaders, creations of the arts of publicity though they may be, push into the far background the doings of the

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sales tax has increased from thirty-four in 1960 to forty-five in 1975. The number of states with a personal income tax has also increased from thirty-one in 1960 to forty-one in 1979.

Federal aid, however, is supplying a larger percentage of state and local budgets: in 1948, 21.9 percent of state-raised revenue, 44.5 percent in 1978. Federal and state aid as a percentage of locally raised revenue was 38.8 percent in 1948 and 76.8 in 1978. Christopher R. Conte, "Possible Strain in Federal, State Relations," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 25 August 1979, pp. 1748–50, 1819.

[13] Alan Rosenthal, *Legislative Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 142. See also David B. Walker, "The States and The System: Changes and Choices," *Intergovernmental Perspective* 6 (Fall 1980): 6–12.

[14] Only Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota provide no staff for individual legislators. Maryland does not provide personal staff for lower-house members. All other states provide some staff pool for individual legislators. See the Council of State Governments, *The Book of the States, 1980–81* (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1980), p. 128.

[15] See the National Conference of State Legislatures Committee on Science and Technology, *Meeting the Challenge* (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1975), pp. 133–34.

A state-by-state description of legislative staff resources is provided in Lucinda S. Simon, *Legislative Staff Services: 50 State Profiles* (Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1979).

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politicians in Springfield, in Sacramento, in Salem, in Bismarck, in Baton Rouge, and in Tallahassee.[16]

In states with a strong metropolitan press corps, the pattern of coverage may be improving, however.[17]

As states get stronger (they account for some 70 percent of the money spent on domestic programs outside of social security), their dependence on national finance grows.[18] Students of federalism, noting the multiplicity of programs and the increase in interaction across levels of government, despair of describing the kind of federal system that has been evolving in the United States. New plans for reform, such as direct election of the president (thereby bypassing the states) and expenditure limitations threatening revenue sharing, raise new questions about the sturdiness of decentralized political authority in the face of solutions imposed from the center.

The Decline of Political Parties and the Rise of Symbolic Interest Groups

Political parties exist on at least three levels: as economizing devices in the minds of voters and ordinary citizens, who identify with one or another party as a matter of habit; as labels that command the organized loyalty of the diverse leaders who meet in Congress and staff the upper reaches of the national government;[19] and as organizations of state and local politicians who mobilize voters, aggregate and dispense patronage, recruit candidates for public office at all levels, and mediate between groups and clusters of voters and public officials.

Parties in the first sense—as cognitive economizing devices—despite small shifts away from party affiliation, have been and remain relatively strong in the United States (see Table 6), while those in the second sense—as determinants of the loyalties of politicians in government—have responded to the decentralized nominating scheme of the federal system and hence have never had much coercive power.[20] But the influence and the importance of parties as intermediary organizations have varied widely from place to place in the United States. Over

[16] V.O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 3.

[17] See Rosenthal, *Legislative Life*, pp. 174–75; and David Morgan, *The Capitol Press Corps: Newsmen and the Governing of New York State* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).

[18] According to the Council of State Governments, "Approximately 25 percent of state budgets consist of federal assistance funds of some type" (*The Book of the States, 1980–81*, p. 80).

[19] Virtually all elected officeholders in the United States, where party designations are not forbidden by law as in some local jurisdictions, are either Democrats or Republicans. At the state level, for example, in 1977, some 7370 elected legislators were one or the other; 127, or 1.7 percent of the whole, belonged to minor parties or were non-partisan. For state executives, the figures were 365 Democrats or Republicans, 8 (or 2.1 percent) something else. Over a twenty-year period the major parties have registered slight gains on minor parties. See *State Elective Officials and the Legislatures* (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1977).

[20] See David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in *Federalism: Mature and Emergent*, ed. Arthur W. MacMahon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 115–36.

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TABLE 6

Proportion of the Population Identifying with Democrats or Republicans

	1952	1960	1968	1972	1976	1980
Strongly	35	35	30	25	24	26
Weakly	39	38	39	38	39	37
Independent-Leaner	17	15	19	22	22	23
Independents	5	8	11	13	14	12
Apolitical, Don't Know, No Answer	4	4	1	2	1	2

Source: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

the last decade, parties as intermediary organizations have suffered a precipitous overall decline as the direct result of changes in rules and laws governing the nomination and election of presidents—the most important single national activity in which the parties should be engaged.[21] The causes and consequences of this transformation are widespread and are only beginning to come into focus.

As recently as the early 1960s, national conventions were primarily composed of politicians who sought to find a popular candidate who could win elections. Today these conventions are frequently dominated by candidate enthusiasts and interest-group activists with ideas quite different from the mass of citizens who identify with the parties in whose name they act.[22] Laws have been written so that one systemic check on the tendency of party leaders to be unrepresentative, namely the rise of third parties, has been greatly discouraged.[23] The nomination process was once part of an effort to create a coalition to govern the nation. Now the electoral apparatus has become almost totally separated from the government. As candidates become individual entrepreneurs, they not only rely less on their party during an election campaign, they are less able to rely on it afterwards.[24] And the kinds of candidates chosen in a process that bypasses par-

[21] See Nelson W. Polsby, "Interest Groups and the Presidency: Trends in Political Intermediation in America," in *American Politics and Public Policy*, eds. Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 41–52.

[22] See Jeane Kirkpatrick, *The New Presidential Elite* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1976); and Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 5th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980).

[23] John Anderson's 1980 presidential campaign provides a good case in point. See Dom Bonafede, "Can John Anderson Succeed Where Teddy Roosevelt Failed?" *National Journal*, 17 May 1980, pp. 806–10; Rhodes Cook, "High Hurdles for the Anderson Campaign," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 17 May 1980, pp. 1315–18, and Cook, "Alternative Party Candidates May Have Substantial Impact on 1980 Presidential Election," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 October 1980, pp. 3143–49. More generally, see Daniel A. Mazmanian, *Third Parties in Presidential Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).

[24] Nelson W. Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons for the Political System," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Spring 1978): 15–25; and Polsby, "Coalition and Faction in American Politics: An Institutional View," in *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), pp. 103–23.

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ties come into office with fewer contacts in Congress and are less disposed to treat Congress as a necessary part of the government. Thus, there is more trouble early because there is less political preparation for incoming presidents, and more trouble late because when things do go wrong presidents have nowhere to gather institutional support.

Interest groups, the other great mobilizers and intermediaries in American politics, have begun to change drastically under the impact of modern conditions.[25] More and more the bases upon which they are constituted are symbolic as well as economic in character, although the gratification of symbolic goals may entail the allocation of large amounts of money. More and more they reach their clientele and receive their legitimacy in the political system through the mass media and direct mail fund raising rather than through face-to-face interaction or geographic propinquity. The government itself is more than ever a prime mover in the creation and mobilization of interest groups as new bureaucracies reach out to find and organize clientele with whom they can do business. In short, the bases of political affiliation change as processes of aggregation change. This brings to prominence new sorts of leaders, with different sorts of appeals.

While single-issue interest groups—said to hasten the paralysis of government by reducing the possibility of compromise and consensus—are not new, the administration and operation of many of the most prominent groups *are* new: the proliferation of movements without members and of interest groups without stable constituencies increases the fluidity of American politics, expands the congressional agenda, and enhances the impact of the media on politics. Based on direct mail fund raising and professional central staff, skillfully exploiting the mass media, these groups are at once a cause and a consequence of party decline.[26]

The Political Role of the Mass Media

The political role of the mass media has changed drastically not only because of changes in the capacity of the media to claim the attention of citizens but also because of the corresponding weaknesses of competing political institutions,

[25] See Polsby, "Interest Groups and the Presidency."

[26] Andrew S. McFarland, *Public Interest Lobbies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976); Charles W. Hucker, "God and Politics: Mixing More Than Ever," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 23 September 1978, pp. 2565–67; Bill Keller, "Evangelical Conservatives Move from Pews to Polls, But Can They Sway Congress?" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 September 1980, pp. 2627–34, and Keller, "Environmental Movement Checks Its Pulse and Finds Obituaries Are Premature," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 31 January 1981, pp. 211–16; Timothy B. Clark, "After a Decade of Doing Battle, Public Interest Groups Show Their Age," *National Journal*, 12 July 1980, pp. 1136–41; Bill Keller, "Powerful Reputation Makes National Rifle Association a Top Gun in Washington," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 9 May 1981, pp. 799–804. For an opinion on the rise of special interest groups and the decline of political parties see Richard E. Cohen, "The Party's Only Begun," *National Journal*, 13 January 1979, p. 67.

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notably the political parties, and of other intermediary organizations, such as labor unions and business groups. The propensity of news workers to operate within the norms of their own professional subculture is an important fact that needs to be related to the enlarged responsibilities that this subculture now bears.[27] Discussion of this cluster of issues has traditionally been hampered by claims that First Amendment rights of news people can be jeopardized by calling attention to their increasing political significance. By virtue of the enormous consequences for patterns of public attention and information, patterns of concentration, control, and regulation of present and future communications technology are critical issues for political analysis and public policy.[28]

Related to the centralized reconstruction of political reality by broadcast media, which has accelerated in the past twenty years, is the more subtle, indirect political impact of mass entertainment, especially through television, now the main leisure-time diversion of Americans. While there is some evidence that the overt political content of the media can be reinterpreted and discounted by local groups and interests (where these retain vitality), television operates at many levels. The possible changes in values and beliefs wrought by cumulative exposure to the top entertainment shows, especially on "moral" issues such as divorce, abortion, sexual preference, and minority rights, are poorly understood.[29] The political effect of "nonpolitical" shows may be substantial because the hours of exposure are so long. The blurring of distinctions between entertainment and news may also affect political understanding and ignorance, trust and cynicism, participation and apathy, as millions of viewers learn their history from televised "docudramas."

The newer issues that the media and media-dependent social movements highlight—environmental, ecological, nuclear energy, abortion, women's liberation, and other moral issues—crosscut the older divisions of region, class, race, ethnicity, and religion. Whether they can function as bases for political realignments as the old "Left-Right" issues of economic equality and security once did, and in some measure still do, is an open question.

[27] The earliest and best statement on this set of issues is Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). See also: Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973); and Nelson W. Polsby, "The News Media as an Alternative to Party in the Presidential Selection Process," in *Political Parties in the Eighties*, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 50–66.

[28] See Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Information Machines* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) for a good statement of many of the issues.

[29] There is a large library on this cluster of topics. See the various publications of the Aspen Program on Communications and Society, for example, *Television as a Cultural Force* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976). In addition, George Comstock et al., *Television and Human Behavior* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), and Sidney Kraus and Dennis Davis, *The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behavior* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976).

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The Professionalization of Policymaking Elites

There have been several interacting transformations at the elite level, where governmental decision making takes place. Entry into official positions of authority now occurs less from social propinquity and more from professionalization. Many issue networks are made up in large part of professional policy analysts, some of them government subsidized but not government employees. For example, after World War II, the air force funded a research organization separate from the Pentagon—the Rand Corporation—in order to obtain advice and analysis on questions of national defense.[30] It is now perfectly possible to formulate a detailed and thoroughly professional set of policy plans for national defense, including their operational and procurement implications, without recourse to the general staff of the armed services. In general, the same is true of foreign policy, housing policy, welfare policy, health policy, fiscal and monetary policy, and so on, right across the board. This capability is increasingly but unevenly used to bypass the bureaucracies on matters of policy planning and analysis. If the two major resources of a senior bureaucrat in influencing public policy are expertise and tenure, it is significant that at a time when the monopoly of expertise that government bureaucracies hold is being significantly diminished, the Carter administration reforms of the senior civil service included major attacks on bureaucratic tenure. The consequences of these changes on the influence and ultimately on the quality of the permanent government are likely to be large.[31]

Perhaps the most dramatic example of professionalization of political elites has taken place in the foreign-policy sector, as a number of political commentators have put forward the claim that a distinctive change has taken place in the composition of the elite group that manages American foreign affairs. "From the era of Monroe and Castlereagh, until the Vietnam era," wrote the late Stewart Alsop, "people with a conditioned Anglophilia not only ran the foreign policy of the United States. In the sense that the old Wasp establishment was

[30] Bruce L. Smith, *The Rand Corporation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[31] They also seem to be coming more quickly than anticipated. See William J. Lanouette, "SES: From Civil Service Showpiece to Incipient Failure in Two Years," *National Journal*, 18 July 1981, pp. 1296-99. For the civil-service reforms of the Carter administration, and some of their consequences, see James L. Sundquist, "Jimmy Carter as Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term," *Public Administration Review* 39 (January-February 1979): 3-11; John R. Dempsey, "Carter Reorganization: A Mid-Term Appraisal," *Public Administration Review* 39 (January-February 1979): 74-78; Eric L. Davis, "The Senior Executive Service and Its Impacts on Agency-Constituency Relations" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, Calif., March 1980); Naomi Lynn and Richard E. Vaden, "Bureaucratic Response to Civil Service Reform," *Public Administration Review* 39 (July-August 1979): 333-43; Norton E. Long, "The SES and the Public Interest," *Public Administration Review* 41 (May-June 1981): 305-12; and Bruce Buchanan, "The Senior Executive Service: How We Can Tell if It Works," *Public Administration Review* 41 (May-June 1981): 349-58.

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predominant financially and even intellectually, until recently such people largely ran the United States. They no longer do."[32]

Casual observation suggests that this conclusion is broadly correct and that the United States is undergoing a distinctive shift in the bases upon which its political elites are recruited and sustained. Alsop's Wasp establishment tended—by this own account—to be recruited from families with money and high social standing, and their most significant formative experiences took place at prep schools, the American imitation of the English public school.[33] The question that Alsop could not answer, and one that might be examined in detail, is what sorts of formative experiences and criteria of selection operate in winnowing and socializing contemporary foreign-policy elites, whether they entertain the same sort—or a different sort—of homogeneity of values and attitudes, whether they are capable of political consensus, and if so what sorts of political consensus, based upon what kinds of shared assumptions, and reflecting what sorts of intellectual strengths and what sorts of blind spots.

Preliminary cogitation suggests a number of probable answers to questions of this kind. The Wasp establishment tended to be amateur, in the British manner, and was dominated by people who had been exposed to good educations but who were not necessarily avid or even successful scholars. The new foreign-policy establishment is marked by the stigmata of professionalization and is much more likely to be composed of holders of advanced degrees of various sorts and of self-starting persons from the top of the class in the scholarly rather than the socioeconomic sense. This suggests that key elements of the socialization of new managers of American foreign policy tend to take place later in life and to be more focused on tools of the trade. They will have in common a grounding not in Chesterton and Shakespeare, the King James Bible and T.S. Eliot, but rather in the writings of Quincy Wright and Kenneth Waltz, Henry Kissinger and Karl Deutsch, Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman, and they will all have teethed on journals like *International Organization* and *World Politics* rather than on the *Book of Common Prayer.*

The common upbringing of the Wasp establishment produced a sort of elite consciousness that included a capacity to formulate, and subscribe to, a conception of national interest that—while it may have been in some respects limited and in some respects quite wrong (for example, on the opening of mail)—was nevertheless nonpartisan in spirit and highly idealistic and provided a continuity in America's dealings abroad that many allies found comforting. There is a question whether the professional norms of contemporary foreign-policy elites

[32] Stewart Alsop, *Stay of Execution* (New York: Lippincott, 1973), pp. 153, 155. See also, Godfrey Hodgson, "The Establishment," *Foreign Policy* 10 (Spring 1973): 3–40; and Leslie Gelb, "Secretary of State Sweepstakes," *New York Times Magazine*, 23 May 1976, p. 13.

[33] A general sense of the sort of institutions private preparatory schools are may be gleaned from such sources as Peter S. Prescott, *A World of Our Own* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972); and Louis Auchincloss, *The Rector of Justin* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964).

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TABLE 7

Use of Courts to Produce Political Outcomes

	District Courts (civil cases filed)	*Appeals Courts (cases filed)*
1962	61,836	4,823
1967	70,961	7,903
1972	96,173	14,535
1976	130,597	18,408

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 June 1977, p. 1233.

are capable of sustaining the same sort of consensus on basic values, or whether foreign-policy professionals have become a highly sophisticated type of hired gun at the disposal of politicians having diverse goals and attitudes toward the rest of the world. In short, a key item for investigation is the extent to which the foreign-policy community is any longer capable of generating its own moral presence in world affairs, a presence separate and distinct from the goals of the politicians it serves, as it most assuredly was able to do—for good or ill—in the past.

To my knowledge no systematic survey of these issues has as yet been undertaken. The emerging foreign-affairs community and its distinctive subculture has been perceived by sensitive observers, and felt as a presence by many of its members, but it has not yet become the object of careful study. Older members of the foreign-policy establishment—for example, Henry Stimson and Dean Acheson—have on occasion left accounts of their participation in public affairs, and of course there is a large body of scholarly and journalistic material about them entombed in such places as back issues of the journal *Foreign Affairs*.[34]

Judicial Expansion and Congressional Transformation

There has been a drastic rise in the extent to which the courts and litigation are being relied upon to produce political outcomes (Table 7). The numbers of lawyers and judges have greatly increased, and the reach of their influence on public policy has correspondingly burgeoned (Table 8). New doctrines justifying judicial intervention, indeed new rights, immunities, entitlements, and prohibitions—"new property," as one scholar described it—have been created in a relatively short historical span.[35] The doctrine of the political question has been narrowed as courts undertake to settle such issues as executive privilege. Meanwhile, equal protection, due process, even cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Constitution have been equipped with protean reach, affecting

[34] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947); Dean G. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969).

[35] Charles Reich, "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal* 73 (April 1964): 733–87.

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TABLE 8

Legal Personnel in the United States

	1954	*1963*	*1970*
Lawyers	241,514	296,009	355,242
Judges	7,903	8,748	10,349

Law Schools and Law Degrees Conferred

	1955	*1965*	*1975*	*1977*
Number of law schools	128	134	154	169
Number of degrees conferred	8,209	11,583	29,296	34,104

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*, pp. 168, 189.

mental hospitals, schools, welfare systems, prisons, ethnic minorities, and the handicapped.[36] Although the American legal subculture and the litigious mode of decision making have always struck foreign observers of American politics with wonder,[37] the great expansion of this sector poses problems of mapping the assimilation of judicial expansion by the adjacent institutions that are affected.

The increased judicial activity that has characterized the postwar period may be less a result of autonomous developments in constitutional law or judicial behavior than of the popular search for new gurus as confidence in the expertise of bureaucrats and politicians has declined. Certainly the expansion of interest groups' orientations from material to symbolic interests has changed the demands groups make on courts and thus the responses that are deemed appropriate.[38] Conceivably, scholars whose expertise lies in such areas as bureaucracies, interest groups, and legislatures will have as much to contribute to the understanding of the growth of the politics of litigation as have those who concentrate exclusively on law and courts.[39]

The number of important changes affecting Congress over the last three decades is remarkable. They include: the transformation of the U.S. Senate from an encapsulated men's club, a "citadel" in the description of one of its observers, into a publicity machine operated for the purpose of linking senators

[36] See, for example, Louis Henkin, "Is There a Political Question Doctrine?" *Yale Law Journal* 85 (April 1976): 597–625; Raoul Berger, *Government by Judiciary* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), and A.E. Dick Howard, "A Litigation Society?" *Wilson Quarterly* 5 (Summer 1981): 98–109.

[37] As, for example, in a famous formulation, Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1 (1836) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Vintage edition, 1954): "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question" (p. 209).

[38] For early observations of a burgeoning trend, see Clement E. Vose, "Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Politics," *Annals* 319 (September 1958): 20–31; and Samuel Krislov, "The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy," *Yale Law Journal* 72 (March 1963): 684–721.

[39] For example, Nathan Glazer, "Towards an Imperial Judiciary," *Public Interest* 41 (Fall 1975): 104–23.

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with national interest groups and factions;[40] the rise in the effectiveness of the House Democratic Caucus, triggered by reapportionment and changes in partisan voting patterns in the South;[41] the redistribution of power in the House away from the committee chairmen upward to the Speaker and downward to subcommittees;[42] the explosive growth in the size and professionalization of congressional staffs, and the formation of two new congressional agencies—the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget Office.[43] Taken altogether these changes constitute a transformation comparable to the revolution of 1910–1919, which modernized Congress and gave it its contemporary role in the political system.[44]

Presidential Politics

Many of these changes are reflected in the conduct of the presidency. Presidential nomination processes that proceed without strong guidance from party leaders tempt presidents to believe that it is possible to govern as well as to be nominated without cultivating party loyalties. The availability of the mass media gives presidents an opportunity to attempt to mold public opinion directly, without the frustrating and often unavailing work of persuading other Washington elites to agree to their policies. The extent to which this new configuration of opportunities constrains presidents is far less understood, by presidents and observers alike, than it should be.[45]

The proper role of the presidency in the political system is understandably in question. Is the presidency to be the institution of last resort, intervening when it judges others have failed, or should it accept stalemate, waiting until other institutions are ready to cooperate? To what extent can the vagaries of presidential popularity become a resource in the dealings presidents have with other Washington decision makers? How does the electoral mandate interact with the constitutional imperatives that force presidents to be accountable to Congress and with the customs that dictate that they be civil to the press, accommodating to interest groups, and attentive to their party?

[40] Nelson W. Polsby, "Goodbye to the Inner Club," *Washington Monthly* 1 (August 1969): 30–34.

[41] Nelson W. Polsby, "Reform of the Party System and the Conduct of the Presidency," in *Problems and Prospects for Presidential Leadership: The Decade Ahead*, ed. James Sterling Young (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, forthcoming).

[42] Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rohde, "Shifting Forces, Changing Rules and Political Outcomes: The Impact of Congressional Change on Four House Committees," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, eds. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1977), pp. 186–269.

[43] Michael J. Malbin, *Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

[44] On the modernization of Congress, see Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968): 144–68.

[45] Polsby, "Interest Groups and the Presidency."

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Conclusion

Together, these medium-term trends and transformations span almost the entire spectrum of public processes that contribute the institutional resource base through which the American people govern themselves. Changes in each sector have reverberated unevenly through the others; in virtually all cases the transformations, and the political consequences, have been very great and surprisingly recent. And they have far outrun our current capacities to talk about them with dispassion and understanding. Thus underpinning these items on the agenda are two other clusters of issues that need further ventilation: how these transformations are related causally one to the others and to more basic conditions in the social system; and how our views of these changes are mediated by the ideas we use to discuss them.

To what extent can the political transformations described above be explained by more basic changes in the social system at large? At least four sorts of explanatory variables must be examined: changes in the structure and composition of the population and its patterns of migration; changes in the capability of the social system to get certain sorts of work done efficiently and cheaply; changes in demands made on the political system from outside; and changes in the capacities and demands of various groups in society.

Migration to the South is responsible for much of the changed regional composition of the House Democratic Caucus—subtracting over thirty conservative southerners whose seats went Republican—which in turn led to the transformation in the powers of the Speaker.[46] A major cause of increased public spending has been the growth in the proportions of older people. In fact, as Harold Wilensky shows, the single most important correlate of increased social spending in nineteen modern democracies is the percentage of their population over the age of sixty-five.[47] And as the enormous generation resulting from the postwar baby boom has moved through successive American institutions appropriate to their place in the life cycle, stresses and difficulties have rippled through each of the institutions in turn: schools, colleges, the housing market, and, only a few decades away, an impact can be foreseen in the social security system.[48] Changes in technology and productivity, in particular, the revolution in communications technology, have provided significant underlying causes of

[46] An early, distinguished contribution to the discussion of the effects of migration on contemporary southern political behavior is Hugh Douglas Price, *The Negro and Southern Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1957).

[47] Harold Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). The proportion of the U.S. population over age fifty-five has risen from 16.9 percent in 1950 to 20.5 percent in 1978. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*, p. 8.

[48] Griping about the future of the social security system is the most recent of the series of complaints caused by unevenness in the age distribution of the U.S. population. See Steven R. Cox and Philip R. Wooten, "The Long Run Problem of Financing the Social Security System," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 37 (October 1978): 397–411; also Martin Feldstein, "Facing the Social Security Crisis," *Public Interest* 47 (Spring 1977): 88–100.

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the demise of traditionally organized interest groups and the rise of symbolic issues and their manipulators.

By all odds the most obtrusive new external influence on American politics in recent years has been the change in the management of oil production and the formation of a successful sales cartel. The ability of external forces to attack the value of the dollar, and therefore to force major changes in American policy, is a new experience for a nation that used to be better insulated. Finally, changes in the structure of families,[49] many of them reflecting the great changes in the economic and social position of women, in the education of the population,[50] in the voting turnout of various groups,[51] in the rise of social interests based on minority status, and in the growth of new social organizations all influence the ways in which political demands are made and met. The reciprocal invasions of the "North" by the "South," the Sunbelt by northerners, and richer counties by poorer people also affect political outcomes. And no issue can be considered apart from its impact on racial and ethnic divisions.[52]

There has been ample evidence in recent years of a fairly steady decline in the

[49] Dramatic changes in family organization and attitudes relating to family life have taken place in the United States. For example, the size of households in the United States has dropped precipitously since 1930, from 4.11 members to 2.81 in 1978. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*, p. 44; Daniel Yankelovich summarizes some other changes: ". . . at an anticipated 1.7 children for each woman of childbearing age, we have fallen . . . dramatically below the 3.7 rate of the nineteen-fifties. . . . In the nineteen-fifties a typical American family consisting of a working father, a stay-at-home mother and one or more children constituted 70 percent of all households. . . . The 'typical American family' [now] accounts for only 15 percent of them.

"A generation ago, the typical worker was a man working full-time to provide complete support for his wife and children. Today fewer than one out of five people who work for pay conform to this standard. . . . A majority of women (51 percent) were working outside the home. . . ." (*New Rules* [New York: Random House, 1981], pp. xiv-xv).

From 1941 to 1968 the number of survey respondents who said that four or more is the ideal number for a single family varied from 41 to 47 percent; in 1980 those giving this number dropped to only 16 percent of respondents. *Gallup Opinion Index*, no. 176 (March 1980): 18.

Findings on continuity and change in family life over a fifty-year period in Muncie, Indiana, are displayed in Howard M. Bahr, "Changes in Family Life in Middletown, 1924-1977," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44 (Spring 1980): 35-52. The most striking changes in attitudes and expectations since the 1930s have occurred to women.

[50] In 1960, 16.5 percent of the population over age twenty-five had completed some college work; in 1978 the figure was 29.8 percent, nearly double the number. The median school years completed in the population was 10.6 in 1960, an amazing 12.4 years in 1978. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*, p. 145.

[51] Robert Axelrod has monitored some of these trends in a way that emphasizes the changing composition of electoral coalitions in "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions 1952-1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972): 11-20 and updates published as letters to the editor in ibid. 68 (June 1974): 717-20 and ibid. 72 (June 1978): 622-24.

[52] An imaginative reconstruction of the map of North America based on geographic aggregations of interests is Joel Garreau, *The Nine Nations of North America* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1981). For another sort of example, the rise of Hispanic-American interest groups, see Leobardo F. Estrada et al., "Chicanos in the United States: A History of Exploitation and Resistance," *Daedalus* 110 (Spring 1981): 103-31, esp. 122-28.

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public's trust in government institutions and officials.[53] While there has been considerable disagreement over the scope and significance of this shift, there is little doubt that it is important for scholars to establish whether or not there has been fundamental change in the prevailing political culture. The evidence from surveys on this point is a puzzling mix of increased cynicism about ongoing practices and firmer commitment to essential democratic values such as freedom of speech and protection of the rights of the accused; of support for an expanded governmental role in providing all citizens a minimum standard of economic and social welfare and advocacy of a "smaller" government; of attacks on leading institutions and yearnings for stronger leadership. One possible unifying thread in these disparate attitudes is a generalized decline in deference toward institutional authority, political and otherwise, that many social commentators attribute to secularization, better mass education, economic progress, and social mobility. This anti-institutional outlook takes different political forms among the well-educated, largely liberal professional classes and the "middle mass" of skilled workers, small entrepreneurs, and clerical staff. But this mood does pose a challenge to political elites seeking to mobilize a consensus in a system where power is widely dispersed, and it has implications for understanding shifts in the bases of legitimation for political change in the United States.

What we—citizens and analysts alike—believe about political transformations is to some degree mediated by the ideas we use to discuss them. In particular, our conceptions of justice and of proper democratic practice play a significant role in helping students, citizens, and political leaders to sort out and understand the normative bases upon which various claims are made. By restricting the notion of democracy to political equality, for example, one set of justifications gains legitimacy. By embracing different notions of democracy, other sorts of practices become legitimate. In recent years, it is common for presidents to make the claim that their legitimacy to act is entirely warranted by the results of the last election, a notion heavily reliant on the norm of political equality.[54] Alternative claims, based on the check-and-balance scheme of the Constitution, have been proffered. These insist upon the legitimacy of interelite accountability as a means for assuring democratic practice between elections. Presumably, understanding that more than one set of doctrines can be invoked to sustain democracy is a necessary precondition of choosing wisely between or among these alternatives.

[53] That there has been a drop in public trust in government has been well documented. It has not been determined, however, if this indicates a loss of support for the political system as a whole, or just for political officeholders. Arguing the former is Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review* 68 (September 1974): 951–72. The latter position is taken by Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," ibid., pp. 973–88. See also Paul R. Abramson and Ada W. Finifter, "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (May 1981): 297–307, for a finding that the latest evidence still can not settle the disagreement.

[54] Expanded discussions of this are contained in Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making," and Polsby, *Political Promises* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 6–14.

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The undoubted desirability of increasing participation in the nomination process has led to institutionalized reforms that have so reduced the capacity of political parties to deliberate as to constitute an unanticipated tradeoff of one value for the other.[55] It is, or conceivably could be, a task of political analysts to reach an understanding of the ways in which the elements of the political system are connected one with the other sufficient to anticipate some of the more important consequences of purposive institutional change on institutions adjacent to the sector upon which reforms are visited. If it turns out to be true that various recent reforms of the presidential selection process have had a significant impact not only on the practices of the political parties, but also on the system of party competition, on political voluntarism, on fundamental processes of political intermediation, on electoral results, on the conduct of the presidency, and on presidential-congressional relations surely those who in the future seek to make institutional changes will want to learn from experience how to choose the instruments of change with greater precision.[56]

Presumably a commitment to democratic values entails a commitment to knowledge. In the realm of social action, the relations between causes and effects are so cursorily mapped as to provide less support than is desirable for claims of instrumental rationality. If democratic practices presuppose that people get what they want, they must also presuppose more general knowledge about what it takes to get what is wanted. Recent experience has, if anything, increased our capacity to see how badly served we are by primitive models of democratic theory and by the shortcomings of the information base upon which we rely in calculating causes and effects in the American political system.*

[55] Polsby and Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 5th ed., pp. 272–86.

[56] For contrasting views of recent party reforms, for example, see William J. Crotty, *Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

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Scientific-Technical Innovation in East Germany

PAUL W. SANDERSON

Does "politics" in an industrialized Communist system cease with the pronouncement of policy by the elite? In other words, is policy application a relatively straightforward administrative affair? Is the implementation process dominated (or controlled) by a monolithic, hierarchical party apparatus? Does the party apparatus constitute a so-called political army at the disposal of the regime's leaders? To what extent are economic officials and technical experts champions of a rational, scientific, and pragmatic *Weltanschauung*? To what extent do *apparatchiki* (party bureaucrats) interfere in the daily activities of economic managers, and what is the nature of this interference? Is the economic-administrative system in socialist countries characterized by an inherent conflict of basic interests between party bureaucrats and administrative technical specialists?

These questions are derived from what Jerry Hough has termed the "modified totalitarianism" and "limited pluralism" models of Communist politics. According to the modified totalitarianism model, policy implementation is a relatively straightforward affair. Once the details of a policy line have been established by the party leaders (after limited consultation with the topmost administrators affected by the policy), the party mobilizes administrators and technical specialists for relatively swift execution of the "party's will." The entire mobilization-implementation process is policed by a ubiquitous, disciplined, and ideologically motivated party apparatus. Given their fanatic devotion to the will of party leaders, and to the perpetuation of their own dominant status as party elite overseers in the economic hierarchy, party bureaucrats may be presumed to be

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major obstacles to the growth of pragmatic, bargaining-style decision making. Since this is ostensibly the decision-making style of state and economic experts and officials, and because party bureaucrats have the right to control managerial activity, one may presume that a classic conflict of interests characterizes the relationship between the technical specialists and the party bureaucrats.

In contrast, the limited pluralism model suggests that politics in a given policy area does not end with the enunciation of a particular line by regime leaders. Policy spheres are conditioned to a significant degree by a constant process of decision making by those responsible for policy administration. Moreover, the presupposition of an inherently adversary relationship between party bureaucrats and administrative and technical specialists common in most modified totalitarianism models is rejected. On the contrary, there may in fact be some divergencies of interest between the central party secretariat and party secretaries at regional and local levels, at least with respect to certain issues.[1]

Two of the most prominent students of the politics of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Ernst Richert and the late Peter C. Ludz, have relied heavily (if implicitly) on variants of the modified totalitarianism paradigm. Richert, for example, contrasts what Zbigniew Brzezinski has termed the party's "organizational compulsion" to remold society completely according to Bolshevik norms with the inevitable need to develop an effective state, and above all, an effective economy. Both Richert and Ludz perceived an inherent structural tension between the professional political agitators and mobilizers concentrated particularly in local party organs and the corps of pragmatic technical experts entrusted with the smooth day-to-day operation of the economy.[2] In contrast, Thomas Baylis has stressed that party officials and economic directors inevitably share an interest in maintaining a high level of output and that, in light of the frequently difficult economic circumstances in which "plan fulfillment" occurs, consultation and cooperation may well characterize their normal relationship.[3]

These contrasting perspectives and conjectures will be assessed on the basis of behavioral patterns manifested by economic and political officials in the execution of measures designed to concretize party policy in the area of industrial innovation and rationalization. This policy sphere continues to preoccupy and, it would appear, to some extent to frustrate those regime leaders especially responsible for intensive economic development in the GDR.[4] The particular

[1] See, Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism* 21 (March-April 1972).

[2] Ernst Richert, *Macht ohne Mandat: der Staatsapparat in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands* [Power without mandate: The state apparatus in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany] (Cologne: West Deutscher Verlag, 1964), pp. 280–82; Peter C. Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 84–86, 292.

[3] Thomas A. Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 94–98.

[4] See Gunther Mittag (secretary for economics for the Central Committee and member of the

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policy investigated concerns the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*—SED) leadership's campaign to recruit and deploy scientists, engineers, and technicians for the "struggle for scientific-technical advance in socialist industry." Within this context, emphasis will be placed on the response of the scientific-technical intelligentsia (*Wissenschaftliche-technische Intelligenz*, or WTI) to the party's mobilization drive and on the response of economic officials and their political supervisors (the party bureaucrats) to measures aimed at deploying and activating the WTI in industry.

The Quest to Improve Productivity Levels

During the period covered in this article, 1953–1963, the GDR economy was essentially patterned on the Stalinist command economy. This centralized system was designed to enable political leaders to revolutionize the structure of the "old, bourgeois" economy and to maximize the absolute growth of production capacity and output in strategic sectors of the economy. Whatever the merits of the command economy in terms of facilitating rapid industrial development, as a centralized, bureaucratic system, it entailed substantial economic disadvantages. Economic actors (workers, foremen, managers, ministerial and branch officials) were generally evaluated on and rewarded for the attainment of planned production quotas. On the other hand, the system blunted the initiative of these actors to lower real costs, to develop new products, or to improve the quality of products.

The cost of the command system's disincentives in these areas was bound to be particularly great in East Germany, given its large skilled-labor force and its large and highly competent scientific-technical intelligentsia. The leaders of the SED were aware of the economic and political importance of meeting top international technical standards, reducing prime costs, and engaging in sophisticated research and development. The GDR was to play a leading role in the areas of electronics, chemicals, fine mechanics, and engineering within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Moreover, the severe

SED Politburo), "Fragen des Volkwirtschaftplanes der DDR 1970" [Questions of the 1970 Economic Plan of the GDR], *Die Wirtschaft* [The economy] 1 January 1970, p. 16. See, too, Gerd Friedrich (deputy director of the Central Institute for Socialist Economic Leadership of the SED Central Committee and member of the Scientific Council for Economic Research of the GDR Academy of Science), "Fragen der Vervollkommung der Leitungstaetigkeit im Prozess der Planausarbeitung und—durchfuehrung" [The issue of improving managerial activity in the process of forming and implementing the plan], in Wissenschaftlicher Rat fuer die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung bei der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR [Scientific Council for Economic Research of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR], *Zu theoretischen und praktischen Problemen der weiteren Vervollkommung der Planung der Volkswirtschaft entsprechend den Beschluessen des VIII. Parteitages der SED* [Theoretical and practical problems of further improvement of the planned economy in accordance with the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress of the SED] (Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1973), pp. 100—104.

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shortage of labor made necessary the quest to improve significantly productivity levels in most branches of industry.[5] SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht's announced intention to meet and surpass the living standards of West Germany by 1965 (the so-called *Oekonomische Hauptaufgabe* [economic competition] announced in 1958), and indeed the "transfer" of the worldwide class struggle to the "plane of economic competition" announced by Nikita Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, tended to generate additional pressure for measures that would promote the "struggle" for scientific-technical advance.

The GDR leadership's commitment to achieve the highest international standards in industry presupposed the active cooperation of East German scientists, engineers, and technicians. The SED elite attempted to "win the hearts and minds of experienced WTI" through inducements and "moral" persuasion, stressing repeatedly the theme that GDR economic development was a precondition for European stability and world peace and that the single-most important contribution WTI could make, therefore, was a direct contribution to this developmental process. Party officials also asked experienced WTI to work for the benefit of "all fellow Germans," rather than for an "imperialist-revanchist elite" in West Germany.[6] This effort, which may have been somewhat unpopular with some party members,[7] was complemented by the creation of

[5] For example, see Walter Ulbricht, "Die Warschauer Konferenz und die neuen Aufgaben in Deutschland" [The Warsaw Conference and the new tasks in Germany], *Referat auf der 24. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands am 1. Juni, 1955* [Report at the Twenty-fourth Session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 1 June 1955], and the Central Committee's declaration, "Die Bedeutung der Intelligenz beim Aufbau des Sozialismus" [The importance of the intelligentsia in the construction of socialism], *Neues Deutschland*, 24 May 1953.

[6] WTI were also encouraged to strive to eliminate "old social barriers" between themselves and the masses. Ulbricht even resorted to *Berufsehre* (professional honor) in appealing to the WTI to help "maintain the fine world reputation of [East] German industry." See Walter Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeitbewegung* [History of the German Workers' Movement] (Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1969), vol. 5, p. 55; Zentralkomitee der SED, *Konferenz der Wissenschaftlern, Ingenieuren, Neuern und Vertretern der staatlichen Organe vom 6. bis 8. Juli, 1955 zu Berlin* [SED Central Committee, Conference of scientists, engineers, innovators and representatives of the state's organs 6–8 July 1955, in Berlin] (Berlin: Central Committee of the SED, 1955), p. 43; and Gerhard Grueneberg, "Auf sozialistische Art leiten und arbeiten" [Manage and labor in a socialist manner], in *Referat und Schlusswort auf der Partei—und Staatsfuntkionaere Konferenz in Potsdam-Babelsberg, Februar, 1958* [Report and summary of the conference for party and state functionaries, Potsdam-Babelsberg, February 1958] (Berlin: Central Committee of the SED, 1958), pp. 14, 58–59.

[7] The Party elite was prepared to grant leading members of the WTI extraordinary material privileges. Thomas Baylis has argued that given the disparity in the socioeconomic backgrounds of rank and file SED members and older WTI this policy may have aggravated existing tensions between these groups. In fact, it appears that suspicion of experienced WTI was not uncommon among leading party figures. See Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite*, pp. 23–31, 65–73; and Kurt Krueger, Hermann Axen, and Gerhard Frost (all CC members) in *Aus dem Wortprotokoll der 25. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 24. bis 27. Oktober, 1955 in Berlin*

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numerous technical colleges and applied arts training and research centers.[8] Clearly the SED leadership perceived the recruitment and development of WTI for work in industry as a vital component of its general development program. Speaking in Leipzig at the 500th anniversary of the "Karl Marx" (Leipzig) University, Ulbricht stated: "We are aware that the fulfillment of our economic tasks is contingent in great measure upon the contribution of our scientists and technicians to the vital struggle to meet the highest scientific-technical standards."[9]

While the party elite was attempting to "transform science into a direct production force" during this period, it was especially concerned that this force be under party control. In fact, the leadership attempted to mobilize East Germany's scientific community in such a way that two fundamental *political* objectives would be met. First, party leaders strove to gain a greater degree of central political influence over research activities in the scientific community. This objective was to be met by channeling research funds to institutions and individuals or groups of scientists concentrating on projects of "immediate relevance" to socialist industry. Along similar lines, the leadership encouraged "contracted" research programs between enterprises and scientific centers and groups. Complementing this dimension of science policy, the leadership attempted to centralize the supervision and coordination of all scientific activity in the state. The equivalents to research and development presidia were established for this purpose.[10]

The second primary objective implicit in the party elite's WTI policy was the

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[From the minutes of the Twenty-fifth Session of the SED Central Committee, 24–27 October 1955, in Berlin] (Berlin: Central Committee of the SED, 1955), pp. 33–35, 51.

[8] During the First Five-Year Plan (1951–1956) the GDR expanded its applied science and research and development capacity by establishing specialized technical colleges (for example, the heavy industry college in Magdeburg, the chemical engineering college in Halle-Merseberg, an electronics-oriented college in Ilmenau). Numerous "scientific-technical centers" coordinated by the State Planning Commission and organized according to industrial branches were also established. See Ernst Richert, *Sozialistische Universitaet* [The socialist university] (West Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1967), pp. 106, 109; and Renaut Rausch, "Foederung und Organisation der Forschung in der DDR" [The promotion and organization of research in the GDR] in *Soziologie der DDR, Sonderheft*, [Sociology of the GDR, Special Issue], ed. Peter C. Ludz (Berlin: West Deutscher Verlag, 1964), p. 267.

[9] Walter Ulbricht, *Entstehung und Perspektiven der sozialistischen Universitaet. Festrede zur 500 Jahrfeier der Karl Marx Universitaet Leipzig, am 12, Oktober, 1959 (Leipzig, 1959)* [Origins and perspectives of the socialist university. Principal address at the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Leipzig's "Karl Marx" University on 12 October 1959] (Bonn: Gesamt-deutsches Institut, 1959), p. 8. See too K. Bondi, "Partei der Wissenschaft" [The Party of science], *Freiheit* [Freedom—the news organ of the Halle district SED executive], 8 January 1962, p. 1.

[10] See Rausch, "Foederung und Organization der Forschung," pp. 264–65, and Peter C. Ludz et al., *DDR Handbuch* [GDR handbook] (Cologne 1975), pp. 21–22. See too, "Verordnung ueber die weitere Umgestaltung des Hoch -und Fachschulwesens in der DDR vom 13. Februar, 1958" [Ordinance concerning the further reorganization of colleges and technical schools of the GDR, 13 February 1958], *Gesetzblatt der DDR* [Legal codes of the GDR] 1, no. 13 (Berlin 1958), p. 75.

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establishment of a corps of auxiliary supervisory personnel (auxiliary to the party bureaucracy in the economy, of course) in the campaign to "promote scientific-technical progress through innovation and rationalization." Accordingly, the leadership stressed the importance of creating "progressive alliances" of innovative workers and members of the WTI under the control of local and basic party (enterprise-level) organizations. These alliances were to become key instruments, according to leading party spokesmen, in the SED's struggle against "bureaucratism and other impediments" in the way of industrial innovation and modernization.[11]

The *intention* of the party leadership was clearly to build up, as it were, an army of WTI, "innovative workers," and activists under party control to form the leading wedge of a struggle to promote scientific-technical progress in industry. The party elite, however, encountered serious obstacles in the course of policy implementation. In its efforts to mobilize the experienced WTI, for example, there is considerable evidence that the party "subsidized" some of the most severe, and effective, critics of the regime. One Central Committee (CC) member, speaking at the Twenty-fifth Plenum of the SED Central Committee in October 1955, asserted bitterly that one "could cite numerous examples of subversion and anti-state activity led by members of the intelligentsia."[12] Members of the WTI were among the most frequent and severest critics of the SED's socioeconomic development policy. Similarly, Fritz Selbmann reported at the Thirty-second Plenum in July 1957 that during the "turmoil" in Poland and popular revolt in Hungary the white-collar staff in a number of large chemical plants in Halle led "anti-party activity." Of particular concern to party leaders was the fact that "many of the younger [GDR-schooled and trained] intelligentsia were influenced by [older] cadres . . . who raised uncertainty over the question of proletarian internationalism." This posed "a threat not just to the development of political consciousness in these firms, but [to] production itself."[13]

Perhaps it is not too surprising that the SED was not entirely successful in "purchasing" the political convictions of all experienced WTI in East Germany during this period. After all, large private firms in West Germany provided stiff competition for the services of such personnel.[14] Most of the experienced WTI

[11] This strategy was reflected in numerous speeches of leading party officials at the Twenty-fifth Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1955. See Krueger, Axen, and Frost, *Wortprotokoll der 25. Tagung*.

[12] See the comments of Kurt Krueger in ibid., pp. 34–35.

[13] F. Selbmann, "Die Durchfuehrung der Beschluesse der Partei im Kohlenbergbau, in der Energie und der chemischen Industrie" [The implementation of the decisions of the party in the coal-mining, energy and chemical industries], in *Berichte, Referate und Beschluss: 32. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED, 10. bis 12. Juli, 1957* [Reports, addresses and decision: The Thirty-second Session of the SED Central Committee, 10–12 July 1957] (Berlin: Central Committee of the SED, 1957), p. 67.

[14] Numerous West German firms established employment offices in Berlin during the 1950s.

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were not likely to have felt great excitement over the prospect of "building socialism on German soil." Of course, during this period, those entirely opposed to the line of the party leadership had the option of leaving the GDR with relative ease. Large numbers of desperately needed scientific-technical personnel did, in fact, protest against the policies of the regime through *Abhauung*, or "skipping" the state. Perhaps this loss of experienced technicians, more than any other factor, influenced the leadership to consider as early as the Thirty-sixth Plenum of the SED Central Committee in 1958 the possibility of physically closing the "Berlin outlet."[15]

Somewhat more surprising was the fact that the SED leadership encountered difficulty in its attempt to exert more direct influence over the activities of the scientific community. Despite the establishment of state research presidia in the nonacademic sector of this community, and the "patterning" of higher education on the Soviet model, the party effectively exercised far less control over scientific research than one might expect. To be sure the Governing Board of the German Academy of Science, the State Research Council, and the State Secretariat for Higher Education were formally instructed to draw the research community's efforts into line with the economic perspectives in the national plan. These bodies, headed by leading scientists in the GDR and directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers, were instructed to ensure that "the direction of the development of the sciences . . . must be based upon, indeed incorporated in, the economic plan."[16] The board, the secretariat, and the council not only were responsible for planning and coordinating research activity, but also held the purse strings for research grants.

Bureaucratic Conservatism and Latent Opposition

Despite the existence of this organizational arrangement, Ulbricht complained as late as November 1961 that far too great a proportion of scientific research undertaken at academic centers in the preceding years had been "detached" from the pressing needs of the economy. While hundreds of scientists at leading academic institutions (including the German Academy of Science) were engrossed in programs that they found intrinsically interesting, noted Ulbricht, "the

Some firms evidently went so far as to send recruiters into the GDR itself. See David Childs, *East Germany* (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1972), p. 33.

[15] For example, Ulbricht asked portentously: "What should be done to stop these sources of *Republikflucht*?" See *Aus der 36. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED, Juli, 1958. Diskussionsbeitraege. Parteiinternes Material.* [The Thirty-sixth Session of the SED Central Committee, July 1958. Commentary of participants. Classified party material] (Berlin 1958), p. 7 (internal party document).

[16] Walter Ulbricht, "Aus dem II. Teil des Berichtes des Genossen Walter Ulbricht auf der 14. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED" [From the second part of the report of Comrade Walter Ulbricht at the Fourteenth Session of the SED Central Committee], *Die Wirtschaft*, 29 November 1961, p. 3.

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economic requirements of superior organs [were] neglected."[17] In actual practice, the board, the secretariat, and the research council issued "directives" that were *interpreted* as broad outlines for researchers. Whether a given proposal was in fact authorized by an appropriate central organ depended primarily on two factors: first, the "sensitivity" of an institute director to the "prevailing state administrative winds" and his ability to bring a proposal "into line" with centrally established guidelines; and second, a positive recommendation from a board of experts in the field in question, which was a virtual guarantee of approval from central authorities. Given the rapid growth of the research community in the 1950s it is not that surprising that central research presidia, which were directed by prominent scientists, tended to accept the recommendations of field experts on highly specialized research proposals. In this way the intrinsic interests of scientists could, and often did, predominate over the narrower, primarily economic preoccupation of party leaders.[18]

Perhaps the most significant obstacle the leadership faced in its struggle to apply the talents of the scientific community to industrial production arose in the economy itself. To be sure, this policy was not openly criticized. Significant numbers of economic officials, however, and SED bureaucrats diluted the content or actually circumvented the thrust of party policy.

Of course, regime leaders *were* aware that "self-satisfied conservatism" was a rather prominent feature of the economy. After all, the policy to promote scientific-technical innovation was characterized as a *struggle*. Typically, bureaucratic conservatism (termed "departmentalism" in the German press) was attributed to "certain state functionaries" with atavistic/bourgeois conceptions of the role of the state in economic life. All too often, party leaders repeatedly complained, economic functionaries implicitly used the pretext that production exigencies (quotas, deadlines, supply difficulties, transportation problems) "explained" the delays in the drive for innovation and technical rationalization. Party leaders stressed that industrial innovation and rationalization were to be achieved in the course of filling the national, branch, and enterprise production plans.

Indeed, the replacement of the industrial ministries by industrial branch trusts (*Vereinigungen Volkseigener Betriebe*, or VVB) in 1958 was, to a considerable extent, an organizational reform geared to catalyze research and development and plant rationalization. The trusts were supposed to function as the principal promulgators of the "new scientific revolution in industry," guiding and encouraging enterprises in the area of research and development.

Party leaders argued that it was precisely scientific-technical progress that would enable the GDR to maintain its leading role within COMECON and to overcome the Federal Republic of Germany in per capita consumption by the mid-1960s. Hence it is somewhat surprising that, as late as the end of 1961,

[17] Ibid.

[18] Rausch, "Foederung und Organization der Forschung," pp. 266–69.

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"bureaucratic, self-satisfied conservatism" prevailed in many VVB. The Politburo's chief economic adviser, Erich Apel, for example, admitted that "there is a long list of VVB in which utter disorder prevails in the administration of scientific-technical matters."[19] Research and development was placed relatively low on the administrative priorities list.

The relatively low priority of research and development was also reflected in the chronic complaint by leading branch economists and central planners that conscientious academicians who offered unsolicited assistance to enterprises, or who desired to conduct on-site research in plants, were often ignored by economic management.[20] For example, the SED secretary at the Technical University of Dresden complained, in November of 1962, that the business community as a whole was unenthusiastic about the efforts of "economic field research" by university economists. Despite some positive examples, he continued, "it must not be overlooked that the help offered to the enterprises is often taken only after considerable delay, and indeed, sometimes not at all." The party secretary concluded that in many instances management seemed to fear the consequences of precise, scientific analysis of their technical and organizational problems.[21]

The lukewarm response of economic managers to field research and the light demand for contract academic research were not the only manifestations of resistance to the party's program to promote scientific-technical advance. Within the economic-administrative hierarchy itself, two primary patterns of latent opposition emerged. Within enterprises, conflicts emerged between those (plant management and production foremen) preoccupied with inexorable output quotas and deadlines and those (some WTI and innovators involved in either new technology drives or quality control) who perceived themselves as particularly responsible for promoting innovation and higher production quality.[22] In certain plants, some of the technical intelligentsia, notably those working on the so-called plan for new technology (*Plan neue Technik*, or PNT) or in the quality control units (the so-called TKO), felt themselves to be subject to the "unwarranted suspicion and hostility of production personnel." The efforts of the TKO, typically staffed with scientists and engineers, were often perceived by

[19] Erich Apel, "Einige Grundfragen der Leitung unserer sozialistischen Volkswirtschaft" [Some basic issues in the management of our socialist economy], *Einheit* [Unity—the principal journal of the SED Central Committee], no. 11/12 (1961):1632.

[20] See Paul W. Sanderson, "Policy and Decision-Making Processes in an Industrially Advanced Communist System: The Case of the Economic Policy Realm in East Germany (GDR), 1953–63" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1978).

[21] W. Erlich "Produktivkraft Wissenschaft wenig gefragt" [The production force of science in low demand], *Die Wirtschaft*, 5 December 1962, p. 3. See too H. Keller, "Wissenschaftliche Fragen in der Oekonomie" [Scientific questions in the economy], *Die Wirtschaft*, 5 September 1962. Keller was an instructor at the Construction Engineering Academy.

[22] See "Der Meister als Leiter in seinem Abschnitt" [The foreman as manager in his division], *Die Wirtschaft*, 31 January 1962, p. 8.

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foremen and managers as "petty interference" in the really important struggle—namely, meeting planned production targets.

In at least one important case, VVB management was explicitly accused of regularly sympathizing with plant managers who tried to meet output targets at nearly any cost. Many VVB directors were, like their immediate subordinates, primarily interested in filling branch production plans. Thus a TKO member at the state's leading photochemicals plant insisted that "it is time to examine the possibility of subordinating . . . the director of the TKO to an agency which is objectively and technically prepared to place its support behind the fundamental task of the TKO." Friedrich proposed that such units be taken out of the personnel administration authority (*Nomenklatura*) of enterprise and VVB management and placed under the administrative control of the *Deutsches Amt fuer Messwesen und Warenpruefung* (DAMW), a state production-control board composed exclusively of engineers and technicians. Although the proposal did not win the approval of the VVB director concerned, it did receive quick endorsement from the DAMW.[23]

It must not be assumed, however, that the scientific-technical intelligentsia as a whole was at odds with or impervious to the interest of many, if not most, economic managers in fulfilling planned output tasks "at any cost." Erich Apel noted, for example, that not only did many managers shy away from technical innovation and product research and development; they actually "believed, obviously, that science exists to provide justification for weak plans." In other words, some managers actually used their technical personnel to "produce evidence that [initial] plans cannot be fulfilled, that assigned tasks have been set too high given factor supply, or that rationalization proposals are too complicated to be met within the stipulated time framework, etc."[24] Obviously some WTI went along with this sort of arrangement. Moreover, as Erich Honecker complained, recent graduates of technical colleges or institutes, uninitiated to "the accepted routine" in many plants, were saddled with dull, bureaucratic "busy" work. It was as if established management consciously or unconsciously strove to dampen the natural enthusiasm and initiative of young WTI, the group party leaders were banking on to catalyze the process of implementing the "struggle for scientific-technical advance."[25]

[23] L. Friedrich, "Ist die TKO an allem Schuld?" [Is the TKO to be indebted to everyone?], *Freiheit*, 3 December 1962, p. 3. Friedrich was a chemist and member of the TKO at Filmfabrik Wolfen. See the response of VVB Director Richter, "Mehr Autoritaet unseren Gueterkontolleuren" [More authority for our quality-maintenance personnel], *Freiheit*, 29 November 1962, p. 2. The DAMW's support for Friedrich's position may be found in H. Oehlmann's article, "Qualitaet—Maßstab der Leitung" [Quality—the standard of management], *Freiheit*, 13 December 1962, p. 2.

[24] Apel, "Einige Grundfragen der Leitung unserer sozialistichen Volkswirtschaft," p. 1631.

[25] Erich Honecker, "Ehrenamtliche Taetigkeit—Massstab fuer neue Qualitaet der Parteiarbeit" [The activity of honorary public service—the standard for a new quality in party work], *Neues Deutschland*, 19 December 1962.

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Clearly, party leaders had good reason to believe that their policy of promoting the immediate application of the beneficial effects of modern science and technology to industry was not being implemented as expeditiously as they would have preferred. One inevitably seeks an explanation for the persistence of obstacles that threatened broad political and economic objectives of the party leadership, particularly concerning the behavior—and inactivity—of party secretaries who bore responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the central party line.

Party leaders had anticipated the establishment of progressive alliances of WTI, innovative workers, and activists at the production level. These groups were to be mobilized and actively supported and led by enterprise-level SED units (the Party Factory Organization [*Betriebsparteiorganisation*, or BPO]) and superior (territorial) party organizations. Party organizations were to "secure the economic, and above all the political, cooperation of workers and members of the scientific intelligentsia."[26]

A variety of programs to "bond workers and scientific intelligentsia" into a SED-directed force for innovation and industrial rationalization were created. An "innovator's movement" was launched in the mid-1950s. This was an attempt to mobilize under "party leadership" "conscientious, progressive workers" at the plant level and to "release their creative initiative" in the drive to improve productivity in various branches. Workers involved in the innovator's movement were to be mobilized by BPO together with engineers and technicians at enterprises so as to form "socialist work collectives." Again, these collectives were to be formed under BPO auspices. Party secretaries were to view these groups as "a new mechanism to bring the intelligentsia into the struggle for socialist development."[27] Programs such as the "technological-organizational measures" (TOM) and the so-called plan for new technology were designed to serve as focal points for the efforts of the party's "army for scientific progress" in industry.

The TOM, introduced in 1957, was supposed to supplement the subsection of the firm's operational plan dealing with technological and organizational change. The program was designed to engage WTI and activists in detailed discussions of concrete means that could be taken to "increase technical standards and efficiency of production on the basis of available resources," that is, *without* additional state outlays.[28] The TOM was subsumed under the PNT in 1960. The goal of the PNT was to "exhaust all available reserves within the

[26] Axen quoted in Krueger, Axen, and Frost, *Wortprotokoll der 25. Tagung*, p. 51. Axen was a leading CC member and first secretary of the Berlin District Executive (*Bezirksleitung*).

[27] H. Taubert, "Zur Entwicklung der sozialistischen Gemeinschaftsarbeit zwischen Arbeiterklasse und technischer Intelligenz" [On the development of socialist cooperative labor between the working class and the technical intelligentsia], *Einheit*, no. 8 (1959): 1106, 1109–10.

[28] H. Mueller and K. Reissig, *Wirtschaftswunder DDR* [The GDR's economic miracle] (Berlin:Central Committee of the SED, 1968), pp. 273–74. See too, H. Groesse, "Geht es nur mit Geld?" [With money alone?], *Neues Deutschland*, 31 January 1957.

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enterprise so as to meet [*in addition to* production targets] the planned acceleration in scientific-technical progress without calling upon the state for major unplanned commitments of resources."[29]

Socialist work collectives, innovator groups, and TOM/PNT discussion groups were not to engage in fundamental debate over the main lines of the leadership's program of "scientific progress." As Erich Apel stressed, the key decisions in this area were to remain centralized. Any new project or plant modification that involved substantial resource commitment had "to be taken centrally, where precise [material] balances can be made." The party leadership's vision of the function of "its army for progress" was clear. On the basis of "rigid [party] supervision, the initiative . . . of hundreds of thousands of workers will . . . be concentrated on the fulfillment of directives . . . which promote innovation and rationalization."[30]

Collective Consultation and Political Irresponsibility

Given the operational and organizational principles upon which SED organizations were based, it appeared that the SED leaders had at their disposal a monolithic force for enforcing their political will. The operational code for all party organs was, of course, the principle of democratic centralism. According to party statute, this principle meant that the most important responsibility of all party organs below the Central Committee was to ensure the "unconditional execution" of directives and decisions adopted by party leaders. In the area of economics, enterprise-level party organs were expressly granted the *Recht der Kontrolle*, or supervisory rights, vis-à-vis enterprise management. By implication, BPO superiors (with territorial jurisdiction[s]) also enjoyed this right and responsibility.[31] Hence, according to party statute and repeated statements by party leaders, the party apparatus was supposed to be the most essential device at the disposal of the CC and Politburo in the struggle for scientific-technical advance and, indeed, in terms of meeting economic development plans in general.[32]

[29] F. Arnold and H. Havemann, *Wie soll die BPO mit dem Plan, dem Vertragssystem und der Statistik arbeiten?* [How should primary party organs work with the plan, contracts and statistics?] (Berlin:Central Committee of the SED, 1960), p. 114.

[30] Apel, "Einige Grundfragen der Leitung unserer sozialistichen Volkswirtschaft," p. 1632.

[31] See *Parteistatut der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* [Party statute of the Socialist Unity party], reprinted in *Protokoll der Verhandlung des IV. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, vom 30. Maerz bis 6. April 1954 in Berlin. Band II* [Protocol of the proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Unity party of Germany, 30 March–6 April 1954, in Berlin, Volume II] (Berlin:Central Committee of the SED, 1954), section 3, no. 26, p. 1126; section 1, no. 1A, p. 1118; section 5, no. 52, p. 1132.

[32] Hence top party spokesmen insisted that "the decisions of the Party Congress find their concretization in the state economic plan. Consequently this plan is the work plan for all state and industrial party organs, and there is no need for any other [work] plan" (Grueneberg, "Auf sozialistische Art leiten," pp. 13 and 58–59).

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In the important political-economic area of industrial innovation and rationalization, however, party leaders often made policy pronouncements that were either simply not implemented or so diluted or distorted in the implementation process that the leaders' central objective was not met. To account for this apparent contradiction one must examine the theory and practice of *politische Kontrolle* (political supervision) of party bureaucrats in the drive to rationalize the economy.

The supervisory rights granted to party secretaries in enterprises entailed the inspection, examination, and review of managerial activity.[33] Party secretaries were empowered to superintend or supervise the implementation of the basic party line in economics at the plant level. They were to penetrate into the problems of the firm and become aware of the concrete situation in each unit of the enterprise. Within this context, it must be remembered that the operational plans constituted the most fundamental work plan for *all* party organs with responsibilities in the economic field.[34] Indeed, economic performance served as a litmus test for the performance of party organizations and officials in the state economic hierarchy, including territorial executive organs.[35]

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret the granting of supervisory rights as an extension of full discretionary power to party secretaries in enterprises. The practice or exercise of *Kontrolle (Kontrolle ausueben)* in this context must not be confused with the English notion of political control or domination. While party secretaries were authorized to supervise managerial activity on behalf of central party organs, they were also obligated to "promote the development of the authority and responsibility of [enterpise] managers."[36] This responsibility was clearly indicated in Article 70 of the statute—the same article granting supervisory authority and responsibility to party organs at enterprises. Theoretically, *Recht der Kontrolle* was reconcilable with, indeed was ostensibly to complement, the principle of *Einzelleitung (edinonachalie)*—the individual responsibility of the manager.

According to the principle of *Einzelleitung*, the economic manager was, in fact, expected to listen attentively not only to the advice of technical specialists on his staff and to recommendations from the BPO secretary, but also to work collectives and innovator groups on a wide variety of matters. The manager bore the ultimate responsibility and authority, however, to make all final decisions concerning daily operations. Leading party spokesmen recommended that "collective consultation" among managers, technicians, party secretaries, and union officials be adopted as a managerial style most conducive for comprehen-

[33] See Christiana Agricola et al., *Woerter und Wendungen: Woerterbuch zum Sprachgebrauch* [Words and their application: A dictionary for the spoken language] (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1962), p. 329.

[34] Grueneberg, "Auf sozialistische Art leiten," pp. 58–59.

[35] "Economic plans are to stand at the core of all party activity for all local party organs" (Arnold and Havemann, *Wie soll die BPO arbeiten?* pp. 3, 127).

[36] *Parteistatut der Sozialistischen* (1954).

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sive plan fulfillment. Such a mode of management was necessitated by the growing complexity of production processes. Johannes Thamm, a leading academic figure in the area of enterprise economics, stressed that the concept of collective consultation did not imply that BPO secretaries were free to usurp the functions of technical experts, let alone those of managers. Party secretaries were to coordinate their activities with those of management so as to futher the struggle to fulfill *all* components of the plan.[37]

When one turns from an examination of theoretical principles to a study of the actual behavioral tendencies of these economic and political officials, however, a somewhat different image emerges. In reality, managers, party secretaries, and plant union officials often failed to satisfy central party elite expectations or the precepts of the party statute. Although excessive interference on the part of the SED official in technical plant matters was one source of such dissatisfaction, a far more frequent and significant problem concerned the subordination of the individual responsibility of the manager to the notion of collective consultation and the practice of collective decision making.

It is clear from a reading of the party statutes and the comments by top party figures and administrative theorists that the regime leaders desired a close, cooperative relationship between party officials and economic officials. The concept of collective consultation, however, was exaggerated to the extent that *all* significant decisions were arrived at collectively. In many firms, collective consultation had become institutionalized. Moreover, according to a study published in 1958, "in many cases the party secretary and the chairman of the enterprise union executive [were] considered *part* of the management collective."[38]

Party leaders feared this development. There was a distinct danger that SED secretaries would identify with the business world view of managers to an excessive degree. Concomitantly, there was the strong probability that the implementation of certain policies or aspects of policies that were unpopular with management would not be subject to rigid supervision. The party leadership was particularly sensitive to this implicit threat in the areas of industrial rationalization and innovation, especially so once Ulbricht announced the onset of an economic race with the Federal Republic.

Party elite concerns in this regard were well-founded. Procrastination, superficiality, and carelessness characterized the implementation of measures designed to promote innovation and rationalization on the basis of internal reserves of enterprises. At least some prominent party figures interpreted persistent reports of delays and failures in carrying out the innovator movement, product standardization, and the TOM/PNT programs as manifestations of inadequate party

[37] "Der Einzelne und die Macht des Kollektivs" [The individual and the power of the collective], *Die Wirtschaft*, 20 March 1958.

[38] Sigfreid Boehm, "Gibt es eine Werkleitung?" [Is there such a thing as factory management?], *Die Wirtschaft*, 28 May 1958 (emphasis added).

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work. A top economic expert in the CC, Guenther Mittag, admitted this in the following way: "the greatest progress in the implementation of these policies [aimed at scientific-technical advance] occurs where the party stands at the forefront. [However] the relative indifference . . . and poor work methods and organization of supervising party organs . . . towards such measures [have made] the prospect of the success of these measures questionable." Erich Apel went so far as to complain of "staged factory assemblies" and meaningless "bloated statistics" concerning research collectives, the innovator movement, and the PNT. Group discussions and mobilization drives directed by the BPO were "tolerated" by the management group, but typically they had little discernable effect on plant operations. Apel pointedly remarked that "such inadequacies are practically equivalent to the violation of party directives. Party organs *must cease* tolerating such behavior."[39]

Many BPOs sided with management staff in conflicts with central planners over individual measures in such areas as promoting technical innovation, meeting top international product standards, standardizing production, and increasing productivity. Party secretaries would routinely attempt to increase factor allocations and to win state subsidies for rationalization and innovation efforts undertaken at their plants. A salient aspect of the leadership's drive to promote scientific-technical progress was, as noted previously, to accomplish this innovation and rationalization on the basis of *existing* reserves in industry. In light of the response of significant numbers of BPO secretaries to this objective, G. Mittag bluntly asserted that "while some party organizations have recognized that they must play a crucial role in the struggle for modernization, a close examination of data concerning concrete policy execution reveals, clearly, that a number of fundamental issues exist and that these are of a political nature."[40]

Particularly illustrative examples of such fundamental political issues were revealed at the Leipzig Conference of Managers and Trust Directors of the Machine Industry, held in January 1962. The keynote address was delivered by the CC apparatus's section chief for machine building and metallurgy, F. Brock. Brock stressed the political significance of the economic race with West Germany and the strategic importance of the machine industry in this competition. He noted that the branch had not, on the whole, met the needs of the GDR for ever-greater production of top-quality heavy and light machinery. Brock went on to state that "it is our opinion that an essential cause of the deficiencies in management is the fact that some VEB [state firm] managers and VVB directors have not studied party directives [pertaining to standardization and quality control] carefully enough." Moreover, Brock asserted that "instances of violations

[39] Gunther Mittag, *Aufgaben und Methoden der Parteiarbeit in der Industrie. Der Parteiarbeiter* [Tasks and methods of party work in industry. The party worker] (Berlin, 1960), pp. 14–15, 24; Erich Apel, "Rentabilitaet—wichtiger Gradmesser der Qualitaet der Leitung" [Profitability—an important measurement of the quality of management], *Neues Deutschland*, 3 September 1960, p. 3 (emphasis added).

[40] Mittag, *Aufgaben*, p. 23.

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of state order and discipline and principles of socialist leadership . . . have long existed . . . and have been tolerated by directors of VVB, enterprise party secretaries and their superiors." For example, on the basis of advice from the State Research Council, the CC announced at its Eighth Plenum in 1960 its desire to see farm tractor engines standardized. Brock observed that the advantages for the branch and the national economy should have been clear to all managers. Yet when central party and government experts met with representatives from engine-producing plants to iron out a concrete plan of action, the "national interest" was clearly *not* foremost on the minds of the producers. Indeed, "instead of concentrating on the tasks [set down by the CC] representatives of the individual firms attempted to promote their own interest, of their own managers' view of what was best. Every one of the representatives attempted to prove that a continuation of their current production line was the best thing to do." Furthermore, Brock alleged, enterprise managers used a variety of tactics to postpone the standardization program. One such maneuver consisted of "purposely establishing impossibly high technical standards in research and development reports so as to make it appear virtually futile to anticipate product-line transformation in a reasonably short period of time." In some instances, enterprise managers simply ignored repeated directives to carry out analyses of plant operations that would clarify the issues involved in product standardization. Because "strict, proper political administration and supervision by the party organs and VVB [was] non-existent . . . those responsible for the previous delays are only just now being held to account for their behavior."[41]

Clearly, all of this manifested "great political irresponsibility" on the part of party officials, managers, and VVB functionaries. The Politburo raised similar complaints concerning the economic activities of territorial party executives. A central theme in the May 1960 meeting of the Politburo with first secretaries of district, county, and municipal SED organizations and chairmen of local state councils was that the measures aimed at furthering scientific-technical advance were typically treated in a formalistic way. Many leading cadres in SED units were "so preoccupied with narrow, production problems" confronting management that they were incapable of addressing broader political-economic questions. Of course the drive to mobilize and deploy WTI and innovative workers in the struggle to promote innovation and the economic competition with West Germany was such an issue. Nevertheless, as was noted at the meeting, in this area "comrades speak often enough of movements for innovation and rationalization, . . . they provide superiors with statistics showing great numbers of workers have been mobilized for these campaigns, [and] they engage in a good deal of rhetorical agitation, but they fail to take adequate, practical steps to ensure the execution of party policy. . . . The serious deficiencies in state and

[41] F. Brock, "An die Adresse einiger Leiter" [On the speeches of some managers], *Die Wirtschaft*, 31 January 1962, p. 7.

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economic official managerial behavior is in good measure attributable to the fact that party organizations *neglect their responsibility for political supervision and leadership in the execution of party policy*."[42]

It is apparent that SED organizations with economic supervisory responsibilities were deeply involved with economic problems. It is just as apparent that executive party bureaucrats were, like enterprise managers and VVB directors, concerned lest the drives associated with innovation and scientific advance create impossible obstacles for producers trying to meet output norms and deadlines. It should be noted within this context that by the middle of 1960 the GDR was in the midst of a serious industrial slowdown, one that would last for a few years.[43] Party leaders were pressing for technical innovations and rationalization at a time when many producers found it extremely difficult to meet output targets. This innovation and rationalization were to be achieved in addition to—but not at the expense of—attainment of output goals. Consequently, many party executives harmonized their actions with management. They perfunctorily carried out the struggle for scientific advance, but in effect failed to exercise rigid supervision in this area of economic policy.

Conclusion

A number of tentative conclusions may be drawn from this examination of the implementation process in the GDR. First, the execution of the party elite's policy toward the struggle for scientific-technical advance in industry was a far more complicated, conflict-ridden affair than envisioned in the modified totalitarianism model. As has been observed, the means by which the party line was to be implemented included various mobilizational campaigns and limited organizational reform. These measures were met by obstacles of either an organizational or ideological nature in the academic research community and in the economic and political hierarchies. The frequency of reports pertaining to

[42] A. Neumann, "Die Politische und Erziehungsarbeit der Partei zur Durchfuehrung der oekonomischen, politischen und kulturellen Aufgaben" [The political and educational work of the party in the implementation of economic, political, and cultural tasks], in *Referat auf der Beratung des Politiburos mit den 1. Sekretaeren der Bezirke -und Kreisleitungen und den Vorstizenden der Raete der Bezirke und Kreise, 23-24 Mai, 1960* [Report at the advisory meeting between the Politburo and first secretaries of district and county party executives, and the chairmen of the district and county State Councils, 23-24 May 1960] (Berlin:Central Committee of the SED, 1960), pp. 3-7, 9, 11, 13, 21 (emphasis added). Clearly these topics were extremely sensitive, and the publications circulated at this conference were to be treated as strictly confidential. It should be noted that the cover page of Neumann's lecture carried a secret/restricted classification. This source was apparently smuggled to the West.

[43] The growth rate in the GDR's "total social product" fell in 1960 to 6 percent (from 12 percent in 1959), and still further to 4 percent in 1961 and 1962. See Peter Mitzscherling et al., *DDR Wirtschaft: Eine Bestandaufnahme* [The GDR economy: An assessment] (Berlin: Duncker and Humbolt, 1974), pp. 61-62.

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such impediments to policy execution suggests that *informal* (but not ineffective) *opposition* to the party line was characteristic of the implementation process.

Second, it is clear that regional and economic-unit party secretaries often manifested a conservative attitude toward the TOM, PNT and innovator movements. Such conservatism, however, was not at all restricted to party bureaucrats. On the contrary, the evidence undermines the presumption that state economic officials and enterprise managers constituted a fairly unified force for the application of advanced technology and economic rationalization. Indeed, it seems that it is not an especially useful practice to apply such conditioning adjectives as pragmatic, progressive, or scientifically oriented to such undifferentiated categories as economic managers or state administrators. Likewise it may be altogether misleading to speak of the party's interest in a particular policy episode, or to paint, as it were, all party bureaucrats with the same brush. It must be recognized, for example, that the complaint of the party secretary at a technical college concerning the lack of enthusiasm of economic managers for scholarly investigations of their problems in implementing measures aimed at increasing plant innovation and reducing real costs was an implicit criticism of fellow SED secretaries in BPOs and of territorial executives.

Third, one must carefully distinguish between the prerequisites of behavior of various sorts of personnel (for example, enterprise manager, BPO secretary) as established in *formal* Communist administrative theory and the actual patterns of behavior that may be observed (directly or indirectly) in any particular policy field. For example, subordinate SED units were required to present to superiors regular standardized reports on the state of plan fulfillment and economic activity in their area of supervision. This investigation indicates that BPO shortcomings in the supervision of innovator movements and other related programs were either ignored or embellished by territorial executives. Territorial (and VVB) secretaries may have been directly or implicitly involved in a cover up of BPO inadequacies. Alternatively, one may conclude that in the practical world in industrial economics, the principle of democratic centralism may be subject to varying and possibly conflicting interpretations by party officials at different levels of the party apparatus.

Finally, the image of the SED during the 1953–1963 period as a bastion of monolithic Stalinism was distorted. In the economic realm, at least, the party was not a "political army" marching and acting exclusively on command from the party central elite. The monopoly of this elite over the party apparatus was not enough to ensure its domination of the implementation process of its WTI/technical-innovation policy: party policy did encounter obstacles and covert opposition in *both* the economic and the political hierarchies. Within this context, it appears that the limited pluralism paradigm reflects economic policy implementation processes in the GDR far more accurately than does the modified totalitarianism model. This conclusion holds true with respect to the participation of field actors in the policy process following the formal announcement of the party line, and with respect to the nature of the relationship

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between party bureaucrats and state or economic and technical specialists. Indeed, the evidence herein suggests a situation contrary to the assumption, so prevalent in Western literature on Communist systems, that a classic conflict exists between *apparatchiki* and economic officials. Certainly, conflict existed in the GDR economy. Fundamentally, however, the conflict was between those who, for whatever reasons, perceived themselves as promotors of a grand scheme of innovation and modernization and those who were preoccupied with the seemingly mundane task of meeting production quotas under difficult circumstances. Clearly, divergent material and professional interests and competing claims on the time and energy of managerial and political personnel rendered the principle of democratic centralism far more ambiguous than a reading of Marxist-Leninist classics—or of modified totalitarianism conjectures—would suggest.*

* This article is drawn from portions of my doctoral dissertation, "Policy and Decision-Making Processes in an Industrially Advanced Communist System: The Case of the Economic Policy Realm in East Germany (GDR), 1953–63," University of Toronto, 1978, under the supervision of H. Gordon Skilling.

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Ethnic Peripheries Versus Ethnic Cores: Jewish Political Strategies in Interwar Poland

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD

This article is intended as an interpretive study, based on secondary rather than primary research. It seeks to analyze and assess the political options and choices that were perceived as available and feasible by the leadership of the Jewish community of interwar Poland. This community was at that time one of several ethnic minorities in a multiethnic state newly restored to political sovereignty and independence at the close of World War I and passing through a particularly difficult phase in its political consolidation and socioeconomic development. Though the following analysis is a case study of a particular historical situation, the dilemmas confronted by Polish Jewry and by the Polish host-government during the interwar period may be relevant for multiethnic states undergoing similar "state-building" or "nation-building" strains today.

More specifically, the case of interwar Poland belongs to the pattern of multiethnic states characterized by a dominant central ethnic core (in this case the Poles) vis-à-vis an aggregation of several peripheral ethnic segments (here Belorussians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Jews).[1] In this pattern the core views itself as the historic, institutional, and symbolic creator, and hence appropriate hegemon, of the state, while the leaders of each of the peripheral minority segments must decide whether to pursue their respective group's goals and protect its interests through an alliance with the other minority segments or through

[1] "Core" and "periphery" may be, but need not be, understood in a geographical sense.

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a separate bilateral arrangement with the dominant core's ruling elite. This choice may entail serious dilemmas of political strategy selection. For example, some Scottish nationalist leaders today propose cooperation with the Welsh to apply leverage on London, while others recommend negotiating a bilateral arrangement with the English, as one "historic kingdom" with another. In Canada, moreover, the Francophone Quebecois have emphatically—and understandably—chosen the second strategy by insisting that they are one of the two "founding nations" (the other being "the British") who should renegotiate on a one-to-one basis the country's political structure. To share this political niche with other ethnic groups such as Canada's Ukrainians, Poles, Italians, Jews, Germans, Inuits, Amerindians, and others, would—the Quebecois fear—gratuitously dilute their own historico-moral status. Alternatively, Jewish activists in the Soviet Union ponder whether to ally themselves with other ethnic and political dissidents in a joint effort to restructure the Russian-dominated Soviet system, or to extract the core regime's assent to their own group's emigration only. In both interwar and contemporary Yugoslavia, again, Croatian leaders have ruminated whether to organize a broad ethnic coalition to restrain real or alleged Serbian hegemony or to bid for bilateral balance with the core Serbs. American ethnic groups confront analogous quandaries. In turn, of course, these strategic dilemmas of the subordinate (or self-perceived as subordinate) peripheral ethnic minorities open up opportunities for maneuvering to the leaders of the dominant core who may thus neutralize an incipient coalition of minorities by satisfying some of its prospective members at the expense of others. The dialectics of these several dilemmas and opportunities, options, and choices will now be probed in the case of Jewish-Polish relations in interwar Poland.

Early Polish-Jewish Relations

It is conventionally, but erroneously, assumed that Polish-Jewish relations were chronically bad throughout the seven centuries of their symbiotic and shared history in Poland. But medieval and early modern Poland—that is, the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, before its partition in the second half of the eighteenth century—was for long Europe's most hospitable state to Jews, the country where normative Ashkenazic Jewish culture developed and flourished, to become Judaism's intellectual and demographic center of gravity. Here Talmudic scholarship reached its apogee; here, too, Hassidism, a spiritual-mystical innovation complementary to rabbinic scholarship, was born; and here Jewish communal self-government, with an autonomous system of educational, judicial, fiscal, and social institutions, reached the highest elaboration ever attained by European Jewry.

It is implausible to enumerate and to celebrate such achievements and successes by the Jewish community of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth without acknowledging due credit to the host society. During the high and late

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middle ages and in the early modern era—that is, until deep into the seventeenth century—old Poland was Europe's most latitudinarian and tolerant state in matters of religion. It was a home for a wide spectrum of Christian denominations and non-Christian religions, and a place of refuge for religious dissenters and minorities from all over Europe—including Jews—at a time when most other European states and societies were insisting on religious exclusivity and uniformity and were convulsed by religious wars and persecutions.

The main reason for this openness was that the dominant legal and political class of old Poland, the *szlachta* or nobility, was engaged in a sustained (and ultimately successful) contest to preserve its hegemony against both the Crown and the Polish bourgeoisie. To maintain its internal political cohesion in this struggle, the *szlachta* de-emphasized religious, linguistic, or ethnic tests and criteria. Its members might be Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Uniate, Calvinist, Lutheran, or Unitarian and might be of Polish, Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, or even Tatar provenance. What united them was their opposition to any emulation in their country of the late medieval West European developmental pattern whereby the nobility was legally curbed and politically defeated by an alliance between the centralizing, rationalizing monarchy and the nascent urban bourgeoisie. To the extent that certain bourgeois commercial and artisanal functions could not be dispensed with, the Polish nobility preferred them to be conducted by immigrant foreigners, that is, by German and Jewish colonists and immigrants, rather than by native Polish burghers, since the former were less likely than the latter to challenge the *szlachta*'s monopoly of political power in the state.

> Jews soon became active and valued partners of this nobility in many enterprises. . . . The interests of the Jews and Polish magnates coincided and complemented each other in one most important aspect of the economic and social activity of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility. On their huge estates the nobles began to establish and encourage the development of new townships, creating a network of "private towns." Because of the nature of their relationship with their own peasant population they were keen to attract settlers from afar, and Jews well suited their plans. The tempo and scale of expansion were great. . . . For their part, the Jews, who were hard pressed by the enmity of the populace in the old royal cities, gladly moved to places where they sometimes became the majority, in some cases even the whole, of the population. . . . Through charters granted by kings and magnates to communities and settlers in these new towns, the real legal status of the Jews gradually changed very much for the better. By the second half of the 17th century everywhere in Poland Jews had become part of the "third estate" and in some places and in some respects the only one.[2]

The *szlachta* itself, of course, disdained as beneath its social dignity and status those bourgeois economic activities that it funneled toward the Jews as a productive, yet politically unthreatening, group to perform them. In other

[2] *Encyclopedia Judaica,* s.v. "Poland" (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Jerusalem Ltd., 1972), XIII, columns 723, 725.

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words, the Polish nobility wished to benefit from the increasing opportunities to export agricultural products to the West, to develop processing industries, and to commercialize its estates; yet it lacked the requisite interest, skills, and ethos to undertake these activities itself and instead leased them out to the Jews. The traditional overrepresentation of Jews in Polish commerce, trade, and artisanal activities—an overrepresentation that persisted throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries—was thus in its historic origins as much a product of Polish abstention as of the Jews' own inclinations.

The traditional benign symbiosis between the Jewish community and the host society began to sour in the eighteenth century and became quite frictional in the nineteenth. In the last decades before its partition, the old Commonwealth sought to stem and reverse its decline by focusing public solidarity on Roman Catholicism as the national ideological consolidating "cement" of the society. Not only Jews, but also Protestant and Eastern Orthodox believers were alienated. There is a terrible irony here in the timing, or, rather, mistiming, of old Poland's public policy toward religion: this policy had been exceptionally latitudinarian and tolerant in the Reformation-Counterreformation era, when most other European states had adopted stances of religious exclusivity and persecution of dissenters, and now it turned illiberal precisely when the rest of Europe was shifting toward the more tolerant values of the Enlightenment. As a result of tnis aberrant, out-of-phase sequence, Polish society's earlier, admirable yet quixotic virtue of religious and ethnic toleration went largely uncredited and Poland entered the modern era with a reputation for benighted bigotry that was exploited to rationalize and justify its partition at the hands of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Then, during the second half of the nineteenth century, when Polish society was seeking to modernize and revitalize itself despite the political and legal travails of being partitioned among three empires, the symbiosis between that society and its still very numerous Jewish minority was further irritated by the belated rise of a Polish bourgeoisie that challenged the traditional Jewish near-monopoly of urban "third estate" roles and positions that had survived from the old Commonwealth. To the extent that the Tsarist regimes of Alexander III (1881–1894) and Nicholas II (1894–1917) systematically eliminated Poles from governmental administrative posts in the Russian sector—the largest—of partitioned Poland, they propelled ever more members of the Polish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia toward private-sector economic and professional careers where they found themselves in competition with established Jews. By this time, the Jews were employing the strategy of high turnover and low profit margins—a strategy that benefited in principle both the consumer and the economy as a whole, but hampered the younger and less experienced Polish bourgeoisie which found it extremely difficult to compete by purely economic means and devices.[3]

[3] Pawel Korzec, "Antisemitism in Poland as an Intellectual, Social, and Political Movement," in *Studies in Polish Jewry 1919–1939*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman (New York: Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1974), p. 21.

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The stage was thus set for the Polish bourgeoisie's demands of the interwar era that the newly restored Polish state use political and administrative measures to break the "alien" Jewish "stranglehold" over the commercial, industrial, and artisanal sectors of the state's economy.

Polish Sovereignty and the Minority Problem

Political life in the restored Polish state after 1918 was heavily colored by a craving to avoid repeating the errors that had weakened the old Commonwealth. There was, however, no unanimity in identifying and defining those errors. Did historic Poland's mistake lie in its early hospitality toward a wide spectrum of religious beliefs and practices in an age when national and state consolidation had been closely identified with a particular religion, or in subsequently having alienated its Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, and Jewish subjects through Roman Catholic exclusivity? Had the old Commonwealth been too generous or too restrictive toward its non-Polish ethnic segments? Had its quasi-federalistic and decentralistic constitutional arrangements been a virtue or a blunder? Interwar political and ideological stances were heavily influenced by the virtually universal Polish awareness of such problems of historical interpretation, of their contemporary political relevance, and of their ambiguity. By and large, the political parties of the Right and Center interpreted Polish history as validating their preference for an ethnically, religiously, and linguistically homogeneous modern society with a centralistic state apparatus, while the Left and the Pilsudskist movement, supported in part by the ethnic minorities, read that same history as a prescription for multiethnic pluralism and political federalism.

In the end, Poland's policy fell between the two stools of these discrepant historical interpretations and political-ideological visions. Capitalizing on the momentary postwar and postrevolutionary weakness of Germany and the Soviet Union, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski's military efforts managed to carve out for the restored Polish state frontiers that incorporated extensive territories of a non-Polish ethnic complexion. Simultaneously, however, the Right and Center, which were determined that this time Poles alone be masters in the restored state, gave the country a highly centralistic constitution and suffused its administration and its domestic policies with a generally xenophobic character such as to alienate the large non-Polish ethnic minorities, who constituted almost one-third of the population. Thus there developed a poor fit between the country's ethnic profile and its political structure. On the one hand, interwar Poland's frontiers and ethnic demography implied constitutional federalism and segmental pluralism; on the other hand, its actual constitutional and political processes implied an integrated all-Polish nation-state. But neither of these implicit conditions were realized in fact.

Of the four important ethnic minorities, the Belorussians and Ukrainians were as overwhelmingly agricultural and rural in social structure as the Jews were commercial, industrial, and urban. The Germans were mixed. While the

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three Christian minorities initially enjoyed the patronage of neighboring powers of their own ethnicity and could, in theory, anticipate realizing their ethnonational aspirations through yet another truncation or even partition of the Polish state (setting aside for the moment Stalin's own hostility toward Ukrainian nationalism), the Jews' political dilemma was more problematic. Lacking a contiguous "mother country" into which to be "redeemed," they had no clear ethnic-group interest in another territorial fragmentation of Poland. Hence their political stances oscillated between the posture of general ethnic-minority solidarity against Polish hegemonial chauvinism on the one hand and efforts to come to a bilateral arrangement with the dominant Poles on the other—an arrangement in which the Jewish leaders hoped to exchange their endorsement of Poland's territorial and political integrity and of its government in return for special recognition of their particular cultural and educational needs. A third hypothetical alternative was a Jewish alliance with the Polish Left. But as rightist ideology permeated Polish society ever more deeply and successive governments more or less reluctantly acceded to popular, especially middle-class, anti-Semitism and rebuffed Jewish overtures for an authentic accommodation, more and more Jews felt that modern Poland had ceased to be a country in which their individual and ethnic-group aspirations could be realized with dignity. Alas, however, the possibility of large-scale emigration to both the United States and Palestine was drastically restricted by interwar American legislation and British policy.

Oscillating Jewish Political Strategies in the Parliamentary Era

Already at the moment of Poland's rebirth, the Jews had been caught in a cross fire of Polish, Ukrainian, Bolshevik, and White Russian armies and armed bands. Frontiers were still indeterminate, the military fronts were fluid, destruction of property was widespread, and pogroms were frequent. The years 1919 and 1920 were traumatic for East European Jewry. In response, Jewish delegations and spokesmen from many countries and communities played a leading role in persuading the Paris Peace Conference to impose on Poland (and other East Central European "successor states" to the defeated Habsburg Empire) the Minorities Protection Treaty of 1919, which was intended to guarantee the legal equality as well as the civil and political rights of the ethnic minorities. But this Jewish effort proved counterproductive. The Poles detested this treaty as implicitly denigrating their new state's sovereignty, and they blamed the Jews for instigating it (even though it was to be Weimar Germany that would exploit the treaty to put Poland chronically in the dock of international public opinion on behalf of Poland's German—not its Jewish—minority). Furthermore, the League of Nations lacked the power to enforce the treaty. Thus, the Jews bore the brunt of the Poles' resentment, yet received no effective protection from this treaty.

Developments within Poland's new Constituent Assembly also roiled Jewish-Polish relations during the years 1919–1921. The effectiveness of this body as a

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potential vehicle for interethnic reconciliation was seriously compromised from the start because its election was confined to areas under Polish control at the beginning of 1919, and was later extended, on a staggered schedule, to include the ex-Prussian provinces and some northeastern localities. Thus the large Belorussian and Ukrainian minorities of the east, whose incorporation into Poland was not settled until 1921, were unrepresented in the drafting of the constitution. And as the seven German deputies decided on a posture of relative passivity in the initial aftermath of Germany's recent defeat, the eleven Jewish deputies were left as the only vocal ethnic minority in the 432-member Constituent Assembly. They decided—with more valor than prudence—to defend all minority interests across the board, as well as specifically Jewish ones. This stance enabled the Polish Right to allege both that the complicated ethnic problems of restored Poland were, in reality, simply a Jewish problem and that the Jews were inherently and incorrigibly disloyal to the state. Such allegations, moreover, were superimposed on the charge that at the Paris Peace Conference international Jewry was organizing a grand conspiracy to defame Poland and cripple its sovereignty.

On an issue of specifically Jewish interest, the Jewish deputies clashed with all Polish ideological and partisan wings—Right, Center, and Left—over legislation requiring that Sunday be universally observed as a compulsory day of rest, even by Jews whose own religion required that Saturday be kept as the Sabbath-day. In vain did the Jewish deputies argue that such legislation was injurious not only to the Jewish artisan, shopkeeper, and peddler, but also to the non-Jewish peasant since in the countryside the Sunday market was a major locus and institution of economic interaction. The compulsory Sunday rest law was in fact passed, but proved difficult to enforce and gave rise to extensive corruption among officials responsible for its implementation. Like the Minorities Protection Treaty, it fueled a generalized feeling of reciprocal Polish-Jewish ill-will and suspicion of each other's political good faith.

The electoral law that the Constituent Assembly adopted for regular parliamentary elections also irritated relations between the Poles and the ethnic minorities. Though it provided for universal, secret, direct, equal, and proportional suffrage, its detailed regulations favored large parties over small ones, hampered the electoral effectiveness of territorially scattered groups, such as the Germans and the Jews, and enlarged the size of electoral districts in the eastern areas, hence requiring more Belorussian and Ukrainian votes to elect a deputy or senator than Polish votes in the regions of Polish demographic concentration.

These and many other disappointments with political developments in the early years of the interwar republic prompted the Warsaw Zionist leader Yitzhak Gruenbaum to take the lead in organizing a Minorities Bloc to present a collective list of candidates in Poland's first general parliamentary elections (*Sejm* [lower house] and Senate), scheduled for November 1922. He hoped that such a bloc of the four major ethnic minorities, which constituted over 30 percent of the country's population, might hold the political balance in a parlia-

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ment in which the Polish national representatives would be split among right, center, and left ideological phalanxes (and among several parties within each phalanx). Even more ambitiously, Gruenbaum hoped thereby to force the transformation of the official, public image of Poland from a Polish nation-state with ethnic minorities into a state of several publicly recognized autonomous nationalities.

Gruenbaum's initiative was controversial among Polish Jews and, predictably, provoked bitterness among Poles. The Jews of Galicia in the south, whose prewar political experience as subjects of the Habsburg Empire had conditioned them toward a stance of pragmatic "accommodationism" vis-à-vis governments, and who tended to perceive Jewish interests as being even more jeopardized by Ukrainian than by Polish political and socioeconomic aspirations, rejected it. So did the Jewish Socialist Bund, which yearned for more revolutionary partners and saw as little reason to select bourgeois parties of ethnic-minority provenance as Polish ones in the search for suitable electoral and political allies. Nevertheless, despite such resistance and misgivings, and despite the objective difficulty that the four minority communities differed vastly in their socioeconomic profiles, interests, and aspirations, the energetic and confident Gruenbaum (assisted by the German deputy Erwin Hasbach) did forge the Minorities Bloc. Though he was careful to announce that his General Zionists and the other Jewish parties entering the Bloc accepted the Polish state and did not endorse the secessionist preferences of certain Belorussian and Ukrainian factions, this did not assuage Polish outrage over Gruenbaum's initiative.

Furthermore, the results of these parliamentary elections of November 1922 failed to give the Minorities Bloc that decisive, pivotal balance for which Gruenbaum had hoped and on which his strategy had been premised. While the Minorities Bloc won 89 out of 444 seats in the *Sejm*, the lower but more powerful house of parliament, and 27 out of 111 seats in the Senate (numbers that were proportionately less than the ethnic minorities' nearly one-third of the total population), the Polish Right emerged with 169 *Sejm* and 47 Senate seats, the Polish Center with 88 and 20 seats, and the Polish Left with 94 and 15 seats, respectively; 4 deputies and 2 senators were elected on miscellaneous lists. The Polish Right and Center soon formed a working coalition that either constituted the governments or provided the necessary parliamentary support for formally nonpartisan cabinets of experts for most of the next three-and-a-half years, until Pilsudski's coup d'état of May 1926.[4] And even the Polish Left was not eager to be politically identified with the ethnic minorities. Hence Gruenbaum's hopes of pivotal leverage for the Minorities Bloc proved abortive.

One further Jewish political liability was incurred as a result of the 1922 elections. While the Belorussians and Ukrainians in the districts that came to Poland from the former Tsarist empire participated on the Minorities Bloc list, the Ukrainians of eastern Galicia (formerly under the Habsburg Empire) ab-

[4] Joseph Rothschild, *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), chap. 1.

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stained from the election altogether. This produced a relative Jewish overrepresentation among the Bloc's deputies and senators and thus provided further grist for the mills of those resentful Poles who wished to depict the entire experiment in ethnic-minority solidarity as basically and simply a Jewish plot against Poland's national integrity. Finally, the Minorities Bloc was less cohesive than Gruenbaum's strategy required as its Belorussian and Ukrainian partners occasionally voted in support of some of the all-Polish governments of the years 1922 to 1926.

As a result of these several developments and disappointments, Jewish political figures who were less doctrinaire (he would have said less principled) than Gruenbaum began to question the validity of his strategy and to emphasize its grave risks. They argued that he was at least premature and possibly wrong in insisting that the Polish governing elite was irredeemably anti-Semitic; indeed, that his dogmatic insistence on that judgment, linked, as it was, to his alliance with potentially secessionist ethnic minorities, risked transforming it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. They suggested, instead, that the Polish elite was sufficiently rational to appreciate its own (and Poland's) stake in a modus vivendi with the country's large, literate, urban, and productive Jewish community.

The pacesetters of this challenge to Gruenbaum were the Galician Zionist leaders Leon Reich and Osias Thon who were historically and politically preconditioned somewhat by their earlier experiences in the Habsburg Empire toward negotiating pragmatic bargains with governments and toward fearing Ukrainian aspirations as incompatible with Jewish interests. They were now also propelled by the urge to find relief for the Jewish population from the government's anti-urban taxation policies, which were inflicting severe hardship on the Jews. Simultaneously with this Galician pressure within the Jewish camp for an accommodation, the Polish government of the day (1924–1925) was persuading itself that its quest for much-needed international loans and for a renewable seat on the Council of the League of Nations would be facilitated by a reconciliation with Polish Jewry, whose coreligionists in the West were believed to carry much political and financial influence. Thus the political trends of the moment within both the Jewish and the Polish leaderships were temporarily on convergent tracks, though the Polish and Jewish general populations remained mutually suspicious. The upshot was the so-called *Ugoda* (compromise, agreement) of 4 July 1925, negotiated between Reich and Thon on the one side, and Minister of Cults and Education Stanislaw Grabski and Foreign Minister Aleksander Skrzynski on the other.

The *Ugoda* consisted of forty-two points, only twelve of which were ever acknowledged by the Polish side. In the twelve published clauses, the Jewish signatories committed their constituency to the inviolability of Poland's frontiers, to the defense of the state's interests in the international arena, and to Poland's internal consolidation—an implicit repudiation of the previous strategy of the Minorities Bloc. The Polish signatories, in turn, endorsed the democratic reorganization of Jewish communal bodies (*kehilloth*) in Galicia and the eastern border areas, allowed all such communal boards throughout the

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country to conduct their affairs in Hebrew or Yiddish rather than in Polish, gave official recognition to Jewish schools (*kheidarim*), thereby rendering them formally eligible for state subventions (which did not, however, materialize in practice), and agreed to authorize arrangements enabling Jewish children in state schools and Jewish soldiers in the armed forces to observe religious Sabbath restrictions and obligations.

The Jewish community perceived these Polish commitments as a mere pittance, barely scratching the surface of Jewish political and socioeconomic grievances against the regime's sustained hostility toward Jewish interests in the realms of taxation, credit, investment, administration, access to higher education, and ethnocommunal development. Worse yet, the Polish Right immediately denounced even these minimal concessions granted by the Polish negotiators as excessively lenient and generous, and the regime failed to stand up to this assault. When the dust settled, the *Ugoda* emerged as having "perfumed" Poland in the corridors of American and British financial and political power (as well as at the League of Nations in Geneva), where Polish diplomats fostered the impression that the Jewish problem was being solved, but as having brought no substantial improvement in the lot of Polish Jewry at home. Reich and Thon were repudiated for having allegedly compromised Jewish honor without receiving any significant Polish quid pro quo and at the cost of alienating the country's other ethnic minorities. Even the belated leakage, in May 1926 by the Jewish press, of the thirty secret *Ugoda* clauses that the Polish side never acknowledged and that had promised significant economic (although neither political nor national) ameliorations for Poland's Jews could not resurrect the *Ugoda*'s repute or viability. By then it had been rendered utterly stillborn by the government's capitulation to the extreme Right's fulminations.

Polish Jewry in the Era of Pilsudski

Having failed either to organize a pivotal bloc of ethnic minorities or to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the parliamentary government, Polish Jewry seized upon a fortuitous third option created by the successful coup d'état of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski in May 1926. Pilsudski, the wartime hero of Poland's resurrection as an independent state, a prewar socialist but currently nonpartisan, was known to esteem the quasi-federalistic, latitudinarian political principles of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and to disdain the nationalistic, narrowly chauvinistic stance and style of the Polish Right and Center. Adopting a somewhat seigneurial, antiparliamentary, pro-law-and-order stance as savior of the Polish state from internal partisan corruption and moral disintegration, Pilsudski was endorsed by virtually the entire Jewish political spectrum—and most enthusiastically by that sector that most closely mirrored his own antimodernist nostalgia for the old Commonwealth, the religiously Orthodox Agudah movement.

Pilsudski and the Agudah complemented each other particularly well. Under the moral and religious leadership of the Hassidic dynasty of the Gerer Rebbe

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(the Rabbi of Gora Kalwaria), whose explicitly political lieutenants were Eliyahu Kirschbraun and Asher Mendelsohn, the Agudah genuinely preferred Poland to the more modern, more secular, neighboring societies and cultures of Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union. Analogously, it also had little use for a domestic strategy of Jewish cooperation with the other ethnic minorities, particularly since that strategy—as conducted by Gruenbaum—was essentially an open, public, parliamentary one; the Agudah preferred quiet "brokerlike" intercessions with the executive and administrative authorities on behalf of Jewish interests and petitioners, especially religious ones. Pilsudski, in turn, preferred his Jewish interlocutor to be a religious movement petitioning for particularistic concessions rather than a secular party presenting comprehensive political demands. His regime therefore facilitated the Agudah's efforts to gain control of Jewish communal organizations, their budgets, and their schools. Though the partners, the arena, the ideologies, and the mutual regards were different from those of the unhappy *Ugoda* episode of 1925, this Pilsudski-Agudah arrangement of the late 1920s was a second try at a bilateral Polish-Jewish understanding. This time the two partners were more sympathetic toward each other in spirit and each was frankly eager to use the arrangement in order to gain advantage over other political sectors in its own ethnonational camp: Pilsudski, to consolidate Jewish backing for his regime against the Polish Right, Center, and even Left; the Agudah, to steal a march on Zionist, secularist, and other Jewish political parties.[5]

Indeed, over the next few years of relative prosperity, the arrangement worked quite well. With Pilsudski's symbolic resurrection of the tolerant traditions of the old Commonwealth and his repudiation of modern ethnonational chauvinism, the "pogromist" atmosphere of the early 1920s eased. The nationalist Right was purged out of the state apparatus, though it was able to strengthen its moral-ideological grip on Polish society, especially Polish youth. Whereas Gruenbaum continued to plead for a resurrection of his strategy to form a minorities bloc, and other Jewish leaders argued that the secular Polish Left was Jewry's natural political ally, the Agudah led a substantial Jewish participation in Pilsudski's "Non-Partisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government" in the parliamentary elections of March 1928 and November 1930. Its reward was the regime's benevolent lubrication of the Agudah's drive to capture and consolidate control over the *kehilloth*. Though the number of Jewish deputies and senators elected to the legislature in 1928 and 1930 was sharply down from the figures for 1922, most Jews appeared to feel well compensated by the fact that their ethnic community now had better access to a more benevolently inclined regime than ever before in resurrected Poland.

With the laceration of Poland's economy and society by the Great Depression of the 1930s, however, this relatively promising situation deteriorated rapidly.

[5] Ezra Mendelsohn, "The Politics of Agudas Yisroel in Interwar Poland," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 2, no. 2 (1972): 52–54.

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Virulent anti-Semitism swept the Polish middle class, now increasingly under rightist influence, as the Pilsudskist regime groped toward an etatist technocratic economic policy that, while not necessarily guided by anti-Semitic ideological imperatives, was nonetheless injurious to Jewish middlemen and artisans. Experienced Jewish entrepreneurs were taxed into oblivion on behalf of clumsy state monopolies in a virtual frenzy of nationalization of the economy. On the one hand, the regime's technocratic ideologues and policymakers tended to view middlemen as unproductive and unnecessary interlopers. On the other hand, they extracted the bulk of the state's tax revenues precisely from the commercial sector of the economy. As a result, Jews, who were overrepresented in commerce and trade, paid 35 to 40 percent of Poland's taxes, though they formed only 10 percent of its population. Public-sector employment in the state apparatus, in municipal administration, and even in state-owned corporations was virtually closed to Jews, whereas approximately one-fourth of the Polish urban population was employed in the public sector by the mid-1930s.[6] More specifically, the government's policy of budgetary austerity in reaction to the Great Depression involved a curtailment of its former subventions to the Agudah's religious school system, which was in dire straits by 1933.

As long as Pilsudski remained in power, his personal authority prevented the government's slipping into explicitly anti-Semitic stances. But after his death in May 1935 his epigoni—the so-called colonels' regime—sought to stem, to outflank, and to trump the Right's burgeoning popularity and populistic radicalization by preempting some of its demagogic chauvinism.[7] Economic discrimination against Jews, including boycotts that occasionally degenerated into quasi pogroms, were now tolerated and even encouraged by both state and ecclesiastical authorities as allegedly righteous and understandable expressions of "the people's anger." Indeed, the government and the Roman Catholic hierarchy virtually sponsored an economic civil war against Poland's Jews who, though they had lived and worked in the country for centuries, were now officially depicted—in the fashionably malignant rhetoric borrowed from the Right—as aliens and parasites. And in the face of sustained violence and thuggery against Jews by rightist youths, the supposedly "strong" colonels' regime of 1935-1939 showed itself suspiciously weak in failing to curb or apprehend the culprits. Despite Poland's excruciating shortage of trained professionals, the regime permitted these rightist youths to extrude Jews from the medical and engineering faculties of the universities. It pandered to primitive demagoguery by sponsoring legislation to restrict Jewish ritual slaughter as allegedly cruel and unhealthy—a measure that particularly outraged Pilsudski's erstwhile Agudah allies. In sum, by the later 1930s the malign combination of rightist populistic anti-Semitism and governmental emulation thereof was escalating the "Jewish

[6] Simon Segal, *The New Poland and the Jews* (New York: Lee Furman, 1938), pp. 119-41.

[7] Edward D. Wynot, Jr., " 'A Necessary Cruelty': The Emergence of Official Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1936-39," *American Historical Review* 77 (October 1971): 1035-58; Emanuel Scherer, *Polska i Zydzi* [Poland and the Jews] (New York: Bund, 1942), pp. 12-16.

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question" into the central issue of Polish political discourse—and this, ironically and tragically, at precisely the time when Nazi German racial-ideological contempt for Poland and Poles was about to crystallize into military aggression.

Poles and Jews on the Eve of World War II

What was to be done by the Jews? The strategy of the Minorities Bloc had already failed in the 1920s; it certainly could not be resurrected in the late 1930s, when the hypothetical German and Ukrainian partners were working in political collusion with Nazi Germany. The *Ugoda* had proven a humiliation in the mid-1920s, even before the Polish interlocutor of the Right and Center had radicalized toward the virulent anti-Semitism of the last prewar years. And Pilsudski's epigoni had, in effect, repudiated his vision and the Jewish claim to equal citizenship for all the state's ethnic components. Were any political options left for interwar Polish Jewry? At this moment, the Jewish Socialist Bund, which had all along depreciated the three previous strategies as deplorable collusions with bourgeois and feudal forces, stepped forward and proposed the alternative image of a revolutionary transformation of Polish society through a Jewish alliance with the Left.

But this strategy, too, was by then impractical. Though the Bund did, indeed, dramatically improve its showing in municipal elections in 1938 and 1939, this electoral victory over the other Jewish parties did not really reflect any general Jewish rallying to the Bund's program, but only a yearning for some relief from the political isolation of Polish Jewry. It was more an expression of despair than of hope. Furthermore, the Polish Socialist party (PPS)—the intended gentile partner in the Bund's prospective alliance—was itself no longer seriously committed to a revolutionary transformation of Polish society. It was also quite nationalistically Polish, unfriendly to the Bund's conception of Jews as constituting a nationality rather than a denomination, and suspicious of autonomous Jewish trade unions and an autonomous Jewish-Yiddish cultural existence such as the Bund championed. The Communists, in turn, were even less plausible partners as their ranks had recently been decimated by Stalin's purges and as their identification with Poland's historic enemy, Russia, rendered them a pariah among all sectors of Polish society.

As Polish Jewry's situation became ever more precarious, the Bund's continuing commitment to the proposition that the "Jewish problem" could be solved, and a happier Jewish future could be assured, within Poland came to appear increasingly illusory and pathetic to most Jews as they scrambled desperately for opportunities to emigrate. By the years 1937 to 1939, even the anti-Zionist Agudah was urging and training its youth to leave for Palestine. Alas, the mounting, indeed desperate, Jewish pressure for emigration from Poland was baffled and stifled by the lack of immigrant havens. The overwhelming bulk of Poland's Jews was thus trapped in that country at the outbreak of World War II and subsequently murdered in the Holocaust. And Poland, the country that had

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once hosted many of Jewry's most glorious achievements, was transformed by the German Nazis into the mass killing-ground of all Europe's Jews.

One final, paradoxical, episode in interwar Polish Jewry's search for viable political options needs to be mentioned, if only as an ironic footnote to this sad tale. The colonels' regime of Pilsudski's epigoni, in its program to polonize the commercial and industrial sectors of the country's economy by "cleansing" them of Jews, also pressed for Jewish emigration. This craving to rid Poland of its supposed Jewish "burden" led the regime into an "objective" alliance with Zionism in the late 1930s. During those years the Polish Foreign Ministry energetically denounced British restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine, while the War Ministry provided secret military training, facilities, subsidies, and arms to the Haganah and IZL (*Irgun Zvai Leumi*) Zionist paramilitary organizations.[8] Thus Polish and Jewish political nationalists finally found a meeting ground for cooperation on the issue of Jewish statehood in the Holy Land. But whereas the initial medieval Polish-Jewish "marriage of convenience" had augured a glorious era in the history of both peoples and led to a true symbiosis, this clandestine cooperation of the last years of the interwar era was but a desperate gamble on the threshold of mutual tragedy.

Conclusion

This article has deliberately focused on the Jewish perspective concerning alternative strategies to ensure a cooperative and secure relationship with the dominant Polish community. Before closing, therefore, it is only proper to outline briefly the perspective of the authorities and elites of the Polish host state—a beleaguered state whose legitimacy was denied and whose very existence was challenged by powerful and predatory neighbors throughout the interwar era, and almost one-third of whose population consisted of more-or-less recalcitrant ethnic "aliens," most of whom were also not fully committed to this state. Under such circumstances, the Poles' defensive, suspicious, resentful, and aggressive attitude toward their state's ethnic minorities becomes understandable, though not necessarily justifiable. (In contrast, the remarkable tolerance of the medieval and early modern Polish nobility toward other ethnic categories and religious dissenters had surely been facilitated by the fact that this ruling elite was then securely confident in its own and its state's legitimacy and power.)

Though in the political dimension the Jews were the least "subversive" of interwar Poland's ethnic minorities—indeed, they were the only one to prefer this state over its neighbors—they were the most irritating and seemingly menacing to the Poles in the socioeconomic dimension. The vast bulk of Polish Jewry

[8] Wiktor T. Drymmer, "Zagadnienie zydowskie w Polsce w latach 1935-1939" [The Jewish question in Poland in the years 1935-1939], *Zeszyty Historyczne* [Historical notebooks] 13 (1968): 69-72.

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was culturally unassimilated, and the pattern of its economic structure was almost the reverse of the general society's. The high prominence of Jews in the developing urban economic sectors of commerce, industry, culture, and communications, and their virtual absence from agriculture, struck the Poles as provocative and even sinister. Poland's excruciatingly slow recovery from the Great Depression—which threw Polish workers, craftsmen, peasants, entrepreneurs, and intelligentsia into severe competition with the highly visible Jews for the limited supply of employment, credit, and entrepreneurial and professional opportunities—aroused real, if misplaced, anxiety that the Jews might dominate commerce and the free professions in Poland.

Even a rich and long-established state—and interwar Poland was neither—might well have been baffled by the staggering problems its ethnic minorities posed: their number, their size, their recalcitrance, their external support, and, in the eastern regions, their poverty. Interwar Poland was doubly handicapped by having to cope simultaneously with the postpartition reintegration of the long-severed parts of the Polish nation-state as it vainly sought a consistent and feasible approach toward the minority problem. Poland's search for a solution was fatefully compromised by the apparent incompatibility between its frontiers and its institutions. Pilsudski's military efforts had incorporated non-Polish ethnic groups that could not be accommodated within the domestic arrangements of the Right and Center. The Right, which by the 1930s had ideologically saturated Polish society, viewed all expressions of nationalism on the part of the minorities as treasonable acts to be stifled. Believing that the old quasi-federalistic Commonwealth had too long been suicidally indulgent toward the non-Polish and non-Catholic populations, the Right insisted that restored Poland either assimilate or expel its minorities. But these minorities were too numerous, already too conscious, and still too rooted for either of these alternatives to be practicable at that time. The minorities were simply alienated by the whole sterile paraphernalia of discriminatory devices that this program entailed: skewed census tabulation, boycott, restrictive quotas for admission to the universities and the professions, colonization, biased land reform, prejudicial tax assessment, and violence. Moreover, and finally, it must be acknowledged that thoughtful members of the Polish elite became concerned lest the specifically anti-Semitic violence of the later 1930s degenerate into a broader rightist assault on all political rivals and, indeed, on public order per se. As war clouds darkened the horizon in 1938–1939, even some government leaders indicated misgiving lest anti-Jewish excesses identify Poland with, and undermine it vis-à-vis, Nazi Germany.

Polish Jewry was thus a classic example of a "pariah" ethnic minority, performing commercial and entrepreneurial functions that are conspicuous, remunerative, important, yet socially disparaged in a setting where the host society consists of warrior nobles who disdain, and of peasants who lack the resources for, these entrepreneurial activities. In such relationships both the minority and the host society agree that the former should not assimilate or ac-

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culturate to the norms of the latter, but should preserve its distinctiveness and communal autonomy. This agreement assures corporate survival to the "pariah" minority and guarantees the feudal elite of the host society against political challenge from this "alien" entrepreneurial minority. Furthermore, the fact that such a "pariah" ethnic minority, with such specifically assigned entrepreneurial functions, is often part of a wider, international diaspora network tends to be perceived by both its hosts and by itself as an economic and cultural asset. Other examples of such "pariah" minorities that might here be cited are the Armenians in the cities of the later Ottoman Empire, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in East Africa, and Yankees in the antebellum American South. The phenomenon as a whole is probably an obsolescing one in contemporary modern conditions, for it depends on a number of now rapidly vanishing cultural and political ingredients: the "pariah" ethnic group's monopoly of mobility and entrepreneurial skills; the host society's disdain for these traits and values and for the liquid wealth that they generate as allegedly status-polluting; the "pariahs' " readiness to remain at best tolerated, but always vulnerable, alien enclaves, and so forth. These several conditions are today evanescing; hence the situation of "pariah" ethnic minorities becomes ever more precarious and fragile—in capitalist, socialist, as well as developing societies.

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The Carter Civil Service Reforms: Some Implications for Political Theory and Public Administration

MARK W. HUDDLESTON

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) marked a major departure in federal personnel policy. Not only did it institute a system of merit pay for mid-level managers, establish a Senior Executive Service (SES) for top administrators, and provide a firm statutory basis for labor relations in the federal sector, but by vesting most functions of the old bipartisan Civil Service Commission in the newly created Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the CSRA redefined the lines of authority for personnel management, placing most responsibilities squarely in the hands of presidential representatives. More remarkable than the substance of this legislation, however, was the overwhelmingly favorable reception it received (and continues to receive) from academic Public Administration. No administrative reform in recent memory has attracted such support or reflected such widespread consensus among students of governmental affairs. Indeed, in some ways the provisions of the CSRA are the premises of modern public administration, a coincidence that presents an unparalleled opportunity to examine some of the basic assumptions of the field.

In this article, I dissent from this consensus and use the CSRA to focus a discussion of the linkages between political theory and public administration. My central argument is that Public Administration's recent counsel has been, as Vincent Ostrom put it, "bad medicine," a kind of administrative malpractice

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rooted in flawed beliefs about the nature of the body politic.[1] But unlike Ostrom, I do not regard the problem as one of too little democracy in scholarly prescriptions. The problem, in fact, is more nearly the opposite: Public Administration has contributed to American governmental malaise—and to its own professional undoing—by acceding to the evaporation of meaning of the "Public" in Public Administration, an evaporation that has been hastened by the administrative practices of the Carter White House and legitimized by the democratic dogmas of the field. This is primarily an intellectual problem, and it now haunts us in the guise of the CSRA because, with a few notable exceptions, scholars have paid far too little attention to the underlying philosophy of administrative theory. What is to be the role of public administration in the modern democratic state? How much discretion should administrators be allowed in ascertaining the public good? Do close external checks on administrative behavior protect or undermine the commonweal? At a time when far-reaching changes in the structure of the public service are being consummated, these questions must be addressed directly. This article discusses two models of the relationship between administration and the state. The first, *democratic* administration, has organized the central normative assumptions for most contemporary theory and, by extension, has guided the current wave of administrative reform. Despite some strong advocates, its counterpart, *republican* administration, never took strong root in the United States, having been generally rejected in the disciplinary turmoil of the 1940s. Nonetheless, it deserves reconsideration at this time, for this approach alone provides a consistent philosophical justification for a distinctly *public* administration.

The Roots of Democratic Administration

Without resorting to caricature, it is difficult to identify a single settled position on any aspect of Public Administration. There has been widespread consensus on one very basic point, however, which may be stated as follows: in a democracy, the test of a good government is the extent to which public policy conforms to public demands; because public bureaucracy is the instrument by which demands are translated into action, administrators must be held to account for the expressed interests of the public. This is the democratic maxim. Although the mechanisms offered to achieve accountability have varied, virtually all have been designed with this principle in mind.

In the early years of the discipline, this matter of accountability was never seriously at issue. Because of the presumed disjuncture between politics and administration, there was no reason to assume that there was a conflict between political democracy and public bureaucracy. As Woodrow Wilson put it, the "discrimination between politics and administration is . . . too obvious to need

[1] Vincent Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1973), p. 5.

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further discussion."[2] This rigid distinction between politics and administration became the cornerstone of the new field of Public Administration and enabled students to direct their energies and attention away from fundamental questions in political theory and concentrate on "practical" matters.

But by the late 1940s, in the wake of a decade of attacks on this distinction and its corollary propositions by Herbert Simon, Robert Dahl, and others, the field of Public Administration was in disarray. Not only were its chief operating assumptions thrown over, but it was suggested that there could be nothing similarly neutral and "scientific" to take their place. Once the politics-administration dichotomy was exposed as myth, there could be no talk of purely administrative activities, no technical or mechanical questions apart from politics.[3]

In the face of this challenge, Public Administration could have moved in one of two major directions. First, the field could have welcomed a political role for administrators and gone about the business of designing a public service that would encourage the discharge of administrative responsibilities with a maximum of integrity and intelligence; of necessity, this would involve an adjustment in political theory in the direction of modifying the democratic maxim. Alternatively, Public Administration could have proceeded, if not by eliminating administrative discretion (for this was recognized as impossible), at least by checking it at every turn. This, in fact, was the road taken. Although the movement was by no means universal, it is fair to say that in a kind of collective acknowledgement of error, the discipline that had considered administration a thing apart from, and hence no threat to, democracy began to worry about what Alvin Gouldner termed "the metaphysical pathos of bureaucracy."[4] The search for strong external administrative controls was on.

The administrative controls proposed in the last thirty years have been so multitudinous, in fact, that only their broad outlines can be sketched here. The primary checking devices advanced by most scholars, of course, have been representative institutions. Usually, because of the executive bias of Public Administration, this has meant the presidency (or other executives in other jurisdictions), although there has been no shortage of advocates of legislative oversight.[5] For some, administrative law has proved an attractive alternative, with a consequent reliance on either close judicial supervision through the regular courts or rigid adherence by administrators to courtlike procedures in

[2] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2 (June 1887): 211.

[3] See Herbert A. Simon, "The Proverbs of Administration," *Public Administration Review* 6 (Winter 1946): 53-67; and Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems," *ibid.*, 7 (Winter 1947): 1-11.

[4] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review* 49 (June 1955): 496-507.

[5] For a brief review of some of this literature, see David R. Beam, "Public Administration Is Alive and Well—and Living in the White House," *Public Administration Review* 38 (January-February 1978): 72-77.

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their decision-making activities.[6] Occasionally proposed as supplements to these devices are extra-institutional agents, such as ombudsmen, or in some jurisdictions, of course, political parties.[7] Another accountability mechanism that has been suggested repeatedly in the literature is representative bureaucracy. The idea here is that traditional control devices have not proved adequate. Because discretion will be exercised in any event, we must assure accountability by recruiting administrators who represent, by virtue of their demographic characteristics, major social groups in the population.[8] A related strand of the literature stresses citizen participation, a perspective especially associated with the New Public Administration movement. This position maintains that direct contact between citizens and administrators must be encouraged to ensure that the bureaucracy has humane, compassionate, and client-centered values.[9] Finally, there is the body of literature that has emerged in the last few years that has labeled itself "democratic administration." Stemming generally from public choice economics, and identified particularly with Vincent Ostrom's *Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, this school insists (wrongly, I think) that most of Public Administration has been undemocratic, wedded to a Wilsonian-Weberian view of hierarchical bureaucratic organization. What is needed, according to this analysis, is the recognition that organizations may take a variety of forms, depending on the circumstances, and that opportunities for choice in the form of organization and the provision of services should be maximized "through a multiplicity of enterprises transcending the limits of particular governmental jurisdictions."[10]

It is clear that there are important differences that separate these various positions. But all of these arguments are united in their essential adherence to the democratic maxim. For the advocate of representative bureaucracy, as for the supporter of strengthened legislative oversight, administrative discretion is to be strictly controlled. Moreover, the Carter reforms, which will be discussed in more detail below, flow directly from this position. The administration's obeisance to private-sector management, as manifest in its zero-base budgeting, endless reorganizations and, not least, personnel policy, has been justified repeatedly by the need for greater accountability. This has resulted in the loss of any meaningful distinction between public and private administration, a loss

[6] Theodore Lowi makes this sort of argument in *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969). One can also consider the "standards" versus "safeguards" arguments in this context. See, for instance, F.A. Hayek, *Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1944), and Kenneth Culp David, *Discretionary Justice* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969).

[7] Donald C. Rowat, *The Ombudsman Plan: Essays on the Worldwide Spread of an Idea* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973).

[8] For a recent review of this literature, see Kenneth Meier, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 69 (June 1975): 526–42.

[9] For a selection of articles discussing this perspective, see Frank Marini, ed., *Toward a New Public Administration* (New York: Chandler, 1971).

[10] Ostrom, *Intellectual Crisis*, p. 20.

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that Public Administration, owing to its single-minded attachment to the democratic maxim, has been unable to recognize, much less to prevent.

It may be objected that this overstates the case, that adherence to the basic democratic principle of accountability has not obscured the importance of other values for students of Public Administration. Certainly, no one makes a serious case for an untrammeled democratic administration, for the concept is at bottom an oxymoron. Yet unavoidable problems do arise in the search for standards to guide the design of systems. When all relevant values are equally firmly embedded in the philosophical foundations of a field, and of the surrounding society, one may be reasonably confident that, in the inevitable conflicts that arise in the practical application of these values, a competitive balance will be maintained. Such is not the case with the principle of democratic accountability, however. There may be other values that have been considered—Herbert Kaufman, in fact, has noted the cycling of the focus of concern that has occurred throughout the history of the field, from an emphasis on representativeness to neutral competence to executive leadership—but none has the status of this one.[11] The result, therefore, has not been a simple clocklike cycle of concern, first with one value, then with another, but rather an inexorable drift to accountability, or representativeness in Kaufman's terms. All administrative reforms of any consequence in this century, from the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, through the two Hoover Commission reports to the recent Carter initiatives, have moved by this principle. And it is not hard to make the case, as Paul Van Riper has demonstrated, that the Pendelton Act and later pieces of civil-service legislation were in fact attempts to improve accountability by strengthening the hand of the executive.[12]

Neutral competence still has its advocates, to be sure. James Sundquist, for instance, recently attacked the continuing politicization of the civil service and maintained that the public administration community must return to an idea of administrative neutrality.[13] Hugh Heclo has made much the same case, as has Bernard Rosen in his defense of the now departed Civil Service Commission and its protection of merit principles.[14]

Although this return to the faith of neutral competence may signal another turn in Kaufman's cycle, it is more likely something less than that, a mere rearguard action in a battle that has been decisively, and I would argue, predictably, won by the forces of the accountability principle. Neutral competence is simply not a principle of equivalent status. It does not challenge the democratic

[11] Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," *Public Administration Review* 29 (January-February 1969): 3–15.

[12] Paul Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).

[13] James L. Sundquist, "Jimmy Carter as Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term," *Public Administration Review* 39 (January-February 1979): 3–11.

[14] Hugh Heclo, "OMB and the Presidency—the Problem of Neutral Competence," *The Public Interest*, no. 38 (Winter 1975): 80–98; and Bernard Rosen, "Merit and the President's Plan for Changing the Civil Service System," *Public Administration Review* 38 (July-August 1978): 301–4.

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maxim. At best it evades it. It attacks not the principle of accountability, but the idea that politics and administration are inseparable. This is a difficult position to maintain, however much one wishes it were true. It is too slender a reed by far to withstand the winds of democratic administration.

A stronger position exists—one that has been considered and rejected by mainstream Public Administration in the disciplinary turmoil of decades past. Yet this position, which I term republican administration, has served other Western nations well, and it may now be time for it to be rediscovered.

Toward Republican Administration

The roots of this alternative formulation of Public Administration are to be found most proximately in the writings of scholars like Carl Friedrich, Paul Appleby, and Emmette Redford.[15] I use the term republican administration because their view of Public Administration was based not simply on the value of neutral competence, but on what Redford called "a publicly-oriented or publicly-conditioned expertness."[16] Republican administration is administration in the public interest; and it is a form of administration that ultimately rests on a redefinition of the relationship between bureaucracy and the state. The premises of republican administration may be summarized as follows: in the modern state, the test of a good government is the extent to which public policy conforms to the public interest; the constituent institutions of government—especially legislatures and political executives—are usually capable of expressing the balance of private social interests, but are rarely disposed to discern the broader public interest; public bureaucracies, on the other hand, when relatively insulated from the day-to-day conflict of social groups, are well situated to temper private demands with the public interest.

The adequacy of this formulation obviously rests on two assumptions: that the concept of public interest has meaning; and that administrators may reasonably be expected to act in accord with it. Because neither proposition is self-evident, it is important to examine each in more detail.

Few questions in the study of politics are more troublesome than, "Is there a public interest?" For most contemporary political scientists, the term represents, in Frank Sorauf's phrase, a "conceptual muddle," the definition of which "lies obscured in a half-light of confusion and disagreement."[17] After lengthy and

[15] Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in *Public Policy: 1940*, eds. Freidrich and Edward Mason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940); Paul Appleby, *Policy and Administration* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1949); idem, *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952); Emmette S. Redford, *Administration of National Economic Control* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952); idem, *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1958).

[16] Redford, *Administration of National Economic Control*, p. 229.

[17] Frank J. Sorauf, "The Conceptual Muddle," in *The Public Interest: Nomos V*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 183.

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frequently acidulous analysis, Glendon Schubert goes even further and concludes that it is simply not worth looking for a definition: "Political scientists might better spend their time nurturing concepts that offer greater promise of becoming useful tools in the scientific study of politics."[18]

For those who still find the term useful, the public interest is usually equated, consistent with utilitarian theory, with some combination of private interests, an approach that seems to avoid the problem of specifying in advance some normative content to the concept. This sort of reasoning is central to "public choice" political economists, like Ostrom, whose theories of public and semipublic goods represent an economic version of the public interest rooted in "methodological individualism," with its associated axioms of self-interest, and Pareto and modified-Pareto optimality.[19] It is this view of the public interest, of course, that underlies democratic administration. And support for this position is usually accompanied by the intendedly damning observation that any alternative formulation that postulates a public interest apart from private interests assumes that a standard of valuation exists apart from that held by extant members of the political community. This cannot be, for values can be neither proved nor disproved, unless one is willing to summon the long-dead spirits of natural law.[20]

Of course, the idea of individual rights, which provides the foundation for democratic theory in non-Marxist societies, is similarly based in natural law and is no more or less subject to proof. But even putting this point aside, there are serious problems with the approach that views the public interest as the aggregate of private interests. First, it assumes that individuals will always be capable of expressing their true private interests, an assumption that does not stand an empirical test very well, as studies of political knowledge and participation indicate.[21] Second, even if individuals did know their own self-interests, however defined, and were capable of articulating them, it does not follow that the aggregate would produce a "public" interest. To make such an assertion is to assume that the community of sentient adults is coincident with "the public." Surely this is a rather narrow view. One need not be follower of Edmund Burke to recognize that society transcends active political participants and must be understood to include those members of the community who are unable to express their own interests at the present time, by reason of youth, infirmity, or having the status of one not yet born. Finally, this view of the public interest does not provide sufficient means for the realization of democratic purposes,

[18] Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 224.

[19] See Ostrom, *Intellectual Crisis*, chap. 3.

[20] Michael M. Harmon, "Administrative Policy Formulation and the Public Interest," *Public Administration Review* 29 (September-October 1969): 483–91.

[21] Whatever the recent changes in levels of political knowledge and participation, absolute levels are still very low, as survey data continue to indicate. See Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); and Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

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even in its own terms. The provision of collective goods necessarily involves some coordination of expectations among individuals. But simply because cooperation would provide more benefits than noncooperation does not mean that cooperation will be forthcoming. This is the familiar dilemma that arises in the case of common-property goods. Public choice theorists, like Ostrom, argue that this problem is usually avoided because enlightened self-interest encourages the creation of coercive authorities to protect common-property resources, such as water, where the absence of such authority would not provide incentives for voluntary cooperation. What they do not tell us is why anyone will recognize that self-interest. Advocates of this position, in other words, ignore the extent to which the definition of public goods is subject to political manipulation.[22]

These criticisms do not even begin to address underlying ethical questions. That is, even if it is not recognized by all or even most members of the voting public, the American political community is structured by certain values, such as liberty, equality, and justice, that are part of our social contract. Although their practical meanings are subject enough to dispute that they do not often guide the everyday actions of government, these values do provide ultimate ethical standards; they provide ideals around which arguments can be organized, a source of community conscience, in Gunnar Myrdal's terms.[23] These values exist independent of any one political document, such as the American Constitution. They are instead part of the American political tradition, or political culture, if you will, and are reflected in the whole range of statements of public purpose that have framed American government, from the Declaration of Independence and the *Federalist Papers* to decisions of the Supreme Court and preambles to major statutes. It is these ethical considerations that form the substantive core of the public interest and that provide a normative framework for republican administration.[24]

But why should administrators have any role in ascertaining the public interest? Why, indeed, should we expect them, once given the role, to act in accord with the public interest? The answer to the first question is obvious. There is no real choice. If politics and administration are not separable, only by eliminating administrators can the public prevent administrators from exercising policy judgments. Attempts to impose detailed external checks is simply the functional equivalent of this step, for it transfers decisions that might be made by administrators to other components of government or society.

Even if it were possible, however, through ever-increasing democratic con-

[22] For Ostrom's argument, drawn from Buchanan and Tullock, that individuals may opt for a set of initial decision rules that do not meet the criterion of Pareto efficiency, see his "Some Problems in Doing Political Theory: A Response to Golembiewski's 'Critique'," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977): 1508-16. The problem is that while this may be a "rather brilliant piece of normative analysis" (p. 1515), it does not take into account the way issues are really defined.

[23] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955).

[24] See John A. Rohr, *Ethics for Bureaucrats* (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1978).

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trols, to limit the range of administrative discretion to questions of relatively little importance, it would not be desirable to do so. Only those institutions that are fairly well buffered against popular demands can resist expedience and pursue policies consistent with the public interest. Democratic institutions respond to democratic passions. Democratic procedures encourage elected officials to define issues in ways that are agreeable to popular sentiment. When these same officials have the ability to control administrative behavior closely, the cycle is complete. The shifting and uncertain sentiments of private interests become substituted for government. In the long run, this can do no less than undermine the conditions for democracy itself, for a government that cannot govern, that cannot provide coercive authority for the common good, is of no use.

In part, this is the dilemma discussed above; strong administrative structures are necessary to guarantee that common-property goods do not become misconstrued as private goods. But beyond that, strong administrative institutions are necessary to protect the rights of political minorities and to ensure that the representatives of temporary popular majorities do not undermine the foundations of the state. The administrative abuses of the Nixon years in the Internal Revenue Service and elsewhere, for instance, stemmed from weak, politically controlled administrative structures. The infamous "Malek Manual," which provided the sanctioning principles for these abuses, reads like a textbook in applied democratic administration.[25]

This is not, it should be stressed, an argument for administrative hegemony. It is an argument for institutional balance. Democratic principles are necessary to safeguard the expression of private interests in the political arena. Republican principles are necessary to ensure that public interests, and indeed ultimately private interests, are not lost in the process.

Of course, even by republican principles, administration must be controlled. And it is clear that exhortations to "act in the public interest" will not prevent abuses of administrative authority. To channel administrative behavior in the direction of the public interest, it is necessary to shape those forces that structure the behavior of individual administrators, which are, in the last analysis, the administrator's own values. This in turn requires giving attention to role socialization, which is the process by which public values are transmitted to individual members of the community.

In order to ensure effective socialization to a "publicly-inclined" administrative role, to use Redford's phrase, four factors must be present. First, and most obviously, there must be scope for the exercise of such a role; thus, administrators must be seen as legitimate participants in the policy process. This means giving more than lip-service to the inseparability of politics and administration. In a practical sense, it means cutting through the tangle of external

[25] White House Personnel Office, "The Malek Manual," reprinted in Frank J. Thompson, ed., *Classics of Public Personnel Policy* (Oak Park, Ill.: Moore Publishing Company, Inc., 1979), pp. 159–87.

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controls on administrative behavior and overturning the supporting belief-structure of democratic administration. It means, in Brian Chapman's terms, recognizing administrators as "public officials," not merely "public servants."[26]

Second, there must be the opportunity for the administrator to develop a sensitivity for the ethical foundations of his role, to learn to recognize the values of the American political tradition. This sort of sensitivity cannot be gained through a week-long, on-the-job training course; like all socialization processes, it is a life-long enterprise that involves the inculcation, integration, and confirmation of basic norms by family, peer groups, and educational institutions. In most European countries, socialization to common administrative roles is facilitated by recruitment models that stress the early identification of administrative elites by ascriptive methods.[27] This pattern has high social costs, however, and it is not recommended that the United States move in this direction. Role socialization can be strengthened without impeding social mobility, however, by doing a better job designing preentry training for prospective administrators, especially at the postgraduate level. Prospective public administrators should be trained in *public* administration. Technical skills are important, but these must not be considered apart from the purposes to which they will be applied, that is, to public purposes. And, of course, government recruiting practices must change accordingly, otherwise well-trained graduates will be edged out by technicians in the job market. At the present time, there are far more MBAs in the higher reaches of government service than there are MPAs.[28]

A third factor that must be present is the sense of corporation or esprit de corps among administrators that derives from a true career service. In order for patterns of earlier socialization to be effective, values must be confirmed by the attitudes and behavior of those who serve as role models. No such confirmation can take place unless an administrator's colleagues have shared similar socialization experiences and have a common orientation to their profession. Failing the establishment of *Grand Corps* in the United States, or at least an American counterpart of the *Ecole National d'Administration* from which all higher administrators can be drawn, there needs at least to be a reduction in lateral entry to upper administration. The "breath of fresh air" that noncareerists are said to bring to administrative service does not begin to compensate for the deficiencies of a "government of strangers." The traditional American emphasis on rank-in-job through position classification militates against a career service, and ultimately, through an emphasis on position-as-skills, distorts the administrative function and obscures the ethical bases of action.

Finally, these socialization processes must be reinforced by clear standards of

[26] Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1959).

[27] John Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[28] George Groade and Marc Holzer, "The Perceived Utility of MPA Degrees," *Public Administration Review* 35 (July-August 1975): 403–12.

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professional conduct that are codified and administered by a professionally staffed central personnel agency. Clear standards of professional conduct are necesssary to prevent abuses of position by administrators, and a high degree of self-regulation, as reflected in a professionally staffed administering agency, is necessary to protect administrators against pressure from elected officials to engage in illegal or unethical activities. Standards of conduct should not be defined negatively, however, as has tended to be the case in the past. That is to say, it is not enough for a personnel agency simply to list prohibited practices and to consider the residue as the core of "merit." In line with a broadened understanding of the administrative role and the needs of a career service, desired conduct must be given positive shape and tied to the incentives and sanctions that determine advancement in the profession.

Any institutional arrangement of human devising carries with it potential for abuse. The principles of republican administration sketched here minimize this potential in this society. In another time or place, these principles could produce a pathologically bureaucratic government. Especially in nations where democratic traditions are weak, or where strong institutions of government developed ahead of mass participation, these dangers are real. But Americans do not face this problem. Democratic norms are strong, deeply imbedded in our culture. Participation developed alongside, even before, strong governing institutions. As a result, the potential abuses of democratic administration are far more serious here. Whether Americans will recognize these abuses in time is doubtful. If the Carter reforms are indicative of the state of theory in Public Administration, and they seem to be, then prospects are bleak indeed.

Assessing the Carter Reforms

How well do the Carter reforms meet the requirements of republican administration? Although no final judgments can be rendered at this early date, it is possible to use the four principles outlined above to make some projections.

The first requirement of republican administration is the construction of distinct "publicly-inclined" administrative roles. Notwithstanding a brief statement in the title dealing with the Senior Executive Service to the effect that the "Senior Executive Service shall be administered so as to . . . provide for an executive system which is guided by the public interest and free from improper political interference," the language of the CSRA and associated changes in administrative structure point in the opposite direction.[29] What has been defined is a set of "*presidentially*-inclined" administrative roles, for in keeping with the principles of democratic administration, the emphasis is on accountability. On a servicewide basis, accountability is now to be enhanced by grouping "positive personnel" functions in a presidential agency, the Office of Personnel Management, which will "provide the president with the personnel management staff

[29] Public Law 95-454, Title IV, subchapter 11, section 3131(13).

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arm that he needs."[30] This structural move, of course, is to be linked with "improvements" in disciplinary procedures in an effort to make them more "flexible"; with more rigorous systems of performance appraisal that "will make it possible to act against ineffective employees with reasonable dispatch"; and with changes in recruitment procedures that will provide additional "staffing flexibility" to "permit agency managers to exercise a more reasonable range of judgment in filling jobs."[31] Within the reaches of the SES, even greater flexibility is accorded OPM and agency officials in dealing with appointments, reassignments, and transfers to ensure accountability to presidential management.

Thus, this reform produces no clear set of administrative roles, save those defined as political circumstances dictate by the president and his appointees. The CSRA does, to be sure, offer some statutory protection against abuses of "merit" principles. But merit alone provides no orienting role for an administrator; it does not indicate what an administrator may do, but rather at best how he or she is to be hired and protected in his or her employment.

Preentry role socialization, the second principle against which to assess Carter's policies, warrants little comment here, for it is an issue that has not been directly addressed in the recent wave of reforms. Training is dealt with in only cursory fashion in the reform act, and even then it refers to procedures for postentry training. Even at the Senior Executive Service level, scant attention is given to educational and experiential requirements of higher administrators. Career appointees shall be recruited "from (1) all groups of qualified individuals within the civil service; or (2) all groups of qualified individuals whether or not within the civil service." This is not terribly restrictive. Nor is the definition of "qualified" which follows:

> The Office [of Personnel Management] shall . . . prescribe criteria for establishing executive qualifications for appointment of career appointees. The criteria shall provide for—
>
> (A) consideration of demonstrated executive experience
>
> (B) consideration of successful participation in a career executive development program which is approved by the Office; and
>
> (C) sufficient flexibility to allow for the appointment of individuals who have special or unique qualities which indicate a likelihood of executive success and who would not otherwise be eligible for appointment.[32]

Although it is too early to assess how well the system works in practice, it appears very unlikely at this point that the Carter reforms will move government recruitment practices in a direction favorable to preentry or systematic postentry training in publicly oriented administration. It seems rather more likely, in

[30] Alan K. Campbell, "Testimony on Civil Service Reform and Reorganization," reprinted in Thompson, *Classics of Public Personnel Policy*, p. 83.

[31] Ibid., p. 90.

[32] Public Law 95-454, Title IV, subchapter 7, section 3393(a).

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fact, that there will be an increased emphasis on technical training, with a concomitant reliance on business-school graduates. After all, as long as administrators are responsible for no more than the execution of public policy, there is little call for broader education.

Although the Carter reforms do not provide any serious discouragement of lateral entry at any point, one could argue that the Senior Executive Service represents a step in the direction of a true career service for higher administrators on the Western European model. Certainly, as Campbell has pointed out, it entails a shift away from a simple position classification system for administrators at this level: "Under the Senior Executive Service, the designation of career and noncareer will be affixed to persons rather than to positions."[33] Not only will nonpolitical executives have an opportunity to assume more policy-sensitive positions without having to relinquish their protected status, but a new "strong emphasis . . . on development and mobility of executives" will offer the SES member "the rich benefits in competence and understanding which accrue from experience gained in a variety of agencies and programs."[34]

These arguments would be more persuasive if SES administrators had something more in common than a label and a commitment to be responsive to the administration's policies. It is hard to imagine this sort of system providing a means to reinforce a distinct set of professional values. As long as behavioral incentives (basic compensation, bonuses, assignment and reassignment rights) and definitions of good performance are controlled by a presidential appointee, fellow SES members will represent irrelevant, not relevant, others. In fact, the likelihood of great discrepancies in compensation at this level (and at General Schedule [GS] 12 to 15 levels, for that matter, due to the introduction of a "merit pay" system here) can only discourage any emergent espirit de corps, as will the provisions that allow up to 10 percent of the service overall and up to 25 percent of any one agency (with some restrictions) to be composed of noncareerists. It is true that careerists have some responsibility for appraising the performance of other careerists; at least half the membership of the review boards that annually assess each SES member's performance is to be composed of career administrators. But these boards have no binding authority. They are only to recommend action to the appointing authorities, who retain ultimate discretion over performance awards and recommendations to OPM for rank designation ("Meritorious" and "Distinguished"). In effect, this system is a step away from a true career service, for it substitutes standards and procedures of evaluation that once only pertained to political appointees.

Finally, to ensure that an administrative service sustains strong roles oriented to public service and that the requisites of a career system are met, it is essential

[33] Campbell "Testimony," p. 94. It should be noted, however, that a number of positions have been designated "career-reserved."

[34] Ibid., p. 95.

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that the system be regulated principally by professional administrators who act in accordance with a clearly defined set of professional standards of conduct. The old Civil Service Commission was ill-equipped to perform these functions because its main goal was simply to protect the merit system and to insure neutral competence; it was not designed to act positively to develop the sort of administrative roles described herein. No matter how ill-equipped, however, it is clear that the Office of Personnel Management, the commission's chief successor, is even less able to accomplish these goals. It is a partisan political organization that has a partisan political function. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is far too removed from day-to-day operations, as Rosen suggests, to provide a serious check on OPM activities;[35] moreover, the MSPB has been seriously underfunded and understaffed. The lesson we seem to have learned from the Nixon period was: let us guard against political interference in the career administrative system, which the Civil Service Commission was too weak to withstand, by giving politicians greater opportunity to interfere.

But this is beside the point, in any event. What is needed is not a strengthened Merit Systems Protection Board, but a professionalized Office of Personnel Management. Positive personnel management is important; indeed one cannot have a workable career system in its absence. But it must be directed by and for administrators. There is no sense in which the Carter reforms move the system in this direction. Primary responsibility for the personnel administration is given at every turn to political appointees. Nor is any clear standard of conduct articulated; at best the list of prohibited practices has been expanded, with residual authority for ensuring "merit" given to individual managers. Curiously, Campbell believes that this "gives employees increased protection against arbitrary and capricious personnel actions and decisions."[36]

Conclusion

With the enactment of the Carter reforms, democratic administration triumphed. The pressures for change that had been building for over forty years finally brought forth a system that swept aside the myth of neutral competence and enshrined in its stead the principle of democratic accountability. But having done so, it now threatens to sweep aside Public Administration as well, for accountability rigorously pursued will brook no neat distinctions between public and private. That which is needed to control discretion will be used, and Public Administration has nothing special to offer. This is a sad state of affairs, for the field and for the nation. Accountability found through business management is governance lost by the demise of administration oriented toward public service.

Not all will agree with this grim assessment, of course. Ultimately one's view of these reforms and the associated developments in Public Administration is a

[35] Rosen, "Merit and the President's Plan," p. 303.
[36] Campbell, "Testimony," p. 85.

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matter of faith. One either believes that the fundamental goodness of the people will produce wise leaders capable of shaping the work of administration to accomplish public purposes, or one does not. For those in the latter category, faith rests more comfortably with the character of the men and women in the public service and with the principles of republican administration.

The sentiments engaged on both sides of this issue invoke very old and very profound questions of political theory, questions of social contract, sovereignty, ethics, and natural rights. These are questions too complex to be addressed adequately in the brief compass of this article. But they are questions that students of Public Administration must at least think about, for it is here that are found the roots of the dilemma. Although some in the field, like Vincent Ostrom, have tried mightily to reawaken interest in these matters, the debate has yet to be widely joined, for as Dwight Waldo observed long ago, Public Administration is a pragmatic discipline, little concerned with airy issues of theory and history.[37] This is now a lack of concern that we can ill afford. When a society builds administrative structures without attention to their moorings in political theory, its citizens should not be surprised when a stiff wind sends them crashing upon them.*

[37] Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1948), pp. 83–85.

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American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February–May, 1946

FRASER HARBUTT

The focus of cold war historiography has moved from passionate polemics about accountability to the patient reconstruction of events. The continuing dearth of conceptual thought, however, can be illustrated from the fate of a central unresolved question: When did the cold war begin? The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 was widely assumed to be the decisive moment until revisionists drew attention to preexisting examples of American militance in early 1945.[1] But the revisionists in turn tended to ignore Secretary of State James F. Byrnes's renewed search for accommodation with Moscow later in 1945. Consequently, almost by elimination, the reorientation of American policy in early 1946 attracted support among some academics, though its leading protagonist quickly abandoned it in favor of June 1950.[2] Others have focused on such specific issues as Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the advent of the atomic

[1] For representative orthodox and revisionist views see respectively, Eric Goldman, *The Crucial Decade and After, 1945–1960* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 57–61; and Barton Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration,* ed. Bernstein (Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 15–77.

[2] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 282–315. Compare Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs* 52 (January 1974):386–402.

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bomb, and the evolution of American public opinion.[3] Clearly there is some confusion here. Historians have not explored, let alone agreed on, the conditions that constitute the beginning of the cold war. One approach is to look for the time when, in response to a destabilizing political crisis, both the American and Soviet governments began to recognize, and encourage their publics to recognize, the other as the principal adversary; to practice openly a unilateral rather than a cooperative diplomacy; and to consolidate their spheres of influence and prospective alliances in a rapidly bifurcating international system.

An aim of this article is to suggest that by these criteria the cold war indeed began in early 1946. The primary purpose, however, is to examine the crisis in United States-Soviet relations that brought this about. John Lewis Gaddis, among others, has established that a reorientation in American policy did occur in early 1946, as is evidenced by Byrnes's February 28 speech, by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" speech on March 5, and by the United States's subsequent firm handling of the crisis in Iran.[4] These overt tokens of change are well known but, partly for evidential reasons, the inner history of the transformation remains largely unexplored. Nevertheless, an examination of neglected American diplomatic records and recent British evidence (including British and other evidence of Soviet policy) suggests a plausible reconstruction of events in early 1946, not in terms of the American about-face alone, but in the context of an evolving bilateral crisis. It reveals an unexpectedly systematic and purposeful American challenge, presided over by Byrnes, that owed little or nothing to such supposed prompts as President Truman's directive to the secretary on January 5 to "stop babying the Soviets," or the celebrated "Long Cable" from United States chargé d'affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, on February 22.[5] It began with an unnoticed set of American initiatives in Eastern Europe on February 12 and rapidly developed into a global and multidimensional threat to Soviet interests. This drew a variegated Soviet response that has attracted even less attention from scholars than has the American threat —a response that led, nonetheless, to the United Nations confrontation over Iran and thus to the cold war.

The End of Accommodation

The international arena between September 1945 and February 1946 was dominated less by United States-Soviet tensions than by Moscow's "war of

[3] See respectively, Lynn Etheridge Davis, *The Cold War Begins* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 3-10; Gar Alperowitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 226-42; Melvin Small, "When Did the Cold War Begin? A Test of an Alternate Indicator of Public Opinion," *Historical Methods Newsletter* 8 (March 1975):61-73.

[4] Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 284, 285-315.

[5] For the contemporary tendency to ascribe causative importance to these events see, ibid., pp. 284, 288-89, 302-4; and Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), pp. 160-62, 167-71.

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nerves" against British interests. This took various forms: pressures against Iran, Turkey, and Greece, looking to territorial acquisitions and increased political influence; a demand to Britain and the United States for Mediterranean trusteeships; and a massive press and radio campaign against Britain's colonial policies and its supposed attempt to form a "western bloc" in Europe. The British received little reassurance from Washington.[6] Byrnes, intent on securing a favorable postwar settlement with the Soviets, carefully avoided involvement. At the Moscow conference in December he ostentatiously dissociated himself from the British (who found him "only too ready to side with the Soviets") and agreed, in effect, to recognize slightly modified governments in Bulgaria and Rumania in return for Soviet recognition of a similar American primacy in Japan. His compromises displeased influential members of the administration, Congress, and the press at home, and President Truman himself. Byrnes nevertheless continued his policy of accommodation for six more weeks. As he instructed an associate in London on January 31, "We want to avoid a general row. You are over there to make peace, not war."[7]

American policy changed on February 12. There was, however, a significant antecedent event. In August 1945 Winston Churchill had agreed to speak on 5 March 1946 at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, where Truman was to introduce him. At the end of 1945 he had renewed his campaign for closer Anglo-American collaboration, though he discreetly justified this stance by making general references to "the world outlook" and "deep uncontrollable anxieties" rather than by focusing on the Soviet threat which was his real preoccupation.[8] In January, while vacationing in Florida, he wrote to Truman: "I have a message to deliver to your country and to the world and I think it likely that we shall be in agreement about it. Under your auspices anything I say will command some attention." A meeting at the White House followed on February 10. Admiral William Leahy, the president's chief of staff, recorded, "The subject of the address will be the necessity for full military collaboration between Great Britain and the United States until the United Nations is fully able to keep the peace, which will be at some time in the distant future." Later that evening Churchill expressed to Lord Halifax, a Tory holdover serving as British am-

[6] For representative British perspectives see Roberts to Bevin, 1 October 1946, "Annual Review of the Soviet Union for 1945," Foreign Office, 371.56921, N13119/38, Public Record Office, London, England (hereafter all citations preceded by "F.O." refer to Foreign Office records in this depository). See also editorial in *Manchester Guardian*, 14 March 1946.

[7] Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 273–90; Byrnes to Cohen, 31 January 1946, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1946,* vol. 3, pp. 629–30 (hereafter cited as *FRUS* followed by appropriate year, volume, and page).

[8] Henry B. Ryan, "A New Look at Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech," *The Historical Journal* 22 (December 1979): 901–20; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, (Commons), 5th Series, vol. 415, (1945): 1290–99; "Mr. Churchill in Brussells," *The Times*, 17 November 1945; Lord Moran, *Churchill, Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran* (London: Constable, 1960), p. 310.

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bassador in Washington, his pleasure at Truman's positive reception. Halifax noted in his diary, "It will certainly start up a very violent argument here."[9]

Two questions immediately arise: Was Churchill acting alone or with some brief from the British Labour government? And, why did Truman accede to Churchill's proposal? Recent British evidence reveals that Churchill informed Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin only that he would speak on "Fraternal association in building up and maintenance on UNO [United Nations Organization] and intermingling of various arrangements." This hid the crucial military dimension that would contravene the official Labour policy of Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Significantly, Labour party leaders sought no elaboration. As Bevin explained later, "we were never consulted on any of these pronouncements and indeed we did not want to be." Inhibited in their response to Soviet pressure by a powerful left-wing opposition at home, but intent on securing an American loan, Attlee and Bevin probably welcomed Churchill's demarche. But they played no part in it or in the change of American policy that ensued.[10]

Why did Truman now accede? Historians have fully described the rising concern in Washington about Soviet expansionism and unilateral diplomacy, the looming collapse of bipartisanship at home, and the disturbing incidents of early 1946: Soviet belligerence at the London meeting of the United Nations Security Council, the Soviet atomic spy scare in Canada, and Stalin's February 9 speech asserting the incompatibility of communism and capitalism and the likelihood of further wars. These events explain Truman's willingness on February 10 to repudiate the American dogma, affirmed to the Soviets many times, that the United States would not collaborate with Britain against the USSR. At a time when headlong demobilization and the lingering legacy of Roosevelt precluded more forceful action, Truman presumably hoped that the threat of a conjunction of American power and British strategic interests would frighten Stalin. At the least, Churchill's bluntness would arouse the American people.[11] Truman's precise motives must remain conjectural. What is clear,

[9] Churchill to Truman, 29 January 1946, and Truman to Churchill, 2 February 1946, President's Secretary's File, Box 115, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter Truman Papers); Diary of Admiral William D. Leahy, 10 February 1946, William D. Leahy Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Leahy Diary); Lord Halifax Diary, 10 February 1946, Borthwick Institute for Historical Research, York, England (hereafter Halifax Diary).

[10] Wright to Dixon, 16 February 1946, Box 14, Attlee Papers, University College, Oxford University, Oxford, England (hereafter Attlee Papers); Memorandum by Bevin, 25 September 1946, Box 6, Attlee Papers; Churchill to Attlee, 21 February 1946, *Premiers Papers* 8/197, Public Record Office, London, England (hereafter, *PREM* connotes all citations of relevant prime minister's papers). See also Ryan, " A New Look at Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech."

[11] Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,* pp. 282-304; Yergin, *Shattered Peace,* pp. 138-162. American armed strength was projected to fall from 8,500,000 on V.E. Day to 1,500,000 by July 1946, see "Statement by Eisenhower on Demobilization Program," *New York Times,* 16 January 1946.

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however, is that within forty-eight hours of Churchill's visit the substantive transformation of American policy began.

On February 12 Byrnes began a series of challenges to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe that undercut the Moscow accords and ended the U.S. policy of accommodation. On January 14 he had learned that the Bulgarian opposition parties were refusing to participate in the government as envisaged at the Moscow conference. On February 2 the secretary was still willing to brave the disapproval of President Truman and American officials in Sofia and grant recognition simply upon pledges from the unreconstructed Bulgarian government to hold free elections, in order to "avoid any appearance of bad faith towards our allies." As late as February 5 he claimed to see what no one else saw: recent progress toward "the achievement of freedom of expression for the opposition." On February 12, however, Byrnes suddenly dropped his support for recognition based solely on the pledge to ensure free elections and notified the Soviets that, in effect, it was up to them to arrange a settlement which would facilitate recognition, that the United States would not pressure the opposition to join, and (a new complaint from him) that the Bulgarian government's failure to settle reparations arrangements was "a non-fulfillment of the armistice conditions."[12] There was a similar about-face toward Albania, whose Communist government had become increasingly unfriendly since the Moscow conference. Here too Byrnes, fearing difficulties with the Soviets, had ignored the complaints of harassed American diplomats through January and early February. But on February 12 he suddenly ordered "strongest representations" and threatened to withhold recognition from and to break all relations with Albania and oppose its membership in the United Nations.[13] The third February 12 initiative concerned Austria which the United States, but not the Soviet Union, regarded as a liberated country. When the Soviets had earlier opposed his plan for a treaty of independence, Byrnes had again put Allied solidarity first and had carefully kept the importunate Austrians at bay. On February 12, however, without notice to Moscow, he sent word to the Austrian government that the four-power agreement was "made extremely difficult" by the Soviet attitude.[14] It was now too late for an effective challenge over Rumania, for Byrnes had extended effective recognition there on February 5—a last flourish of the old accommodation policy. Here too, as in the Bulgarian case, Byrnes had compromised the U.S. position further by failing to extract a precise election commit-

[12] For Moscow agreement see *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 2, p. 822; Barnes to Byrnes, 14 January 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 6, pp. 51–53; Byrnes to Barnes, 2 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 6, pp. 65–66; Cohen to Byrnes, 2 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 6, pp. 71–72; Byrnes to Cohen, 12 February 1946, U.S. Department of State, Decimal File, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 874.00/2-946 (hereafter cited as "SD" and decimal file number).

[13] Jacobs to Byrnes, 29 January 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 5, pp. 1–3; Kennan to Byrnes, 1 February 1946, ibid., pp. 3–4; Byrnes to Jacobs, 12 February 1946, ibid., pp. 296–97.

[14] Byrnes to Ehrhardt, 12 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol.5, p. 307. For American objectives see Memorandum by Dunn, 18 January 1946, ibid., p. 296.

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ment before moving towards recognition. But again he changed, both admitting to Truman on February 13 that Rumania was not complying with its undertakings and recommending a strong attitude "henceforth."[15]

Was Byrnes converted directly by Truman, who was now himself collaborating with Churchill? Although the existing evidence is ambiguous on this point, Byrnes was well aware of his political vulnerability and thus may have acted autonomously on February 12—which was clearly the real turning point in U.S. policy.[16] Truman's reprimand to Byrnes on January 5, if it existed, had no discernible immediate outcome in policy; and Kennan's February 22 cable, while influential in consolidating attitudes, came after the administration's policy had already changed. This is further substantiated by Byrnes's systematic intensification of U.S. pressure in Eastern Europe immediately after February 12. On February 15, to the delight of American representatives in Bulgaria, Byrnes at last protested against the Soviet failure to implement the Potsdam agreement to revise Allied Control Council procedures for Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. He now demanded "prompt measures to ensure future compliance." On February 26, reversing a more compromising January decision, he insisted on full American participation in any current Danubian administration. On March 2 he accused the Soviets of obstructing Hungary's recovery with overburdensome reparations, economic interference, and "very large occupying forces," and he called for the "early reintegration" of Hungary into the general European economy. On March 4 he complained of similar Soviet practices in Austria and threatened to expose them publicly.[17] Meanwhile Byrnes began to apply economic leverage. On February 21 he offered non-Communist Hungary a $10 million credit, although in early March he refused to resume trade with Communist-dominated Bulgaria. Also on February 21 he at last offered talks with Moscow on the $1 billion credit requested in August 1945 (and since "lost"), but insisted they include the settlement of American claims, and the solution of Eastern Europe's economic problems "by democratic means."[18]

[15] For Moscow agreement see, *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 2, pp. 821–22; Harriman to Byrnes, 6 January 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol.6, pp. 557–60; Berry to Byrnes, 8 February 1946, ibid., pp. 574–76; U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* 14 (17 February 1946): 298; Leahy Diary, 13 February 1946. For Byrnes's comment, "Vishinsky really endeavored to comply in full with the Moscow agreement," see Byrnes to Ethridge, 29 January 1946, Box 232, Papers of James F. Byrnes (hereafter Byrnes Papers), Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina.

[16] Daily Sheets, February 1946; and Desk Calendar, February 1946, President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers; Russell to Connor, 14 January 1946, File 569(1), Byrnes Papers. See also, Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 552.

[17] Byrnes to Kennan, 15 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 6, pp. 74–75; Barnes to Byrnes, 18 February 1946, ibid., p. 77; Byrnes to Winant, 26 January 1946, *FRUS 1946,* vol.5, p. 229; Kennan to Molotov, 2 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 6, pp. 265–67; Byrnes to Ehrhardt, 4 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 5, pp. 315–17.

[18] Schoenfeld to Byrnes, 27 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol.6, pp. 263–64; Byrnes to Barnes, 8 March 1946, SD 611.7431/2-2646; Byrnes to Orekhov, 21 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol.6, pp. 828–29. See also Thomas Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 51–52.

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The significance of these initiatives of February 12 has been obscured by the lack of an immediate Soviet response. But a remote Soviet broadcast to Bulgaria in early January had predicted that the decisions of the Moscow conference would stop "prolonged efforts at interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria and Rumania," and attempts "to impose abstract standards of western democracy." Now the Soviets were alarmed. The British Broadcasting Corporation's *Daily Monitor of Foreign Broadcasts*, recently called by William O. McCagg "the single most important tool for studying the political history of the Soviet Union and international communism in the period at the end of the war," records a sudden flurry of anti-American comments on the Soviet radio in late February, concentrating on corporate war-profiteering, on the harsh treatment of blacks and the harassment of the Left in the domestic realm, and on American interference in Italy as well as the encouragement of German, Spanish, and Turkish fascists in the diplomatic realm.[19] This was accompanied by an equally unusual cordiality toward British officials in Moscow. In reports between February 23 and March 6 the British chargé d'affaires reported his happy surprise at this reversal in Soviet attitudes which extended also to substantive matters. For, while ignoring Byrnes's complaints, the Soviets reassured Britain on March 1 that Bulgaria would indeed supply food to Greece, despite the reluctance of the Sofia regime.[20]

Meanwhile Byrnes was preparing a much broader challenge. Already on February 9, alarmed by Chinese reports of Soviet Red Army depredations in Manchuria, he had cabled Moscow to announce that he would propose the establishment of a reparations commission and to assert American rights under the Open Door policy.[21] On February 17 he flew to Florida to visit Churchill, who outlined his draft speech and recorded that Byrnes "seemed to like it very well" and that "there is much fear of Russia here as a cause of future trouble." Aware now that Churchill was planning an aggressively anti-Soviet course of action, Byrnes prepared to intervene in the eastern Mediterranean and Near East, an arena that had hitherto been essentially the preserve of British and Soviet interests. On or about February 25 he decided to return to Istanbul the remains of

[19] Barnes to Byrnes, 3 January 1946, SD 874.00/1-346; William O. McCagg, *Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1978), p. 320; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), *Daily Monitor of Foreign Broadcasts*, 22 February 1946, 3.b.i., 2 March 1946, 3.a.i., 3.a.iv., British Broadcasting Corporation Archives, Reading, England (hereafter cited as BBC *Monitor* with appropriate notation. The three references used in each notation after the date refer respectively to: the country of the originating broadcast, the USSR being designated as "3"; whether the broadcast is for domestic or foreign reception, "a" connoting domestic, "b" connoting foreign; and the transcript page number). See also Roberts to Bevin, 23 February 1946, F.O. 371.56780, N2466/140/38.

[20] Roberts to Bevin, 27 February 1946, F.O. 371. 56780, N2829/140/38; Roberts to Sargent, 25 February 1946, F.O.371.56780, N3040/140/38; Kennan to Byrnes, 7 March 1946, SD 740.00119 EW/3-746.

[21] Byrnes to Kennan, 9 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 10, pp. 1104-5; Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 340.

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the deceased Turkish ambassador (who had died sixteen months earlier in the United States) on the U.S.S. *Missouri*, the U.S. Navy's most powerful battleship; and on February 28 he agreed to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal's proposal to send an accompanying Mediterranean task force, despite a Joint Strategic Survey report only three weeks earlier arguing against any American commitment in the area.[22]

Brynes also began to intervene in the looming Iranian imbroglio. In compliance with wartime tripartite agreements the United States and Britain had withdrawn their occupying troops from Iran in anticipation of a 2 March 1946 deadline. Moscow, sponsoring two rebel autonomous regimes in the Soviet northern zone and preventing Teheran from regaining control, seemed likely to remain illegally. Concerned about United States-Soviet relations Byrnes had worked through December and January to mediate the issue. On February 22, however, he sent word to the Iranian prime minister, Sultaneh el Qavam, encouraging him to complain to the U.N. Security Council and promising American diplomatic support. He was now courting rather than avoiding confrontation.[23] Finally in his "firmness and patience" speech to the Overseas Press Club on February 28, Byrnes began to rally public support for a policy of resistance to aggression. A central but overlooked feature of this speech, whose impact was diminished by the erroneous belief that it was a forced political response to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg's attack on official administration policy the day before, was Byrnes's assault on a vital Soviet interest: the Security Council veto. The principles of the U.N. Charter, he insisted, were more important than "the mere legal veto," and "we will stand united with other great states in defense of the Charter." Here was the implicit threat, which Churchill made explicit five days later, of a de facto Anglo-American alliance legitimized by and working through a redefined and thus more responsive United Nations.[24]

The new policy was clearly one of confrontation. But the objective, at this point, was the conclusion of satisfactory negotiations with Moscow rather than the launching of a cold war. Thus, on March 5, concerned at delays in the preliminary peace talks in London, Byrnes drafted a proposal for Molotov and Bevin suggesting the convening of a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in late April.[25] Unlike his course of action at the Moscow conference, however, he now

[22] Churchill to Attlee, 21 February 1946, *PREM* 8/197; James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 349. For report see Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 336.

[23] Byrnes to Kennan, 22 February 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 334–35. For Byrnes's mediation at Moscow and London respectively see: *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 2, pp. 750–52; and Memorandum by Dixon, 17 January 1946, F.O. 371.52662, E679/5/34. See also Gary R. Hess, "The Iranian Crisis 1945–46 and the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (March 1974):117–46.

[24] U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* 14 (10 March 1946): 335–58; Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,* pp. 304–6. For earlier attacks on the veto by Truman, Bevin and other Western leaders see, "Tests for UNO," *New York Times,* 27 January 1946.

[25] Byrnes to Dunn, 5 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol.2, pp. 22–23.

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consulted Bevin in advance. And this time the United States would negotiate from a position of strength. Truman and Byrnes attached great importance to Churchill's March 5 demarche in building that strength. Both read and approved the speech in advance. They also created a public impression of Anglo-American association for the occasion. Thus Byrnes appears to have deliberately deferred protests to Moscow about its Manchurian and Iranian policies until March 5. "One would have to go back far," noted a commentator in the *New York Times*, "to find two notes to one power on two different issues on the same day." The Soviet leaders can hardly have seen this as coincidental, especially in light of events since February 12. Also on March 5 Byrnes instructed Kennan to request copies from the Soviets of all economic agreements they had made with East European governments, as enjoined by the Yalta accords, but not yet invoked. The commencement of Senate hearings on the British loan on March 5 was doubtless coincidental, but the warm endorsements by Truman and other high officials on March 4 and 5 must have strengthened Moscow's impression of a calculated American solidarity with Churchill. The official announcement on March 6 of the *Missouri* mission to Turkey (significantly by the State, not the Navy, Department) worked to similar effect and completed this remarkable cluster of well-timed American initiatives.[26]

Churchill's "iron curtain" speech, delivered with characteristic eloquence, shattered the convention of outward cordiality toward the Soviet government hitherto observed by Western leaders.[27] With the Nazi parallel implicit throughout, he depicted ruthless, untrustworthy police governments exercising control in Communist countries "contrary to every principle of democracy" and marching obediently to Moscow's instructions. Had they, rather than the West, possessed the atomic monopoly, Churchill warned, they might have forced "totalitarian systems upon the free world with consequences appalling to human imagination." As it was they had erected an "iron curtain" from the Baltic to the Adriatic and "their malign power was still on the move, felt directly in Turkey, Iran and the Far East" and through fifth columns in Italy and France. What must be done? Churchill shrewdly subverted the two reigning symbols of accommodation. Roosevelt, the object of so many of Churchill's tributes while alive, now went completely unremarked. The United Nations he adapted, urging that it be built "not upon shifting sands or quagmires but upon rock." This

[26] Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 349; Leahy Diary, 3 March 1946; Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Postwar Memoirs of the Right Honourable Earl Attlee* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1961), pp. 162–63. For Manchuria and Iran respectively see U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* 14 (17 March 1946): 448–49, and Byrnes to Kennan, 5 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 7, pp. 340–42. "Truman Endorses Loan for Britain," *New York Times*, 6 March 1946; John Crider, "Vinson Calls Loan to Britain a Must," ibid., 6 March 1946; "U.S. to Ship Turk's Body," and Bertram D. Hulen, "U.S. Sends Two Protests to Russia on Manchuria and Iran Actions," ibid., 7 March 1946. Byrnes to Kennan, 5 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 6, pp. 269–70.

[27] *Vital Speeches of the Day* 12 (15 March 1946): 329–32. (*Vital Speeches of the Day* have been published since 1934 by the City News Publishing Corporation.)

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"rock" was the Anglo-American "fraternal association" which Churchill now grafted onto the world body, making explicit what Byrnes had implied on February 28. This "association," clearly a de facto alliance, would include Canada and "all the British Commonwealths" with full reciprocity, the joint use of naval and air bases worldwide, and joint military planning, training, and weapons standardization. The atomic monopoly would be preserved and "the breathing space" used to extend the Anglo-American lead with "so formidable a superiority as to impose effective deterrents upon its employment or threat of employment by others." He also hinted at the future liberation of Eastern Europe and East Germany, but ended by calling upon the Soviets to enter urgent negotiations for a postwar settlement.

The Failure of Soviet Appeasement

Churchill's speech converted the unilateral American challenge into a full crisis, evoking a powerful response from both the Soviet government and the American public and setting the stage for Byrnes's successful campaign to bring these two fundamental forces into direct confrontation. What was the immediate Soviet reaction? Specialists of Soviet contemporary history offer little guidance. Adam Ulam, occupying a position somewhat similar to that of Gaddis on the American side, discusses this period in an insightful though limited way; but here too no detailed studies seem to have appeared.[28] Yet there is significant evidence that tends to vindicate the Truman-Churchill belief that the threat of close Anglo-American collaboration would alarm the Kremlin. Thus Khrushchev recalls of this period "that the Cold War had already set in. Churchill had given his famous speech in Fulton urging the imperialist forces of the world to mobilize against the Soviet Union. . . . our relations with England, France, the USA and other countries who had cooperated with us . . . were, for all intents and purposes, ruined." Moreover, Soviet officials told British diplomats that Stalin had been shocked by the speech, had recalled the former *cordon sanitaire*, and "knew for a fact" that Churchill was speaking for the British government. In Washington a Soviet diplomat warned that an Anglo-American alliance "meant the liquidation of the coalition of the three powers." In their first meetings with American officials after the Fulton speech, Stalin and Molotov made the same reproaches.[29]

[28] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1967* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), pp. 408–32. See also, Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin*, rev. ed. (Middlesex, England: Pelican Books, 1966), p. 565; McCagg, *Stalin Embattled,* pp. 236–37; and V.G. Trukhanovsky, *Winston Churchill* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), pp. 336–41.

[29] Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 361, 393; idem, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 353, 355; Lord Gladwyn, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 185; Roberts to Bevin, 26 March 1946, F.O. 371. 56782 N4310/G; Diary of Joseph E. Davies, 15 March 1946, Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

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Some of these reactions may have been officially inspired, but the Soviet diplomatic response tends to confirm their general authenticity. This took a few days to develop. Meanwhile Churchill's speech was an immediate public sensation in the United States. But the reaction has been misunderstood. It is true that the notion of an Anglo-American alliance was at first greeted with widespread reserve or hostility. Truman and Byrnes (and Attlee, more justifiably) felt obliged to disclaim foreknowledge or association. The distrust of such an alliance burnt out very quickly, however, and in retrospect, the degree of anti-Soviet sentiment the speech instantly exposed, and then fostered as the Soviets behaved aggressively in Iran, seems much more significant. Not only did much of the internationally oriented press of the eastern seaboard immediately support Churchill, mostly without serious reservation, but most moderate and isolationist opinion agreed with him immediately on the Soviet threat. Thus Senator Burnet R. Maybank (D–North Carolina), a representative southern conservative, rejected a British alliance but agreed that Stalin sought "indefinite expansion." So did various regional newspapers such as the *Salt Lake Tribune* and the *San Francisco Chronicle*, which had hitherto been friendly to the Soviets.[30] Even left-wing spokesmen found Soviet policy hard to defend, and a commentator in the leftist New York daily *PM* conceded on March 17 that "members of Congress generally agreed with Churchill's remarks about Russia." A March 13 poll found 71 percent of Americans critical of Soviet policy and 60 percent characterizing American policy as "too soft." Another poll found only 18 percent favoring an Anglo-American alliance immediately after Churchill's Fulton speech, but 85 percent supporting it a month later. There was, as one senator noted, "a decided trend towards Mr. Churchill's point of view." This was also the view of Lord Halifax, who cabled Bevin on March 8 that "a trend of thought has probably been started and an issue presented which is likely to preoccupy public attention here for many days in the form given to it by Mr. Churchill rather than by the more guarded utterances of the American statesmen who have tried to deal with the same problems."[31]

But the real dynamic force in consolidating American opinion behind the new confrontation policy was Soviet conduct. Moscow's first reaction was to exploit

[30] See editorials in *New York Times,* 6 and 7 March 1946. Other support in the eastern United States included editorials in the *Wall Street Journal*, 8 March 1946, and *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 March 1946, and "No Cause for Alarm," *Time*, 25 March 1946, p. 19. For representative moderate and isolationist editorial reaction see, respectively, *Washington Star*, 6 March 1946, and *New York Mirror*, 7 March 1946. *Salt Lake Tribune,* 7 March 1946; *San Francisco Chronicle*, 17 March 1946. See also "Press Reaction to Churchill Plan for Closer U.S. Ties with Britain," *United States News* (15 March 1946), p. 39. For Maybank statement see, "Doubts Are Expressed in Washington," *New York Times,* 6 March 1946.

[31] B. Bolles, "Churchill's Speech Defeats Own Ends," *PM*, 7 March 1946; Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, eds., *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 963, 1060; *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (Winter 1946): 265; "Should the United States Enter a Military Alliance with Britain, as Proposed by Winston Churchill," *United States News*, 15 March 1946, p.32; Halifax to Bevin, 8 March 1946, F.O. 371.51633, AN1246/7/40.

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the initial American distrust of an Anglo-American alliance and attack Britain, especially Churchill whom Stalin, in a bitter statement on March 14, compared to Hitler.[32] The second, more significant response, neglected by historians, was to head off the Truman administration with carefully calculated appeasement. Thus the anti-American tone of the recent Soviet media virtually disappeared. On March 7 Moscow announced that, despite a long-ignored invitation, Soviet observers would attend the impending International Monetary Fund meeting at Savannah, Georgia. But the main theme of this peace offensive was geopolitical. On March 10 Soviet troops began to withdraw from Mukden in Manchuria. And on March 16 Moscow formally undertook to withdraw from the strategically important Danish Baltic island of Bornholm, where the persisting Soviet occupation had long caused anxiety. At the same time the Soviets stood firm in Eastern Europe, officially refuting on March 7 Byrnes's earlier interpretation of the Moscow agreement on Bulgaria, and reproaching the United States for acting "without any attempt at preliminary coordination." These gestures harked back to the sphere of influence conceptions of Yalta and Moscow.[33]

But Stalin's appeasement was persistently subverted by two factors: Soviet clumsiness in Iran; and Byrnes's exploitation of this clumsiness in order to consolidate his new policy of confrontation, now through the United Nations rather than Churchill's Anglo-American alliance. Advised that the Soviets were reinforcing rather than withdrawing their troops in Iran, Byrnes sent three important cables on March 8: to Molotov seeking explanations; to Bevin seeking British support for a United Nations solution; and to Teheran urging a further protest against Soviet intervention at the forthcoming Security Council session in New York beginning on March 26 and promising American backing. On March 12 the secretary announced the new Soviet troop movements, which created a brief but intense war scare. This forced Tass to disclaim on March 13 any expansionist purpose in Iran. Despite this embarrassment the Soviets stayed on in Iran through March. Yet they continued to appease elsewhere. Perhaps Stalin, under pressure, thought of Munich. No doubt geopolitical considerations, which permitted reluctant gestures of retreat in Western Europe and the Far East (but not Eastern Europe), urged resistance to any American intrusion in the Near East where the British and Soviets had been dominant forces. Above all Stalin clearly expected to foreclose the whole issue before the next Security Council session by pressuring Qavam into concessions (a favorable oil agreement and autonomy for the northern provinces) that would permit the desired

[32]BBC *Monitor,* 9 March 1946, 3.a.v.; 13 March 1946, 3.a.v.; Emanuel R. Freedman, "Stalin Says Churchill Stirs War and Flouts Anglo-Soviet Pact; Soviet Tanks Approach Teheran," *New York Times,* 15 March 1946.

[33] "Russia to Attend Monetary Parley," *New York Times,* 8 March 1946; "Reds Fight Chinese in Mukden Streets as Russians Leave," ibid., 11 March 1946; Svend Carstenson, "Russians to Quit Bornholm Island, Restore it to Full Danish Control," ibid., 17 March 1946; Novikov to Byrnes, 7 March 1946, *FRUS 1946*, vol. 6, pp. 83–85.

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military withdrawal. But this failed because Byrnes, between March 8 and 18, not only labored behind the scenes to focus American opinion on a Security Council solution, but also pressed Qavam to make the complaint himself. Qavam, assured of American support, did so on March 18, and the hearing was scheduled for March 26.[34]

Stalin's response to this further setback was an intensification of his new appeasement policy. Between March 20 and 23 the Soviets offered to leave Iran, now in exchange only for the promise of a future Soviet-Iranian oil venture; officially and ostentatiously promised a complete withdrawal from China by the end of April; accommodated Western views in reaching an accord concerning acceptable levels of production of German industry; announced the forthcoming demobilization of six age-group classes from the Red Army; and publicized Stalin's March 21 interview with Associated Press expressing Soviet opposition to war and faith in the United Nations.[35] Here again the Soviets stood firm in Eastern Europe, choosing this moment to reject Byrnes's earlier complaint about Allied Control Council procedures there and to protest themselves about the treatment of Soviet officials in Italy. But even here the resignation of the Bulgarian government and the opening of talks with the opposition suggested compromise. Kennan cabled that the Soviet government "has made efforts to ease general situation." The Soviet campaign now seemed to be working. On March 22 Truman felt obliged to welcome Stalin's support for the United Nations and reciprocated by postponing the atom bomb tests in the Pacific. Byrnes resigned himself to losing his carefully prepared confrontation. A *New York Times* headline "Council Test Fades" caught the sense of anticlimax.[36]

In fact Stalin had again failed. Qavam unexpectedly held out for unconditional withdrawal. The infuriated Soviets, the Security Council deadline looming, unilaterally announced on March 25, through Stalin himself, an agreement

[34] For Byrnes's Iran diplomacy between 8 and 18 March 1946 see *FRUS, 1946*, vol.7, pp. 340–66. For war scare see Bertram D. Hulen, "Heavy Russian Columns Move West in Iran: Turkey or Iran May Be Goal," *New York Times*, 13 March 1946; for Soviet disclaimer see "Tass Calls U.S. Statement on Army Contrary to Facts: Declares Soldiers Are Not Moving Towards Teheran and Turkey," ibid., 14 March 1946. Joseph C. Harsch, "Soviet Brands U.S. Action Violation of Balkan Pact: One World Tested in Iran," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 March 1946; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 160, 238; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), vol.2, p. 1720; Tom Connally, *My Name is Tom Connally* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Publishers, 1954), pp. 289-90, 298. For the Iranian issue generally see Hess, "The Iranian Crisis," pp. 117–46.

[35] Murray to Byrnes, 22 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 7, p. 369; "Russian Demobilizaton of Six Groups Announced," *New York Times,* 21 March 1946; Tillman Durden, "China Announces Russians Will Go," and "Allies Reach Accord on German Industry," ibid., 24 March 1946; Eddy Gilmore, "Stalin Asserts No Nations Want War: Affirms Faith in UNO to Keep Peace; Delegates Here Cheered By His Move," ibid., 23 March 1946.

[36] Kennan to Byrnes, 25 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol.6, pp. 89–91; Kennan to Byrnes, 22 March 1946, SD 961. 24591/3-2246; "Truman Declares He Knew Stalin Would Support UNO," *New York Times*, 23 March 1946; James B. Reston, "Council Test Fades," ibid., 24 March 1946; Byrnes to Murray, 24 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol.7, p. 378.

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for withdrawal, barring "unforeseen circumstances," which rendered further United Nations action unnecessary.[37] On March 26 Byrnes, personally leading the American delegation in the Security Council, and aware that no agreement existed, exposed this clumsy Soviet bluff by refusing to drop the issue from the agenda until the agreement was produced. The next day Byrnes again led a well-marshaled Western majority in refusing a further Soviet request, this time for a postponement. The Soviet delegation then walked out, which created a worldwide sensation. Contrary to many expectations, however, the Soviets did not leave the United Nations, doubtless fearing the transformation of that body into an Anglo-American instrument, as Churchill and Byrnes had implied.[38] There were subsequent diplomatic skirmishes on the Iran issue through April and into May, but the denouement in United States-Soviet relations, to which events had been tending since February 12, had occurred. With few exceptions American official and press opinion applauded Byrnes's new "firmness" and assumed a more consistent anti-Soviet posture.[39] On April 4 Stalin complained of Byrnes's diplomacy and Churchill's speech which, he charged, signified an existing Anglo-American alliance. When the Council of Foreign Ministers met at Paris in late April to discuss the peace treaties, Molotov made the same reproaches. Byrnes remained firm. But Soviet appeasement was now over. Weeks of fruitless haggling followed, but a growing geopolitical clarity emerged. The American and Soviet delegations defended their own spheres of influence (the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, respectively), while trying vainly to penetrate their opponent's sphere. When the conference ended unsuccessfully on May 20 Byrnes openly reported the "disagreements" to the American people and threatened to refer the treaties to the now congenial United Nations forum if Soviet-inspired delays continued.[40]

Conclusion

By May the three basic conditions marking the beginning of the cold war had appeared. First, each power now recognized the other as its principal adversary. The United States replaced Britain as the leading target of the Soviet media,

[37] For the Soviet about-face see Murray to Byrnes, 25 March 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 379–80. "Need for UNO Move Scouted by Stalin," *New York Times*, 26 March 1946.

[38] For full proceedings see United Nations, Security Council, *Journal of the Security Council*, Meetings 17 and 18, 25 and 26 March 1946, respectively, pp. 351–64. For British support see Bevin to Cadogan, 25 March 1946, F.O. 371.52669 E2633/5/34; and Bevin to Cadogan, 2 April 1946, F.O. 371.52671, E2950/5/34. See also Hess, "The Iranian Crisis," pp. 138–40.

[39] For Iranian issue after 27 March see Hess, "The Iranian Crisis," pp. 139–47. Representative press support can be seen in editorials in *New York Times*, 28 and 29 March 1946, and *Washington Post,* 17 April 1946. See also "Periscope: Washington Trends," *Newsweek*, 8 April 1946, p. 16. For revived official support for Byrnes see Leahy Diary, 18 March 1946; and C. L. Sulzberger Diary, 22 April 1946, cited in Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934–1954* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 311.

[40] Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia, Pa.: J.B. Lippincott, 1950), p.

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which used the anniversary of Roosevelt's death on April 12 to eulogize the former president and excoriate his successor. Thereafter hostile references were repeatedly made to "the American lie" about Soviet troop movements on March 12, the "attempts. . . made to exaggerate artificially the so-called Iranian problem," and the growing global system of American bases which was self-righteously contrasted with the Soviet withdrawals from Manchuria, Bornholm, and Iran.[41] Similarly, in the United States the press and numerous polls acknowledged the Soviet threat. Isolationist sentiment remained a factor, but the Truman administration, now dominated by the Churchill-Kennan thesis of confrontation, was able to push through Congress both the loan to Britain and an extension of the draft, formerly dubious prospects, in the new anti-Soviet atmosphere.[42]

Second, each power now pursued increasingly unilateral policies. In late April Byrnes introduced the familiar twenty-five year four-power security treaty to test Soviet intentions on the German issue which was not, as Yergin writes, "a subject of real contention until well into the spring of 1946." Molotov's negative response and the American military commander's decision on May 3 to halt reparations deliveries to the Soviet zone led, as Churchill had foreseen, to a competition for German support. By early May, Byrnes "had almost given up hope for a united Germany."[43] On the Soviet side a former foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, told an American journalist on June 18 that "the wrong people" now made Soviet policy and warned against further concessions. But Byrnes had already told French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault on May 1 that "American opinion was no longer disposed to make concessions on important questions."[44] This unilateralism was masked through 1946 by a continuing public dialogue in such ostensibly cooperative institutions as the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Security Council. In fact, these were now cockpits of United States-Soviet confrontation. In the later Council of Foreign Ministers meetings the Americans made no substantive concessions. The Soviets abandoned most of their claims in the Mediterranean, but their acceptance of certain

53; Memorandum by Bohlen, 28 April 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 2, pp. 146–47. For conference and aftermath see Patricia Dawson Ward, *The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945–1946* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1979), pp. 78–102.

[41] BBC *Monitor*, 6 April 1946, 3.b.iii.; 7 April 1946, 3.a.v.; 9 April 1946, 3.b.vii.; 12 April 1946, 3.b.viii.; 13 April 1946, 3.b.iv.; 17 April 1946, 3.a.vii.; 19 April 1946, 3.a.viii.; 6 May 1946, 3.a.viii.; 15 May 1946, 3.b.i. Peterson to Bevin, 14 June 1946, F.O. 371.56783, N7730/G.

[42] Cantril and Strunk, *Public Opinion*, pp. 964–65; Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), pp. 94–95; Richard Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 249; editorial in *New York Times*, 6 June 1946. See also Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 318–19; and Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 253–55.

[43] Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 226, 457, n.12; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1950), pp. 122, 132.

[44] McCagg, *Stalin Embattled*, pp. 390–91, n.76; Memorandum by Matthews, 1 May 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol.2, pp. 203–6.

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"open door" rights in Eastern Europe in December came only after the West had recognized the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments and had given up the Allied Control Councils. Thereafter, as William H. McNeill has said, "the sacred sovereignty of national governments could be invoked to assure a Communist interpretation of all such objectionable clauses."[45] Similarly in the Security Council, where the Soviets had expected to concentrate on Franco's Spain and Argentina, the Iranian crisis enabled these rightist regimes to escape virtually unscathed. The dominant issue thereafter was the United States-Soviet argument over the international control of atomic energy.[46]

Third, there was a consolidation of distinct spheres of influence and a gravitation of allies. While retreating from exposed positions the Soviets strengthened their hold on Eastern Europe. Khrushchev writes of Stalin's "obsession" with Eastern Europe at this time. The Communists extended their control over the Bulgarian government in late March, and the Soviets intervened in Hungary in early July.[47] A powerfully integrative Soviet media campaign developed during this period, asserting that "Anglo-Saxon reactionaries" and "imperialist circles" were reviving Germany, and warning Poles and Hungarians against financial dealings with the predatory West. A strident campaign to instill Slav consciousness appeared stressing both Soviet leadership and the "linguistic, cultural and historical" affinities of the Slavs. At the same time Soviet radio broadcasts to North America and West Europe discouraged intervention by the Western powers by emphasizing both the strength of the Red Army and the growing contentment of the East Europeans.[48]

Soviet policy was not entirely defensive. Indeed the renewal of Moscow's expansionist thrust can be identified from late May when the Greek rebellion revived. Fresh pressure on Turkey in August and Iran in November soon followed, together with a more intensive political effort in Western Europe.[49] By this time, however, the United States had also moved forward, and in the new crises it was mostly American power and resolve (with British help) that encouraged local resistance to Soviet pressure. Starting in mid-1946 American influence in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Near East took varying forms: military demonstrations and assistance, economic aid, and encouraging statements. At the Paris Peace Conference, non-Communist delegations

[45] Ward, *Threat of Peace*, pp. 168, 176; William H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941–1946* (London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970, of 1953 ed.), p. 722.

[46] B. Bolles, "State Department Career Clique Still Soft-Pedals Chorus Versus Franco," *PM*, 5 April 1946; Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 237–41.

[47] Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 361; Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943–1947* (New York: Humanities Press, 1975), p. 136.

[48] BBC, *Monitor*, 26 April 1946, 3.b.ii.; 29 April 1946, 3.b.ii.; 2 May 1946, 3.b.ii.; 3 May 1946, 3.b.iv.; 11 May 1946, 3.a.vi.

[49] See Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 233–35, 269, 279–80; and Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, pp. 342–82.

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courted Byrnes assiduously, and the United States assumed the political leadership role it had rejected in 1919, which the British observed with relief.[50] It only remained for the United States to complete the consolidation of a supportive public opinion and then acknowledge, as Truman did in March 1947, the cold war assumptions it had been working on since Churchill's visit to the White House a year earlier.

[50] For American activism see Lundestad, *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe,* pp. 167, 170–71, 278–79; and Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 222–37. For Paris conference see Ward, *Threat of Peace*, pp. 127–51. For British approbation see, Foreign Office Memorandum on Attlee-Tsaldaris Discussion, 10 July 1946, *PREM* 8/197. For a general overview see Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 316–52.

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Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link

JULIETTE L. GEORGE
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE

Arthur S. Link of Princeton University has been studying and writing about Woodrow Wilson for some forty years, and he is the editor of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. The thirty-six volumes thus far published in this series are a tribute to his prodigious scholarship. By common consent, Professor Link is the preeminent Wilson scholar of our time. If Link finds serious fault with an interpretation of Wilson, it behooves those who advanced it to re-examine their work in the light of his criticisms. As authors of *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*, we felt placed under such an obligation upon the publication in *Political Science Quarterly* three years ago of an article by Link in collaboration with Edwin A. Weinstein (a psychiatrist and neurologist who has been studying and writing about Wilson for almost fifteen years), and James William Anderson (a clinical psychologist). In their article, Weinstein, Anderson, and Link characterized *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* as "an essentially incorrect interpretation of the personality of Woodrow Wilson and its effect on his career."[1]

[1] See Edwin A. Weinstein, James William Anderson, and Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson's Political Personality: A Reappraisal," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Winter 1978-79): 586; and Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality*

JULIETTE L. GEORGE, coauthor of *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*, has been an editor and political affairs analyst for the U.S. government in Washington, England, and Germany. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, has written extensively about presidential decision making, various aspects of foreign policy, and personality and politics.

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Over the past few years, therefore, we have reviewed our work and have incorporated into our research a great deal of manuscript material that has become available since the publication of *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* in 1956. This review in the light of all the evidence, old and new, has served to confirm our belief in the validity of the interpretation of Wilson we offered in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*. Indeed, the data now available permit a much fuller delineation of the relationship between Wilson and his father—of the extraordinary bond that existed between them, the very intensity of which, in our view, is related to the intensity of Wilson's early self-doubt, his suffering and need for approval (all of which now also may be more fully documented). We continue to view Wilson as a great tragic figure whose "tragic flaw"—a ruinously self-defeating refusal to compromise with his opponents on certain issues that had become emotionally charged for him—evolved out of low self-estimates that we believe he developed as a child in response to his father's demands.

We consider it unfortunate, moreover, that Weinstein, Anderson, and Link present as though it were an indisputable fact Dr. Weinstein's *hypothesis* that beginning in 1896, Woodrow Wilson suffered a series of brain-damaging strokes that significantly and adversely affected his political functioning even so early as during his Princeton presidency. That Weinstein's retrospective interpretation of Wilson's medical problems is open to question among qualified medical specialists is obvious from the statement by Michael F. Marmor, M.D., of the Stanford University School of Medicine (see appendix). Of even greater concern, however, is the fact that Professor Link has permitted himself to state unequivocally in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* that Wilson suffered such strokes. In numerous notes and other editorial apparatus to several volumes of *The Papers*, Link asserts that Wilson had small strokes in 1896 and 1907 and "a major stroke" in 1906.[2] We believe he has thereby compromised the objectivity

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Study (New York: John Day Company, 1956; Dover Publications, 1964). We are exiled in good company. Some years ago Arthur Link wrote of Ray Stannard Baker that his eight-volume *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927-1939) suffered from Baker's having "to a large degree imposed his own personality profile upon Wilson." Moreover, claims Link (without justification, in our opinion), Baker portrayed Wilson "as being mainly feminine in personality, if not virtually a sexual neuter." This of the man in whose early volumes Woodrow Wilson fairly springs to life. Baker's prodigious research resulted in the collection of that rich raw data upon which Link's own work—and that of every other Wilson scholar—heavily rests. See Arthur S. Link, ed., *Woodrow Wilson: A Profile* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), pp. vii-viii.

[2] We shall here cite two of the two dozen instances we have thus far found in Arthur S. Link et al., eds., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 36 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966-). Of Wilson's illness in May 1906, it is stated in the introduction to vol. 16: "Years of excessive work take their toll in late May 1906, when Wilson suffers a major stroke that seems for a moment to threaten his life. . . ." (p. vii). In December 1907, Moses Taylor Pyne, a Princeton trustee, wrote to Wilson saying he was sorry to learn "that you were suffering from an attack of Neuritis" (ibid., vol. 17, p. 549). Link's editorial footnote to the word "Neuritis" reads: "In fact, Wilson had unquestionably suffered a slight stroke" (ibid., p. 550).

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of that otherwise superb series and therefore compromised its value to historians, both present and future.

Weinstein, Anderson, and Link state in their critique that *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*

> suffers from three major deficiencies, which, taken together, result in an inaccurate portrayal of Wilson's personality. The principal failing of the book is that the research on which it rests is inadequate. Second, the Georges fail to recognize the limitations of their psychological model and misrepresent evidence to fit their theory. Third, they ignore Wilson's neurological disorders as conditions affecting his behavior.[3]

We shall address these criticisms in turn.

Source Materials for *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*

Weinstein, Anderson, and Link disparage our research – *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* furnishes " 'deep' interpretations of the work of others."[4] In our book, we characterized our work as "largely a synthesis and reinterpretation of well-known facts of Wilson's career."[5] We did not claim to be historians, nor was it our aim to uncover new data: rather, we hoped to cast a fresh eye on that which was already known. Indeed, we extracted a great deal of useful information from the published literature. To the extent that we could gain access to them at the time we were doing our research, however, we also studied the major primary sources.

The three principal relevant manuscript collections were: the Wilson papers at the Library of Congress, the papers of Ray Stannard Baker at the Library of Congress, and the papers of Colonel House at the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University. Mrs. Wilson, who was notoriously chary of granting scholars access to the Wilson papers, rejected our periodically renewed requests until our study was almost complete. Then we were allowed to read a series of documents which, Katharine E. Brand (Mrs. Wilson's representative in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress) assured us, was all the collection contained for the years of Wilson's childhood and youth. We found little of significance in what we were allowed to see that Baker had not already published.

Miss Brand herself had charge of Baker's papers and she granted us access to them. We studied the Baker papers, over a period of years, to the great enrichment of our comprehension of Woodrow Wilson. For Baker, with Mrs. Wilson's help, had collected the reminiscences of scores of Wilson's family, friends, and associates. His papers remain an indispensable source for Wilson researchers.

Access to Colonel House's papers was controlled by Charles Seymour,

[3] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 587.

[4] Ibid., p. 598.

[5] George and George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, p. 323.

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president-emeritus of Yale University. Shortly after Seymour announced that Colonel House's diary would be open to scholars, we applied for, and were granted, permission to read it. It is a source of abiding satisfaction to us that, although we do not consider ourselves historians, we found and published for the first time numerous passages in House's diary (which Seymour had omitted from *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*) revealing of certain significant aspects of the Colonel's attitude toward Wilson.

Inga Floto, whose book *Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919* Weinstein, Anderson, and Link refer to as "the most authoritative study of House at the Paris Peace Conference," characterizes *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* as "epoch making," a " 'coup' from an historian's point of view."[6] We find it awkward to cite her generous praise but consider the disparagement of our research by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link justification for doing so. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, Floto writes, is "the first attempt at a consistent utilization of House's voluminous diary in its full, chronological scope," and she credits us with having made available material of "decisive importance."[7]

Weinstein, Anderson, and Link make no reference whatever to our use of primary source materials, let alone to the fact that we unearthed new data. We consider this an unfair omission and their criticism of our research unjustified.

Woodrow Wilson's Personality

We turn now to the second of our "principal failings": ". . . the Georges fail to recognize the limitations of their psychological model and misrepresent evidence to fit their theory."[8] It seems to us that we were not only aware but scrupulous to convey to readers an awareness that what we were presenting for their consideration is an interpretation of Wilson based on certain hypotheses, which we articulated and invited them to examine on the basis of data, which we also presented. We explicitly stated in our book that the validity of our interpretations is necessarily a matter of opinion:

> No incontrovertible proof can be offered. Nor can any one incident be relied upon to sustain this or any other theory of Wilson's motivation. It is only when the man's career

[6] Inga Floto, *Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919* (Aarhus, Denmark: Universitetsforlaget, 1973; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 597.

[7] Floto, *Colonel House in Paris*, pp. 13, 20, 21. We cite Floto solely on the question of our research and do not mean to suggest that she endorses our interpretation of the House-Wilson relationship. To be sure, she credits us with "elucidating the 'mechanism' " of the friendship in an "unassailable" fashion, but she is critical of our analysis of the "break." Her book is an important contribution to a continuing discussion among historians. We think, however, that the assertion by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link that Floto "proves conclusively that the cause of the so-called break between the two men was House's failure to follow Wilson's explicit instructions while the latter was in the United States" ("A Reappraisal," p. 597) is an oversimplification.

[8] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 587.

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> is viewed as a whole that a repetition of certain basically similar behavior is discernible. Let the reader consider whether these patterns of behavior become more consistently comprehensible in terms of the explanations herein offered than in terms of other explanations. That will be the best test of their usefulness.[9]

Weinstein, Anderson, and Link evince no such restraint in the presentation of their hypotheses. Consider, for example, the way they conclude their statement concerning Wilson's inability to read until he was eleven, which they attribute to developmental dyslexia, physiologically determined, and which we, on the other hand, suggest in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* may have derived from feelings of inadequacy and been an unconscious expression of resentment of his father's perfectionist demands.[10] Say Weinstein, Anderson, and Link: "We do not have a good record of Wilson's childhood such as might be gained from contemporary letters, diaries, or autobiographies; like any other child, he may have felt insecurities. However, it is certain that they did not come about in the manner postulated by the Georges."[11] Whence, in the absence of adequate data, these authors' certainty? Is peremptory assertion a substitute for reasoned argument? So apparently Weinstein, Anderson, and Link think; for so many of their interpretations and medical diagnoses are couched in categorical language—language that we consider inappropriate to the speculative nature of their enterprise.

The Dyslexia Hypothesis

Let us get down to specific cases: we do not think our hypothesis about Wilson's delayed acquisition of reading skills can be thus handily dispatched. Nor do we consider it irrelevant that Link's present certainty about the cause of Wilson's reading problem follows decades of his failing to recognize that a problem requiring explanation even existed. In *Wilson: The Road to the White House*, published in 1947, he did not even refer to Wilson's early learning difficulties and wrote that "Wilson's boyhood was notable, if for nothing else, because of his normal development."[12] (This notwithstanding that years before, Baker, whose work Link cites, had specifically drawn attention to Wilson's early slow development.)[13]

Twenty years later, in 1967—long after we, in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, had again drawn attention to the data of Wilson's early learning problems and he himself had mentioned in passing that Wilson "was a late starter"—Link was still arguing that "all evidence indicates that Wilson had a normal boy-

[9] George and George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, p. 12. See also ibid., p. 114.

[10] See ibid., p. 7.

[11] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," pp. 588–89.

[12] Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 2.

[13] Baker, *Life and Letters*, vol. 1, pp. 36–37.

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hood, at least as normal as was possible for boys growing up in the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction."[14]

By 1968, Link was at least referring, however doubtfully, to the "family tradition" which "may or may not be correct" according to which Wilson "did not learn to read until he was nine." (Actually the data indicate he had learned only his letters when he was nine. He could not read until he was eleven.) To be sure, Link was now willing to acknowledge that the boy "seems to have suffered from insecurity on account of his inability to achieve as rapidly as he thought he should," but he was quick to pronounce it "normal insecurity." "His personal advantages and precocity aside," Link wrote, "Wilson seems to have been a remarkably normal person during the first forty years of his life. His childhood was serene. . . ."[15]

The article in *Political Science Quarterly* by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link provides gratifying indication that Link has at last taken notice of what he joins his colleagues in correctly describing as the "well-known" facts of Wilson's boyhood learning difficulties. However, the diagnosis he joins them in offering—developmental dyslexia—seems to us to collapse under scrutiny.

Weinstein, Anderson, and Link speak of developmental dyslexia as if it were a now thoroughly understood disability of established etiology.

> Undiagnosed in Wilson's childhood, the condition was well-known to neurologists at the time that the Georges wrote their book. However, a number of psychiatrists and psychologists still believed that the condition was an emotional rather than a neurological problem, and the Georges simply chose an explanation that was currently popular. The condition is a frequent one, occurring in about 10 percent of the school population, significantly more frequently in boys. Research over the past seventy years indicates that developmental dyslexia is caused by a delay in the establishment of the dominance of one cerebral hemisphere—usually the left—for language.[16]

A far less confident tone about the nature of reading disabilities and various types of dyslexia is taken by several of the experts who participated in the conference on dyslexia conducted in 1977 by the National Institute of Mental Health. For example, Michael Rutter, a British psychiatrist, contends that the term "dyslexia" has not yet been even satisfactorily defined and that "the presumption of a neurological basis is just that—namely a presumption." He

[14] George and George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, p. 7; and Arthur S. Link, "The Case for Woodrow Wilson," *Harper's Magazine* 234 (April 1967): 91. In anticipation of the argument that Wilson did poorly because his schooling was disrupted in consequence of the disrupted times, let us point out that "Tommy" was a *conspicuously* poor student compared to his peers. According to Baker, " 'Tommy' Wilson's school work was decidedly below average" and his teacher complained to Dr. Joseph Wilson that "Tommy" was at the foot of his class not for want of ability but because he would not study (Baker, *Life and Letters;* vol. 1, p. 42; also the Papers of Ray Stannard Baker, Series IB, Box 3, "Memo for the Augusta Period," Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., p. 10). Link had referred to Wilson as a "late starter" in *Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography* (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1963), p. 18.

[15] Link, *A Profile*, pp. xiv-xv.

[16] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 588.

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considers it "meaningless" at this time to attempt any estimate of the prevalence of dyslexia.[17] While there is great interest in the hypothesis that a delay in the acquisition of left-hemisphere dominance may be associated with some cases of reading difficulty, Rutter believes that "the evidence on this point remains inconclusive." John Hughes of the Department of Neurology, University of Illinois School of Medicine, writes: "Satz (1976) has summarized the data relating cerebral dominance and dyslexia and has claimed that information is still lacking on this crucial issue." As for the etiology of reading disorders, a number of eminent psychiatrists *continue* to believe that emotional factors are the basis for some of them.[18]

Our purpose in citing the continuing perplexities of specialists in dyslexia research is to counter the impression that readers might well gain from Weinstein, Anderson, and Link that medical research has solved the mystery of reading disabilities and that psychological explanations have been eliminated for all varieties. According to Rutter the very concept of developmental dyslexia "constitutes a hypothesis—the hypothesis that within the large overall group of disabled readers there is a subgroup with a distinct constitutionally determined condition."[19] Very well. Weinstein, Anderson, and Link claim that "Tommy" Wilson was such an intrinsically impaired child. What is their evidence?

"Specific evidence" of developmental dyslexia, Weinstein, Anderson, and Link claim, is that Wilson "was a slow reader into adult life. At the Johns Hopkins, the amount of assigned reading was his bane. 'Steady reading,' he wrote his fiancée, 'always demands of me more expenditure of resolution and dogged energy than any other sort of work.' "[20]

The sentence from Wilson's letter to his fiancée, Ellen Axson, that Weinstein, Anderson, and Link quote in support of their thesis is incorrectly cited as having been written on 29 March 1884. This is an error of some consequence, since its correct date, 29 *November* 1884, places it within the period that Wilson was making a heroic effort to toil through the reading required for obtaining a Ph.D. It was an effort he detested, which only weeks before he had decided to abandon on the grounds, he had written Ellen Axson, that "a forced march through fourteen thousand pages of dry reading" would jeopardize his health. "I am quite sure that I shall profit much more substantially from a line of reading of my own choosing, in the lines of my own original work. . . ."[21]

[17] Michael Rutter, "Prevalence and Types of Dyslexia," in *Dyslexia: An Appraisal of Current Knowledge*, eds. A. L. Benton and D. Pearl (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 5, 24. The chapters in this book were written for the National Institute of Mental Health conference.

[18] Ibid., p. 9; John R. Hughes, "Electroencephalographic and Neurophysiological Studies in Dyslexia," p. 234 and O. Spreen, "The Dyslexias: A Discussion of Neurobehavioral Research," pp. 178–79, both in *Dyslexia*, Benton and Pearl; also see Leon Eisenberg, "Psychiatric Aspects of Language Disability," in *Reading, Perception and Language: Papers from the World Congress on Dyslexia*, eds. D. D. Duane and M. B. Rawson (Baltimore, Md.: York Press, 1975), p. 225.

[19] Rutter, "Prevalence and Types of Dyslexia," p. 24.

[20] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 588.

[21] Wilson to Ellen Axson, 8 November 1884, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 3, p. 415.

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Nonetheless, in those days, as in these, a degree made a man more marketable. Wilson, avid to equip himself for a job that would give him the wherewithal to marry, reluctantly embarked on the hateful "forced march" shortly after he had renounced it. The drudgery was all but unbearable. His letters to Ellen Axson during these weeks and until mid-February, 1885, chronicle his growing distress. He is tempted "to throw down these heavy volumes and run out into the glories of the open air." He berates himself for not accepting the necessity of complying with the requirements. Try as he will to submit, "I often grow savagely out of humour with my present state of pupilage. . . ."[22]

Reading for the Ph.D. was not the full measure of his problem. "I am handicapped for my degree," he wrote to a friend, "because of the extra work with which I was indiscreet enough to saddle myself." He had committed himself to collaborate on a history of political economy with one of his professors. "I am to wade—am wading, indeed—through innumerable American text writers," he continued, "for the purpose of writing . . . about one-third of the projected treatise." As for the degree, "it's this year or never."[23] The burden proved too great and, finally, on 19 February 1885, he wrote to his fiancée: "I have given up—this time conclusively—the struggle for the degree. . . . Cramming kills me; reading in development of a subject improves and invigorates me."[24]

Is the sentence that Weinstein, Anderson, and Link pluck from one of the letters Wilson wrote in the midst of the struggle described above credible evidence of developmental dyslexia? That construction of it strikes us as tortured. It seems to us much more likely that Wilson's statement indicates his distress at the *kind* of reading that was being demanded of him and the crushing amount of it.

If the record suggested that Wilson was generally a reluctant reader, slow because the very act of reading was difficult for him, the case for Weinstein, Anderson, and Link's hypothesis of developmental dyslexia would gain some ground. The record fails them, however. One has but to look through the diary he kept during the summer after his freshman year at Princeton to see that he was in fact an omnivorous reader, provided only that he had a taste for the matter at hand: Macaulay, Shakespeare, Gibbon, Plutarch, Pepys, Dickens, novels, magazines, encyclopedia articles—all passed under his frequently enthusiastic but, by preference, unhurried scrutiny.[25] The argument may be summed up in a simple statistic: that is takes no less than thirty pages of quite fine print in the index to the first twelve volumes of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* to cover the subject category, "Woodrow Wilson—Reading."[26]

[22] Wilson to Ellen Axson, 20 January 1885, ibid., p. 623; 13 February 1885, ibid., vol. 4, pp. 244–45.

[23] Wilson to Heath Dabney, 14 February 1885, ibid., vol. 4, pp. 248–49.

[24] Wilson to Ellen Axson, 19 February 1885, ibid., p. 269.

[25] See ibid., vol. 1, pp. 83–128, and 132 ff. for a still earlier diary and "Commonplace Book" in which Wilson recorded his enjoyment of reading. See also Wilson to his sister, Annie Howe, on 19 April 1876 in which he reports "employing most of the last week in reading" and finding "a great deal of enjoyment" in it (ibid., p. 128).

[26] See ibid., vol. 13, pp. 267–97.

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Weinstein, Anderson, and Link claim two other "groups" of "specific evidence that Wilson had developmental dyslexia": he was "extremely poor in arithmetic," an ineptitude commonly associated with developmental dyslexia; and he quickly "and without practice" mastered writing with his left hand when in 1896 (as the result of a stroke, they say, an assertion about which more later) he was unable to write with his right hand. This ability "strongly suggests that he had mixed cerebral dominance for language."[27]

We question that the dyslexia hypothesis finds support from these "groups" of evidence. Being "extremely poor in arithmetic" can have a score of explanations other than developmental dyslexia; moreover, whatever his difficulties with arithmetic, Wilson's capabilities ranged from keeping meticulous personal financial records to overseeing the formulation of national economic policy and the negotiation of intricate international economic questions. As for his left-handed writing, given Wilson's considerable artistic talents and his intense perseverence, it is not surprising that he succeeded in acquiring that skill. It was not the easy accomplishment that Weinstein, Anderson, and Link suggest, however. We know from Stockton Axson's account that Wilson set about the task with "customary determination."[28] We know from Wilson himself that he practiced "laboriously," notwithstanding which writing with his left hand remained "clumsy and uncertain," "awkward," "tedious," "a painfully slow process"—"it takes me half an hour to [write] one of these pages."[29] In short, Wilson does not seem to have been naturally ambidextrous. Even with practice, writing with his left hand seems to have remained an uncomfortable occasional necessity rather than an easy alternative to the use of his clearly preferred right hand.

The dyslexia hypothesis suffers further when one considers two aspects of dyslexia about which the experts generally agree: that it is strongly associated with disordered handwriting and with persistently atrocious spelling.[30] Wilson's handwriting—as surely Weinstein, Anderson, and Link would agree—is a very model of beautiful penmanship. Even his check registers look like copperplate. And he was an excellent speller. His errors were few and far between.

For the purpose of pursuing our critics' train of thought, however, let us grant for a moment that "Tommy" Wilson suffered from some inborn defect, that it was indeed developmental dyslexia that impeded his learning to read. What

[27] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 588.

[28] "Material on Woodrow Wilson Prepared by Dr. Stockton Axson with Occasional Assistance of Admiral Cary T. Grayson," a memoir owned personally by Professor Link. See chapter entitled "Health and Recreations," p. 15. We wish to thank Professor Link for granting us access to this manuscript.

[29] Wilson to Dr. Azel W. Hazen, 29 March 1897, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 10, p. 201. Wilson to Ellen Axson Wilson, 17, 21, and 23 June 1896, and 3 July, 18 August 1896, ibid., vol. 9, pp. 519, 523, 527, 532, 573. Also see Wilson to Ellen Axson Wilson, 29 June 1908, ibid., vol. 18, p. 345.

[30] Macdonald Critchley, *The Dyslexic Child* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1970), pp. 36-40. See also Rutter, "Prevalence and Types of Dyslexia," p. 18.

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would the psychological consequences of such a disability have been, both upon the boy and his parents? The literature on dyslexia is clear that every poor reader, no matter what the cause of his problem, is predisposed to feeling inadequate, "bad," or "stupid."[31]

Weinstein, Anderson, and Link give passing recognition to the fact that "the reading disability affected Wilson's development and his relationship with his parents," but they immediately add "but hardly in the way that the Georges state." How, then, *was* the boy affected? "It probably made him more dependent on his family," they say. They acknowledge that "he may have feared that his reading problems indicated that he was stupid or lazy" and that "the condition probably made Dr. Wilson more pedagogic and insistent on drilling his 'lazy' son." Having edged up to the dread explanation, Weinstein, Anderson, and Link hurry away and remove Dr. Wilson with them: during the Civil War he was sometimes away from home; other family members read to Wilson and he enjoyed that; and the data are lacking, but whatever insecurities Wilson might have felt "it is certain that they did not come about in the manner postulated by the Georges."[32]

This account by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link leaves some nagging loose ends that not only deserve but demand consideration. What would the effect be on a boy to fear that he was stupid or lazy—and, by the way, there is no "may have" about it: years later when he was president, Wilson often reminisced about his boyhood with his physician and friend, Cary Grayson, and Grayson recalls that "he often spoke of himself as being a lazy boy."[33] What attitudes toward himself would his father's "insistent drilling" have engendered—his father, a master of the English language, a brilliant expositor of Calvinist doctrine, which says nothing about developmental dyslexia but a great deal about wickedness and sin and dereliction of duty? Would this devoted father, a man of his times, not have had an especially poignant stake in the intellectual progress of this, his third child but first son, and been frustrated and disappointed at the boy's poor performance? And would "Tommy's" self-concept not almost inevitably have suffered? Would he not have felt humiliated, unworthy, inadequate? In short, would this family situation not have fostered the ripening in a boy's heart of those low estimates of himself that these authors deny existed? It seems to us they overlook the ample evidence that this was the case and refuse to draw the conclusion obvious even from their prettified account of the family interaction.

[31] Eisenberg, "Psychiatric Aspects of Language Disability," p. 220. See also D. Duane, "Summary of the World Congress on Dyslexia," in *Reading, Perception and Language*, Duane and Rawson, p. 5; and Critchley, *The Dyslexic Child*, p. 97.

[32] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," pp. 588-89.

[33] "Memorandum of Interviews with Dr. Cary T. Grayson on February 18, 19, 1926 at Washington," Papers of Ray Stannard Baker, Box 109.

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Woodrow Wilson and His Father

For the sake of evaluating Weinstein, Anderson, and Link's thesis on its own ground, we have thus far omitted the ingredient of Dr. Wilson's propensity for sarcasm and severe criticism and how these are likely to have impinged upon his son's development. "The Georges claim that Wilson suffered from a troubled relationship with his father," write Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, and they reject the idea.[34] Having attempted to subtract Wilson's reading problem as indication of father-son stress, they try to belittle the significance of the testimony of young family members that Joseph R. Wilson, a man of many virtues to be sure, was also a sarcastic tease.

The evidence cannot be so handily dispatched, however. And now there is a good deal more of it than was available at the time we were writing *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*. There is, for example, an unpublished manuscript by Dr. Stockton Axson, the much younger brother of the first Mrs. Wilson, who lived with the Woodrow Wilsons for a number of years. Axson was not only Woodrow Wilson's devoted friend for over forty years; he was also a great favorite of Wilson's father. The two were fast friends to the day Joseph Ruggles Wilson died, and Stockton Axson thought the old minister a great man. Yet he wrote at length of the forbidding side of Dr. Joseph Wilson and of how, when displeased, his humor "bubbled *hot*" in "scalding sarcasms" which could be "really withering." He had in him, Axson tells us, "a certain savage humor which caused him to say sometimes cruel things even to those who loved him and whom he loved." Notwithstanding his qualities of greatness, he was a

[34] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 587. Space limitations preclude further discussion of Wilson's childhood and relationship with his father. For relevant data, see George and George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, pp. 6–13, 31–32, 271–72; see also George and George, "*Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*: A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson and Link" (Paper delivered at the 1981 meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Mannheim, Germany, June 1981), pp. 10–78. We hope to publish elsewhere a fuller account, made possible by the data now available, about Wilson's father as his relentlessly driving (as well as wonderfully incisive) critic; and of Wilson's longing to do—as he put it—"immortal work," work of such noble service to humanity that to further it he felt morally justified to indulge his aggressions against those who stood in his way in that sphere of authority in which he sought compensatory gratifications.

One interesting vein of data—a good deal of which Professor Link, unfortunately, has omitted from *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*—is contained in letters to Wilson from his parents about their difficulties in raising Wilson's much younger brother Joseph R. Wilson, Jr. ("Josie"), ten years Wilson's junior. Dr. and Mrs. Wilson complain to the now studious and increasingly successful "Woodrow" that "Josie" is "lazy"—even as Wilson himself, as a boy, had been made to feel. They disparage "Josie's" nascent competences, express concern about his lack of will to study, seek Wilson's advice about what to "do" about the hapless boy (as, when Wilson was a lad, his father had conferred with the family's distinguished elders about what to "do" about *his* poor performance in school). They poke fun at "Josie," squelch his wish to play, disparage his popularity with his fellows, express surprise and amusement at his accomplishments. In short, years after publication of our book, further documentation has emerged of a parental style that includes the seriously ego-damaging characteristics which we—on the basis of practically no evidence, according to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link—were able to describe in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*.

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"ruthless sort of a man," Axson wrote, "a man with a distinct streak of perversity in him." In his sarcasm, he reminded Axson of Jonathan Swift.[35]

The sarcasm, the mordant wit, the cruel teasing, the relentless drilling to which he subjected his son obviously constituted only one facet of Dr. Joseph Wilson's personality. We do not for a moment deny—nor did we in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*—that there is rich and persuasive evidence of the comradeship between Wilson and his father, of abiding love, and of the transmission from father to son of moral values and of a range of skills and perceptions that fostered the greatness of Woodrow Wilson.[36] Recognizing and giving full weight to this evidence, however, does not necessitate refusing to recognize, as we think our critics refuse to do, that *all* facets of Joseph Wilson entered into his interaction with his son and that the syndrome we tried to trace in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* also had important consequences. Weinstein, Anderson, and Link write as though they consider it beyond the realm of possibility that the demanding father may have generated in his sensitive son feelings of inadequacy and also of unconscious resentment. Is it likely that the boy never inwardly rebelled at the stern religious teachings graven into his soul? Did Woodrow Wilson enjoy some divine dispensation from experiencing conflicting emotions about a beloved parent? Is it really unthinkable to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link that Wilson may have had to deal with ambivalence?

There is the briefest intimation—half a sentence—that such questions crossed our critics' minds. "Dr. Wilson had a tremendous influence on his son," they write, "and probably no boy grows up without *some* resentment toward his father."[37] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link write as though any unconscious resentment Wilson felt toward his father was of minor dimensions and without significant repercussions for the understanding of his political behavior. They write as though his early learning difficulties neither resulted from nor led to psychological problems that importantly affected his development. They leave unmentioned and show no sign of having considered the implications of many self-revealing statements Wilson made in private conversations or of dozens of self-characterizations to be found in his letters, in his diaries, and sometimes even in his public utterances which bespeak great inner turmoil.

Wilson's Enduring Anxieties

We shall cite just one such statement to convey the flavor of the evidence. In 1884, at age twenty-eight—long before any of the "strokes" that Weinstein, Anderson, and Link claim altered his personality—Wilson wrote to his fiancée:

[35] "Material on Woodrow Wilson Prepared by Dr. Stockton Axson," chapter entitled "Woodrow Wilson and His Father," pp. 5, 8, 15–16; chapter entitled "Dr. Joseph R. Wilson," pp. 1, 2, 9, 12–13; chapter entitled "The Personality of Woodrow Wilson," Part II, p. 24; and untitled chapter, pp. 4–5.

[36] George and George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, pp. 3, 12–13.

[37] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 592 (emphasis added).

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> It isn't pleasant or convenient to have strong passions: and it is particularly hard in my case to have to deal with unamiable feelings; because the only whip with which I can subdue them is the whip of hard study and that lacerates *me* as often as it conquers my crooked dispositions. I hope that none of my friends—and much more none of my enemies!—will ever find out *how much it costs me to give up my own way*. I have the uncomfortable feeling that I am carrying a volcano about with me.[38]

In other letters to Ellen Axson Wilson he refers to himself as "a man of a sensitive, restless, overwrought disposition." He speaks of his "sombre, morbid nature," his "fears," "anxieties," "morose moods," of "my poor, mixed, inexplicable nature." "Deep perturbations are natural to me, deep disturbances of spirit." He writes of "my natural self-distrust," of having "never been sanguine," of often falling when irritated into "the stern, indignant, defiant humour, the scarcely suppressed belligerent temper for which there are abundant materials in my disposition." "I have to guard my emotions from painful overflow," he confides.[39]

Such feelings, so persistently and intensely expressed, require explanation. Weinstein, Anderson, and Link offer none. We believe that these emotions were related to his ceaseless effort to maintain his self-esteem; that for Wilson carving out a sphere of competence in public life and striving for high achievement were a means of overcoming feelings of unimportance, of moral inferiority, of weakness, of mediocrity, of intellectual inadequacy; that in certain crucial situations in his public career, Wilson's self-defeating stubbornness and unwillingness to defer (or at least make expedient gestures of deference) to men whose cooperation was essential to the accomplishment of his goals were irrational manifestations of underlying low self-estimates against which he had constantly to struggle. It remains our conviction that the hypotheses advanced in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, applied to the vast body of data concerning Woodrow Wilson, have consistent explanatory power.[40]

Woodrow Wilson's Medical Problems

The third "principal failing" of *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, according to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, is that we "ignore Wilson's neurological disorders as conditions affecting his behavior." Undaunted by the virtual absence of medical records for this period of Wilson's life, they assert unequivocally that he suffered strokes in 1896, 1900, 1904, 1906, and 1907.

[38] Wilson to Ellen Axson, 7 December 1884, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 3, p. 522 (emphasis added).

[39] See in ibid. Wilson to Ellen Axson (Wilson), 17 February 1885 (vol. 4, p. 263), 13 March 1892 (vol. 7, p. 483), 20 July 1908 (vol. 18, p. 372), 9 August 1902 (vol. 14, p. 68), 23 February 1900 (vol. 11, p. 436), 28 January 1895 (vol. 9, p. 137), 20 March 1885 (vol. 4, p. 389), and 29 August 1902 (vol. 14, p. 118).

[40] See also Alexander L. George, "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders," *Journal of Social Issues* 24 (July 1968):29–49.

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They say that "by the end of World War I, Wilson was showing signs of generalized cerebral involvement." They state further that an episode of illness (which Weinstein had earlier diagnosed as a stroke) in April 1919 while he was negotiating the Versailles Peace Treaty in Paris was not only influenza but "probably a virus encephalopathy, which, superimposed on pre-existing brain damage, produced changes in behavior which may have influenced the outcome of the peace negotiations." The massive stroke of October 1919 which, as is well known, paralyzed Wilson's left side also, according to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, resulted in personality changes "which were important factors in his failure to obtain ratification of the Treaty of Versailles."[41]

It is certainly the case that we did not think that brain damage became a factor to consider in Wilson's political behavior until the autumn of 1919. While doing our research for *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, we were alert to the possibility that personality changes affecting his handling of the League controversy in the Senate may have followed the catastrophic stroke of October 2. There was indeed evidence that he was given to outbursts of tears and of temper. His pathetic hope that the Democratic convention might renominate him and that he could win a third term in 1920 suggested impairment of his judgment of the political realities. A moving memorandum by Katharine E. Brand detailing Woodrow Wilson's last years made it clear that in many ways he was but a shadow of his former self. Nonetheless it was our conclusion then and it is our conclusion now that his behavior on the League issue remained intact. Whatever the nature of the brain damage he sustained in the fall of 1919, it altered neither his grasp of his problem with the Senate nor his strategy to deal with it. He had struck his unyielding position long before October 1919—a position that anguished practically everyone who cared personally about him or supported U.S. entry into the League of Nations. Wilson's conduct in this respect after the stroke was entirely consistent with his behavior before it. Both before and after, ample warnings were conveyed to him of the all but inevitable consequences of his refusal at every turn to compromise. Both before and after the stroke, he rejected these warnings, using the same arguments against compromise and cogently communicating them from his sickbed. The stroke seemed not to modify his behavior one whit in this respect.

Of course, it is possible to argue that he *would* have changed his position had he not been stricken. One can only speculate. Our own guess, given his history, is that he would not have yielded, that his stubbornness was in the deepest sense an

[41] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," pp. 587, 594. It is useful throughout this discussion to bear in mind Dr. Weinstein's criteria for accepting impaired brain function as an etiological or causal agent in political behavior. He stated them in his article, "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness," *Journal of American History* 57 (1970), as follows: "First, the appearance of clinical evidence of brain damage should coincide with behavioral change. Second, the behavioral change should involve some impairment in performance. Third, it should be possible to classify actions in the political field into behavioral syndromes known to be associated with certain types of brain damage" (p. 325).

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expression of the integrity of his functioning on the public issue of supreme value to him. To the day he died, he expressed the conviction that history would vindicate him. To those who knew and loved him best, his refusal to compromise was a source of sorrow rather than of surprise. A sense of some terrible inner logic to his self-defeating behavior in terms of stable, persistent characteristics that they had long since recognized pervades their narratives.

His implacable enemy, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, too, sensed that Wilson was held to his course by some invincible inner compulsion. The leading opponent of Senate ratification of the Treaty as submitted by Wilson, Lodge based his strategy upon a shrewd assessment of Wilson's personality. He calculated that Wilson would never agree to accept even minor reservations, that rather than compromise with the Senate and particularly with him (Lodge), Wilson would allow the treaty—League of Nations and all—to be defeated.[42]

The drama unfolded quite as Lodge had foreseen. His tactical finesse in maneuvering Wilson from one excruciating refusal to compromise to another testifies to his deadly insight into the tragic flaw in Wilson's character. He was not confounded by any perplexing "changes" in Wilson. His success at predicting Wilson's reactions suggests their constancy through all the vicissitudes of Wilson's health.

There was a time when Link recognized the relationship between Wilson's character and the recurrent defeats he suffered. In his book, *Wilson: The Road to the White House*, Link wrote:

> The Princeton period was the microcosm of a later macrocosm, and a political observer, had he studied carefully Wilson's career as president of Princeton University, might have forecast accurately the shape of things to come during the period when Wilson was president of the United States. What striking similarities there are between the Princeton and the national periods![43]

Link's comment pertained to the quad and graduate school controversies that fractured the Princeton community in 1907 and continued to reverberate bitterly for years after Wilson's resignation from the Princeton presidency in 1910. The quad controversy revolved about Wilson's plan to build quadrangles in which upper and lower classmen, some graduate students, and unmarried preceptors would live and eat together thereby, Wilson argued, stimulating intellectual exchange outside of the classroom. Opponents, among whom were

[42] See Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925). Wilson, Lodge wrote, "was simply an element to be calmly and coolly considered in a great problem of international politics" (p. 226). It was "of vital moment to me" to make "a correct analysis of Mr. Wilson's probable attitude" (p. 219; see also pp. 212–13). Lodge's insight was based upon years of hostile but astute observation stretching back to the beginning of Wilson's administration—a period during which, if we understand Weinstein, Anderson, and Link correctly, they believe Wilson to have been relatively free of manifestations of the brain damage from which they say he suffered.

[43] Link, *The Road to the White House*, p. 90.

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wealthy alumni on whose contributions any construction would depend, viewed the plan as a threat to the eating clubs to which many were sentimentally attached and as having high-handedly been presented to the Board of Trustees before discussion with faculty and alumni. Moreover, they regarded Wilson's quad plan as a brazen attempt to divert attention and resources from the long-planned development of the graduate college under the leadership of its dean, Andrew Fleming West. In 1906, at Wilson's own behest, West had declined an invitation to become president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in favor of remaining at Princeton in order to put the graduate college into operation. A bitter dispute erupted between Wilson and his supporters and West and his supporters which crystallized around the ostensible issue of where the proposed graduate college should be located. Various concessions to Wilson's views were offered including substantial reform of the eating clubs, stripping Dean West of much of his authority, and compromising on the site issue. Wilson refused them all.

Writing in *Wilson: The Road to the White House* about what he then considered Wilson's unreasonable behavior, Link said: "The vagaries of his mind during this period are unfathomable." At that time he found the most striking fact about the whole Princeton controversy "the absence of any clear-cut issue" and that Wilson had shifted from one issue to another so that "it was almost impossible to tell where he really stood."[44] He attributed Wilson's difficulties at Princeton and later in his career explicitly to his *character* rather than to the logic of the situations he confronted:

> Wilson was a headstrong and determined man who was usually able to rationalize his actions in terms of the moral law and to identify his position with the divine will. . . . The time came at Princeton, Trenton, and Washington when Wilson did not command the support of the groups to whom he was responsible. Naturally, he was not able to change his character even had he wanted to change it, with the result that controversy and disastrous defeat occurred in varying degrees in all three cases.[45]

Link now holds a different view of the Princeton imbroglio, as he indicates in a footnote to the article by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link: "Arthur S. Link wishes to state that much new evidence discovered since the publication of his *Wilson: The Road to the White House* in 1947 has convinced him that his treatment of Wilson and West and the graduate college controversy is inadequate and unbalanced."[46]

The account of the Princeton controversy given by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link suggests that Wilson's actions in fact derived from a reasonable assessment of the situation rather than from characterological idiosyncrasies. If this is indeed Link's current interpretation, it collides with the simultaneous claim that

[44] Ibid., pp. 76, 78.
[45] Ibid., pp. viii–ix.
[46] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 596, n. 30.

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"changes" in Wilson's behavior due to brain damage from the alleged strokes of 1896, 1900, 1904, 1906, and 1907 impaired his performance and played a critical role in his defeat. To us it seems that to the extent that they consider Wilson's refusal to compromise in the quad and graduate college battles a reasonable defense of his principles, they reduce the grounds for arguing the significance of the alleged personality and behavioral changes in consequence of the alleged strokes.

Wilson's Behavior in Paris

If in their article Professor Link repudiates the interpretive structure of *Wilson: The Road to the White House*, Dr. Weinstein also discloses a significant change of view involving one of his key diagnoses: that of Wilson's brief illness in Paris in April 1919. In his widely read and widely quoted article, "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness," published in 1970, Weinstein stated that the most likely cause of Wilson's illness during the Peace Conference was a "cerebral vascular occlusion (blood clot in the brain)"—in short, a stroke. He construed certain aspects of Wilson's behavior during and after his illness as evidence of the kind of behavioral change that would confirm brain damage caused by a stroke. Weinstein described the "cerebral vascular occlusion" as "a lesion in the right cerebral hemisphere extending to include deeper structures in the limbic-reticular system. With the history of lesions of the left side of the brain, indicated by the attacks of right-sided paresthesia and left monocular blindness from 1896 to 1908, he now had evidence of bilateral damage, a condition affecting emotional and social behavior more severely than a unilateral lesion."[47]

This medical description was so precise and authoritative in tone that few laymen would dare to take issue with it. The problem is that the major evidence on which it relied—the allegedly strange changes in Wilson's behavior—is tittle-tattle which has gained momentum and grown in absurdity in its passage from one source to another. The historical record, as we shall shortly attempt to show, provides a background against which Wilson's "strange behavior," viewed in context, seems reasonable and rational.

The speculative nature of Weinstein's diagnoses is revealed by the fact that in the article by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link the minutely described stroke of his earlier article is withdrawn. A footnote states that new evidence indicates that it is not likely to have occurred after all.[48] Now readers are informed that

[47] Weinstein, "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness," pp. 341-42.

[48] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 594, n. 26. We wished to include as part of the data we were assembling for independent medical review the "new evidence" that led Dr. Weinstein to abandon his "stroke" diagnosis. For over a year and a half, however, we were unable to gain access to it. Both Professor Link and Dr. Weinstein stated in reply to our several requests that they were bound by a promise of confidentiality not to reveal it. We were especially interested to know how the new evidence related to Dr. Weinstein's current diagnosis of "virus encephalopathy," upon which the hypothesis that Wilson sustained brain damage in Paris must now rest. We therefore

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Wilson had an attack of influenza in Paris in April 1919 (as most historians have thought all along). A crucial aspect of the brain-damage thesis is salvaged, however, for Weinstein, Anderson, and Link also say that it was not merely influenza but "probably a virus encephalopathy." In short, as a result of one disease or another, according to Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson sustained brain damage in April 1919 that significantly affected his judgment in the conduct of the negotiations. In both articles "strange" changes of behavior are cited as evidence of altered brain function.[49]

Let us examine some of this allegedly irrational behavior: one manifestation cited by Weinstein in his earlier article (which presumably constitutes part of the documentation of the "changes in behavior" alleged by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link) was Wilson's instruction to his personal staff in Paris that they use official limousines only for official business. Irwin "Ike" Hoover, White House head usher who served as chief of Wilson's household staff in Paris, is the source of this tale, which he recorded in his book, *42 Years in the White House*. This gentlemen, as his letters to his wife indicate, had grown accustomed to taking joyrides practically every day—sometimes two and three times a day. ("It is fine to order up a big limousine, say 'to the hotel' and off it goes," he wrote to his wife. "Come out, say 'home' and you are on the way back." Of the scores of letters he wrote home, there is scarcely a handful—except when he was at sea en route to or from the conference—in which he did not articulate his use or nonuse of the limousines for the particular day covered. "Ike" missed his family—and also his Dodge automobile to which he referred affectionately in several letters.)[50] Other staff members fell into the same habit of rushing for the cars the moment the president and Mrs. Wilson went out.

One day during his illness in April 1919 the president sent for one member of his staff after the other and found that they were all out in the cars. This angered him and he ordered the staff to curtail use of the cars for personal pleasure.[51] We see nothing "strange" or "irrational" in Wilson's crackdown—

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wrote Dr. Weinstein and asked whether the new evidence proved or suggested the diagnosis of virus encephalopathy. In a letter dated 12 September 1979, he replied that the confidential data did not go beyond confirming the diagnosis of influenza.

On 22 October 1980, Professor Link wrote to us that he had been released from the pledge of confidentiality and he granted us access to the diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, Wilson's physician throughout his presidency. We thank him for this courtesy.

[49] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link make repeated references to physiologically induced behavior and personality changes in Wilson without delineating the characteristic behavior patterns, the underlying personality, upon which the alleged changes impinged. Changes, after all, are comprehensible only in terms of that which preexists. Did the postulated brain damage accentuate certain aspects of a well-established behavior system or did it, in these authors' view, cause quite alien behavior to become manifest?

[50] Papers of Irwin Hoover, Box 2, Library of Congress.

[51] Diary of Cary T. Grayson, 5 April 1919; Gilbert Close to Arthur Walworth, 7 May 1951, Papers of Arthur Walworth, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.

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unless it be that he did not sooner lose his temper at Hoover's profligate abuse of privilege.

On the basis of "Ike" Hoover's account, Weinstein also accepted as "markedly irrational behavior" after his April 1919 illness that Wilson was concerned that the French servants in the house the French government had placed at his disposal were spies. The fact is that many Americans at the conference were worried about spies. Joseph Grew, secretary of the American commission, issued directives warning of the need for the secure handling of confidential papers, for burning trash, for being alert to the possibility that telephones were being tapped, and that French employees might be spying for their government. During the very week of Wilson's illness, Dr. Grayson wrote in his diary that one of the servants who claimed not to speak English had been found to know English fluently and that the French government was engaged in spying on the president. Mrs. Wilson's secretary, Edith Benham, noted in her diary on 29 March 1919 that conversations at meals had to be restrained because "Colonel House says there are spies here in the house who report everything to the Foreign Office." Colonel House noted in his diary at the beginning of the conference that the private wire between his study and Wilson's "is constantly 'covered' to see that it is not tapped."[52]

It seems to us grotesque that Wilson's concern for security at the conference should be interpreted by Weinstein and others as evidence of brain damage. Was Joseph Grew also brain damaged? And Dr. Grayson, Colonel House, and Miss Benham too?

The Question of Strokes

And what about the earlier episodes of illness in 1896, 1900, 1904, 1906, and 1907 which Weinstein, Anderson, and Link state were strokes, the one in 1906 being "the first one to be recognized as such"?[53] By all accounts, Wilson's illness in 1906 was the most serious of his prepresidential years. One spring morning in that year, he awakened unable to see out of his left eye. He immediately consulted two eminent Philadelphia specialists (an ophthalmologist and an internist). The medical records, unfortunately, are missing. Surviving letters and later reminiscences, however, indicate that Wilson was told that a burst blood vessel had caused a hemorrhage in the eye, that he had arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure, and that he needed prolonged rest. Wilson obediently delegated his duties to Princeton colleagues, spent a quiet summer in England and, with medical approval, resumed his work in the fall.

[52] Memoranda nos. 29, 32, 47 from Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to members of the commission and their staffs, Papers of Tasker H. Bliss, Container 286, Library of Congress; Diary of Cary T. Grayson, 8 April 1919; Diary of Edith Benham Helm, 29 March 1919, Library of Congress; Diary of Edward M. House, 7 January 1919, Yale University Library.

[53] Weinstein, Anderson, and Link, "A Reappraisal," p. 596.

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Nowhere could we find evidence that this illness had been diagnosed as a stroke or "recognized as such." We wrote to Weinstein and asked when Wilson's illness in 1906 was recognized as a stroke and by whom. In his reply, Weinstein cited sources that simply contain no mention of a stroke.[54] He further wrote in this letter that Wilson's ophthalmologist and internist knew that he had arteriosclerosis and high blood pressure and that strokes are very common in these conditions; and that they may not have told Wilson in so many words that he had had a stroke but used a euphemism instead. Such speculation on Weinstein's part consisting of what he thinks must have been in other people's minds strikes us as utterly inadequate justification for the unqualified claim by Weinstein, Anderson, and Link that the 1906 illness was a stroke "recognized as such," much less for Link's assertion in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* that it was "a major stroke."

Of course the question to which all the foregoing discussion leads is: how would competent, independent medical authority evaluate Woodrow Wilson's illnesses throughout his career and Weinstein's diagnoses of them? For a response to this question, we turned to Michael F. Marmor, M.D., associate professor of Ophthalmology at the Stanford University School of Medicine. We placed at Marmor's disposal all the data in our possession relating to Wilson's health[55] and made available to him the relevant volumes of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* as well as the source materials cited by Weinstein in his various articles.

Marmor embodied the results of his review in a letter to us dated 18 May 1981 (see appendix for the text). The letter speaks for itself and we need only note here Marmor's main conclusions: that in the absence of documented findings or medical records, Weinstein's analysis is necessarily speculative; that his own reading of the evidence leads him to question both the medical interpretations of Weinstein and the propriety of presenting such views as historical fact.

As a matter of fact, questions about the validity of Weinstein's diagnoses have been raised previously and were brought to the attention of both Link and Weinstein a decade ago. In 1971, Robert T. Monroe, M.D., an internist long associated with the Harvard University School of Medicine, wrote four pages of comments on Weinstein's article, "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness," which had been published the preceding year. He detailed the medical grounds for doubting Weinstein's interpretations and expressed his overall evaluation as follows: "Professor Weinstein seeks to prove that Wilson 'had a long history of

[54] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George to Edwin A. Weinstein, M.D., 19 July 1979 and his reply 12 September 1979. Dr. Weinstein cited Baker, Mrs. Wilson, Stockton Axson, and Moses Taylor Pyne. In a subsequent letter (3 October 1979), Dr. Weinstein said he had no other sources.

[55] This included the diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson as well as our correspondence with both Professor Link and Dr. Weinstein concerning the data upon which they relied for the preparation of their article and, most particularly, for Dr. Weinstein's diagnoses of Wilson's illnesses in 1906 and in Paris in April 1919. Professor Link informed us (letter dated 1 March 1979) that he had no medical records concerning Wilson that have not already been published in the *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* or are not available in the Wilson papers at the Library of Congress.

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cerebral vascular disease,' and that it 'was associated with alterations in behavior and personality.' In my view he has failed on both counts." Weinstein dismissed Monroe's comments as uninformed, and the following year, volume sixteen of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* appeared with the statement in the preface that Wilson's illness in 1906 was "a major stroke."[56]

Implications for *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*

In conclusion, we should like to say a few words about *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, of which Professor Link is editor. The publication of Wilson's papers is one of the major projects in historiography in our time. These volumes are meant to preserve for posterity a true and unbiased record concerning Woodrow Wilson. Scholars today consult *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* on the assumption—an assumption upon which they ought to be able to rely—that the facts stated in the informational notes to various documents are true and accurate. Scholars will continue to consult *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* on this assumption for many generations to come. As we noted at the beginning of this article, the editorial matter of several volumes of *The Papers* contains (in prefaces and in numerous notes as well as in listings in various indices) unqualified allusions to Wilson's so-called strokes between the years 1896 and 1907. (The volumes covering the period of the Paris Peace Conference into which Wilson's illness of April 1919 falls have not yet been published.) We believe that these allusions have prejudiced the objectivity of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* and have already misled a number of writers.[57] We also believe that those in charge of the project have a reverence for the truth and a fidelity to their scholarly duties. We suggest that a reconsideration and emendation of the editorial matter that elevates Dr. Weinstein's controversial medical hypotheses to the status of historical fact is in order.*

[56] See the Papers of Arthur Walworth, Yale University Library, for Dr. Monroe's comments and Dr. Weinstein's reaction to them.

[57] See, for example, John Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 143, 145, and 147 for unequivocal references to Wilson's "stroke" of 1896 and its supposed effect on his thinking; see also his account of Wilson's illness in 1906 in which the stroke hypothesis also appears (pp. 185–86). There are numerous other references to the effects of Wilson's alleged strokes on his thinking and behavior.

* We wish to express our cordial thanks to the staff of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, for facilitating our research there and especially to Dr. David Wigdor, specialist, twentieth-century political history. At the Yale University Library, Arthur Walworth took precious time from his own work on Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference to direct our attention to documents of particular interest from his own files and in the papers of Colonel House. Professor Link and Dr. David W. Hirst accorded us many courtesies, for which we thank them, at the Firestone Library, Princeton University. At all stages of our work on this project we have benefited from the expert knowledge and wisdom of Margaret M. Stuart, M.D. We are indebted to Joseph M. Goldsen, A.E. Hanson, Elise F. Kendrick, and Lee R. Lombard for helpful comments on the first version of this article, which was presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology in Mannheim, Germany, in June 1981.

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POSTSCRIPT

A book by Edwin A. Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography*, has appeared since this article was completed. We can only note here that Weinstein persists in presenting, as if it were indisputable fact, his theory that Wilson suffered a series of disabling strokes dating back to 1896. The book contains numerous statements implying the existence of medical data and opinion which, so far as we know, simply are not available in the historical record.[58] An even more serious concern is that Weinstein has omitted data of critical diagnostic significance, thus precluding an objective evaluation of his hypotheses by his medical peers. His account of Wilson's episode of visual loss in 1906 is an important case in point.

In describing the 1906 episode, Weinstein writes that Mrs. Wilson "searched for evidence that would bear out the Doctor's opinion that her husband's stroke had been brought on by strain and overwork." He also writes that the Princeton trustees "agreed that the stroke had been caused by overwork." However, we know of no evidence (and Weinstein offers none) that Wilson's doctors, Mrs. Wilson, or the Princeton trustees stated, implied, or even believed that Wilson had suffered a stroke.

Weinstein titles his chapter about the 1906 episode, "A Major Stroke and Its Consequences," and he begins with a general description of carotid occlusive disease. In this disorder, blood clots or arteriosclerotic plaques in the neck may fragment and form emboli that lodge in smaller arteries such as those within the eye. He then writes that Wilson's ophthalmologist (Dr. George E. de Schweinitz) "told him that he had sustained a blood clot in the eye," the obvious implication being that "clot" refers to an embolus from the carotid. We believe this is a misleading description because important evidence has been omitted. What de Schweinitz actually told Wilson is not known. It can only be inferred from letters written by Wilson and Mrs. Wilson at the time, and from the later recollections of such knowledgeable people as John Grier Hibben (who had accom-

[58] Edwin A. Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 165–167. See also Ellen Axson Wilson to Mary Hoyt, 12 June [1906], *Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* vol. 16, p. 423; Wilson to Nicholas Murray Butler, 1 June 1906, ibid., p. 413; "Memorandum of Interviews with Grayson," Papers of Ray Stannard Baker, Box 109, p. 3; ibid., Box 5, Notebook XXII, pp. 56–57; Cary T. Grayson, *Woodrow Wilson: An Intimate Memoir* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960 and 1977), p. 81; Stockton Axson, "Material on Woodrow Wilson," chapter entitled "Health and Recreations," p. 23, and chapter entitled "The Physical Man," p. 10. In the Papers of Ray Stannard Baker, see conversation with John Grier Hibben, 18 June 1925, Box 111; conversation with E.P. Davis, M.D., 12 November 1925, Box 106; E.P. Davis, "Memoranda Concerning Woodrow Wilson"; and Gilbert Close to Ray Stannard Baker, 26 September 1925, Box 103. See also Eleanor Wilson McAdoo, *The Priceless Gift* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p. 241. It is interesting to note that Weinstein himself, in his article "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness," stated: "De Schweinitz found that the blindness had been caused by the bursting of a blood vessel in the eye" (p. 334). De Schweinitz's finding of a burst blood vessel is also reported in a footnote in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 16, p. 412, n.1.

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panied Wilson to Dr. de Schweinitz's office), Stockton Axson, Drs. Cary Grayson and E.P. Davis, and Eleanor Wilson McAdoo. *All* of these sources say that Wilson's loss of vision was caused by a hemorrhage or burst blood vessel within his eye. Yet Weinstein omits any mention of hemorrhage in his book, even though the distinction between hemorrhage and embolic clot is critical, because bleeding within the eye is *not* characteristic of carotid occlusive disease and indeed militates against that diagnosis. Weinstein's only cited source for the word "clot" is a letter from Ellen Axson Wilson to a cousin in which she says: "Two weeks ago yesterday Woodrow waked up perfectly blind in one eye! – it turned out from the bursting of a blood vessel in it. . . . The clot in the eye is being absorbed with extraordinary rapidity." The word "clot" in the context of Mrs. Wilson's letter seems clearly to refer to a coagulum from the burst blood vessel rather than to an embolus.

We (Michael F. Marmor, Juliette L. George, and Alexander L. George) hope to comment more fully on Weinstein's book elsewhere.

Appendix

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STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Department of Surgery
Division of Ophthalmology

May 18, 1981

Dr. and Mrs. Alexander George
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Dear Dr. and Mrs. George:

I have reviewed at length the medical and historical source material which bears upon the possibility that Woodrow Wilson had neurologic disease. I am preparing a comprehensive analysis of this material for publication and this letter represents a summary of my impressions and conclusions. You have my permission to quote from this letter, with the proviso that statements should not be taken out of context or used without sufficient material to provide a balanced picture of my views.

Let me say at the outset that the medical analysis of historical figures is by nature a speculative process. In the absence of documented findings or medical records, one must rely upon guesswork and judgment to analyze lay descriptions of disease. Physicians are trained to consider all of the rare and unlikely disease which might afflict their patients, lest one be missed. However, in looking back over history, the approach should probably be the opposite: given the symptoms, search for the most common and likely causes. Under these constraints, historical diagnoses will rarely have the certainty of scientific

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fact, and should in general be considered hypothesis.

In a series of articles, psychiatrist Edwin Weinstein has argued that Wilson suffered from serious cerebrovascular disease over a period of nearly thirty years, and that discrete strokes accounted for behavioral changes at several critical junctures in Wilson's professional life. This view has been accepted by the eminent historian Arthur Link, who has referred to these "strokes" without qualification in the current edition of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. My own reading of the evidence leads me to question both the medical interpretations of Dr. Weinstein, and the propriety of presenting such views as historical fact.

Weinstein's thesis is that Wilson suffered for many years from cerebrovascular disease, primarily carotid artery insufficiency, and had discrete strokes which influenced his professional behavior. Weinstein contends cerebrovascular disease first became manifest as disability of the right arm, resulting from one or more small strokes in 1896. The strongest and most direct evidence for stroke is considered to be Wilson's episode of left visual loss in 1906, which Weinstein describes as diagnostic of left carotid occlusive disease. Finally the illness which Wilson suffered during the 1919 Peace Conference is viewed as viral encephalopathy superimposed on preexisting brain damage. Each of these points merits careful analysis.

Wilson had difficulty with his right hand and arm for more than twenty years, and referred on numerous occasions to "writer's cramp" which was apparently diagnosed as a "neuritis." The precise symptoms are not spelled out, but the hand and arm were often painful, especially while writing. These symptoms began long before the alleged stroke of 1896, and references to this complaint can be found in the Wilson papers as far back as 1884. There are no references to suggest a sudden onset of symptoms (as from a stroke) in either 1884 or 1896, and the symptoms are too chronic to call them a result of transient ischemic attacks. Furthermore, Wilson also had occasional discomfort and pain in his *left* arm.

"Writer's cramp" is poorly understood as a clinical entity. Some cases may have an organic basis from pathology such as arthritic joint damage or inflammation of the nerves, but many are thought to represent an occupational neurosis. Characteristically, the patient has difficulty writing more than a few words, but lacks any major disability for other activities. This fits the descriptions of Wilson's disorder, and there is evidence that even during his severe periods of disability he was able to write brief ledger entries with his right hand which rules out any serious paralysis or limitation of movement. To accept this condition as writer's cramp (even without a precise definition of that term) seems perfectly reasonable in view of the nature and duration of the symptoms, whereas to fit these symptoms into a stroke syndrome places them in the category of unusual manifestations.

The 1906 episode is interpreted by Weinstein as direct evidence for cerebrovascular disease, since right-sided weakness and left-sided blindness are often associated with insufficiency or occlusion of the left carotid artery. However, the ocular findings in Wilson's case argue *against* a diagnosis of carotid occlusion. Wilson awoke one morning aware of poor vision in his left eye, which numerous sources indicate was found to result from bursting of a blood vessel and hemorrhage inside the eye. The fact of the matter is that retinal hemorrhage is *not* a sign of carotid occlusive disease. Carotid disease most characteristically leads to occlusion of the retinal arteries which causes a loss of vision but produces a very different picture (without hemorrhage) inside the eye. Arterial occlusion would not have been described in the language used by Wilson and his family members.

Wilson's doctors noted signs of arteriosclerosis and mild hypertension, and there seems little doubt that he had systemic vascular disease. The most likely cause for Wilson's eye disease would be a retinal vein occlusion, which is often associated with hypertensive vascular disease, and which produces diffuse hemorrhages in the retina. Other possibilities include hemorrhagic macular degeneration. The point to emphasize is that these ocular hemorrhages occur frequently as isolated events; they give evidence of

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generalized vascular pathology but they do not constitute strokes or carry any direct implication of cerebral ischemia or symptomatology.

There are other reasons to doubt a stroke in 1906. The stroke would have affected the left cerebral hemisphere which has major control over language and speech, yet Wilson clearly suffered no impairment in these areas. Weinstein implies that a stroke caused personality changes that affected Wilson's subsequent activities, but the literature on strokes is quite clear in emphasizing that personality changes are not a characteristic of the stroke syndrome in the absence of cognitive changes or dementia. Weinstein carefully qualifies his argument to state that Wilson's behavioral changes in 1906 were an adaptation to his illness and could result from stress as well as brain damage. Considering that Wilson had indeed suffered an ocular hemorrhage, and that he was working with intensity as president of Princeton University, why should it be necessary to invoke strokes or cerebral pathology to account for his actions?

Similar problems arise in analyzing the illness that began on April 3, 1919, during the Peace Conference. Weinstein initially concluded that Wilson had suffered a stroke to explain his behavior during the conference, but the tenuousness of the stroke hypothesis is shown by Weinstein's shift to a diagnosis of viral encephalopathy when new evidence made it clear that Wilson had had respiratory disease. I fail to see the need for postulating any diagnoses beyond severe influenza to account for Wilson's behavior. Wilson was ill with respiratory symptoms and high fever, and there are surely few of us who cannot attest to the debilitating effect of severe flu. Wilson was confined to bed for five days but was incapacitated only on the first day, after which he resumed conferring and decision making from his bedroom. The term "viral encephalopathy" may apply to a broad range of symptoms, from minimal headache and irritability, to severe somnolence, convulsions, and death. Wilson clearly did not have the latter, and some would argue that the former are in fact a routine component of the flu syndrome. Wilson's activities for the remainder of April 1919 seem quite consistent with a history of severe but uncomplicated influenza, and I should think the burden of proof would be to show otherwise.

Wilson probably had systemic vascular disease for a good part of his life, and there is no question that he ultimately suffered a severe stroke in the fall of 1919. Neither of these observations, however, can be construed as evidence for multiple strokes or for significant neurologic dysfunction during the earlier years of his career. Chronic vascular disease may cause subtle changes in mentation, ultimately resulting in dementia. Could Wilson have had very mild degrees of change accumulating over the years? Certainly this is possible, but how does one distinguish this type of subtle degeneration from other aspects of maturation and aging which are evident in everyone? This man actively ran one of the major universities in the United States, campaigned articulately for the presidency, and was clearly a lucid and powerful thinker in political affairs up to the moment of his serious stroke in 1919.

The interpretations which I have chosen to emphasize focus upon common and ordinary conditions, rather than the unusual or the extreme. I think the odds favor such an interpretation, but these views are admittedly hypothetical and open to review or criticism by others. I hope that my arguments will, at the least, raise reasonable doubts about the stroke theory and return it to a position of hypothesis rather than fact in historical source material.

With warm regards,

(Signed) Michael F. Marmor, M.D.
Associate Professor
Division of Ophthalmology
Chief, Ophthalmology Section
Veterans Administration Medical Center
Palo Alto, California

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Book Reviews

Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross *by Archimedes L.A. Patti. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. 632 pp. $19.50.*

It is a commonplace that the neglect and subsequent purges of many of the best "old China hands" of the State Department needlessly distorted America's Asian policies for over two decades. Far less known, and in its way as harmful, was Washington's muzzling of the 1945 reports of Archimedes Patti and his small group of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents, charged with gathering information on Indochina for the war against Japan and its aftermath. Only now, a very painful thirty-five years later, can one learn of Patti's encounters with Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants, especially from April to the end of September 1945, when he was recalled to Washington.

Yet, at the time, Patti reports that his superiors "were unimpressed with my early reports of the nature and significance of the Viet Minh" (p. 125), and that Washington "took no notice" of Ho's repeated efforts to get U.S. help to stop the drift to war with France (p. 381). Where Patti believed Ho "a nationalist first, a communist second" (p. 86), whose "sincerity, pragmatism and eloquence made an indelible impression on me" (p. 392), Washington refused to respond to Ho's messages since his "government was not recognized by the United States." In mid 1954, the Department of the Army blocked the author's first effort to publish this book.

Patti documents with telling details the evolution of U.S. policy from Roosevelt's wartime hope for a U.N. trusteeship for Indochina to Washington's statement of 13 May 1947, which declared that in Asia, the United States was in the "same boat as French, . . . British and Dutch [and that the] Vietnamese will for [an] indefinite period require French material and technical assistance and enlightened political guidance" (p. 386). He also shows that the beginning of U.S. aid to the French for Vietnam on 1 May 1950 came over a month before the beginning of the Korean War which greatly accelerated it.

Patti makes a significant contribution to the study of mid-century Vietnam with his firsthand reports of OSS intelligence on Indochina. There is new information, for example, on his Japanese counterparts in the *Kempetei* (the security police); on the presence of some five- to six-hundred Soviets in Indochina in 1945; and on the Chinese intervention

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after August, which established "a solid base in Indochina for an exploitive economic operation that lasted well over thirty years" (p. 290) and was in good measure responsible for "the Boat People" refugee waves after 1979 (pp. 381–82). He shows that the 25 September 1945 massacre of over one-hundred Caucasians at Cité Herault, a suburb of Saigon, was the work not of the Viet Minh but of the notorious criminal society, the *Binh Xuyen*. The very next day, however, the Viet Minh, apparently mistaking him for a Frenchman, did kill Major Peter Dewey of the OSS, the first American casualty of the war.

Yet, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed 2 September 1945 in the presence of Patti and other Americans with a paraphrase of the opening words of the United States's Declaration of Independence, the Soviet Union did not recognize the new government until 30 January 1950, and then presumably because the newly victorious Chinese Communists had just done so. Ho Chi Minh even told Patti, "I place more reliance on the United States to support Vietnam's independence, before I could expect help from the USSR" (p. 373).

How can one explain the startling shift in perspectives that ensued? Undoubtedly, Patti's greatest contribution is his pinpointing from the very beginning of the wars in Indochina the basic contradictions in the United States's Asia policy after 1945. Where the Viet Minh constantly praised America's historical example and its current policies toward the Philippines, Washington, while talking of support for Vietnamese nationalism, "always stopped short of endorsing the only logical and effective [Vietnamese nationalist] leader, Ho Chi Minh" (p. 387). Therefore, at "no time did the United States attempt to understand or win the friendship of the Vietnamese people but callously provided the wherewithal for the French government in Indochina to destroy the only grassroots effort to achieve independence" (p. 437). The author's own views about why this was so are radical. He writes that fundamentally Washington believed "that American national security was inextricably linked to the control of foreign markets and resources by a combination of political-military overlordship" (p. 378).

It is more than unfortunate that Washington blocked the information that Patti provides, whatever its embarrassment at such views, which in any case are rarely expressed. Very possibly the author added them much later as the present book is an enlargement and rewriting of the manuscript blocked a tragic quarter-century ago. The last part of the book analyzes the decade of the French war and its immediate aftermath, from the author's new vantage point as intelligence analyst in Washington. It stops with Diem's temporary consolidation of power in 1955. Given the circumstances of its writing and delay of publication, it is easy to understand certain lapses in the book's language and presentation. These are more than offset by its unique information; and in addition there are excellent appendices, giving chronology to 1976, and capsule biographies and accounts of major parties in the long Vietnamese struggles.

JAMES P. HARRISON
Hunter College, City University of New York

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National Defense *by James Fallows. New York, Random House, 1981. 204 pp. $12.95.*

For every complex problem, the saying goes, there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. Likewise for every complex issue, like national security, there is a book like this one—beautifully written, coherently argued, but ultimately wrong.

Fallows has an enviable talent for clear prose and a journalist's sense for topical issues. His chapters treat the problem of management versus leadership in the services, the Defense Department's tendency to develop overly sophisticated weapons, the question of all-volunteer versus drafted military forces, and the uncertainties of strategic doctrine.

On all counts he is critical of prevailing policies. The military promotes officers who are well-educated managers when it should promote officers who can lead troops. The Pentagon develops weapons systems that are so sophisticated and expensive that few can be purchased and fewer still work, when the country needs simpler systems and more of them. The government has created an all-volunteer force that takes in the dregs of society, when the nation should have a draft to ensure that it is defended by those having a stake in its well-being. And the United States is about to spend billions on a basing scheme for the Missile Experimental (MX) missile when an assessment of the uncertainties that surround estimates of missile accuracy makes it impossible to conclude that our present Minuteman force is really vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive strike.

Each of these arguments has a grain of truth to it. It is Fallows's unfortunate tendency, however, consistently to mistake the grain for the whole, making most of the book's arguments superficial.

A small example is Fallows's use of the Trident submarine to illustrate the dangers of the search for efficiency. Managers gave the Trident eight more missiles than its predecessor, he argues, to increase its efficiency. To do so they had to make it larger, however, making it noisier in motion and hence more vulnerable to enemy detection. The "simplest managerial logic" thus led to "a senseless step down in effectiveness" (p. 20).

Fallows has the noise problem right, but ignores three additional facts. First, missile submarines rarely move fast anyway. Second, the longer range of the Trident's missiles decreases its vulnerability by allowing it to roam over a larger area. Third, the Trident's size resulted from a compromise between competing factions in the U.S. Navy, not from managerial choice.

A bigger example is Fallows's plea for simpler and more reliable weapons, an argument that puts him in league with army generals who argued against breech-loaders in the years before the Civil War. Simple is a relative term; today's simple weapons are yesterday's technical marvels, made reliable by development, test, and use. There are indeed problems with cramming too much new gear into a single weapon, and with testing those systems inadequately, but these more subtle problems escape Fallows's attention.

So do the sources of these problems. Fallows lays the blame for overly complex weaponry on a "procurement culture" shaped by a naive belief in the promise of new technology and the pecuniary and career rewards attached to spending money on procurement. The effects of these factors are outweighed, however, by the sincere and often legitimate belief that new technologies (like breech-loaders) win wars, and by perverse in-

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centives that spring from organizational politics among the services, other agencies in the Defense Department, and the Congress.

Everywhere the pattern is the same: Fallows employs his impressive writing skills to weave scattered facts and opinions into a coherent whole that barely touches the true complexities of the issues. It is a method that produces books, but not much knowledge.

THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER
The Brookings Institution

Debacle: The American Failure in Iran *by Michael Ledeen and William Lewis. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1981. 256 pp. $14.95.*

This study of American policy during the recent Iranian revolution is subject to the vices and virtues of "instant" history. It is clear that the authors have talked to many key policymakers as well as to major national and international figures. Much of what they reveal will reappear in future studies and their interpretations will, for better or worse, influence what will "become one of the most passionately debated issues of recent American history" (p. 231). They have spun together a coherent narrative of an enormously complex event. In fact, they tell the story so well that they might beguile readers into accepting their insistant conclusions.

But the authors at times use a literary device that should disturb careful scholars—an omniscient narrative voice. Readers do not always simply hear what choices President Carter or his advisers faced or what worried the Shah, they are often told what people actually thought. Such liberties would not trouble the reader if the sources were cited. They are not. The authors claim journalistic license to protect their sources (p. xi). Yet, as scholars making sweeping judgments savagely critical of the Carter administration ("The President must be judged a failure on every count, for he did not pursue any coherent strategy at all"—p. 234) the authors make almost no references to primary sources and few to available secondary literature.

At the core of the analysis is the assumption that once a vital security interest had been identified with Iran, the United States not only should, but could, control events threatening to national security. The authors can sustain that assumption because they largely ignore or misinterpret the history of American-Iranian relations between 1941 and the early 1970s. Despite the illusory success of the CIA's 1953 countercoup, the United States has never had adequate policy instruments to determine the course of Iranian politics. By the 1970s, as the authors themselves argue, the two major pillars of U.S.-Iranian relations, arms sales and oil purchases, were undermining the Shah's regime. Both contributed to the westernization, modernization, corruption, inflation, cultural dislocation, and dependence on a single foreign power that so disturbed Iranian nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists.

So by what means was the United States supposed to reverse the erosion of the Shah's authority? The authors imply with the irritating smugness of foreign-policy technocrats that if they had been at the helm the outcome would have been different. Gone would be Carter's insistence on human rights that contributed so much to the Shah's fatal vacilla-

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tion. They would have urged the Shah to wield the "iron fist" of military repression backed by an American show of force. But neither Carter nor the Shah had such "clarity of purpose" to unleash the military in time to contain the opposition and thereby avoid the debacle.

But what would an American-supported blood bath have achieved? The authors' analysis shows that the Shah's position was perilously weak. Unknown to the CIA, he was fighting a slow, losing battle with cancer. The "white revolution" was a disaster; peasants were deserting their land for urban slums; inflation was destroying the *bazaaris*; intellectuals were alienated; and the Shah's own obsession with loyalty had saddled the officer corps with a legion of "yes men." It is, thus, unconvincing to point the finger of blame at individuals, no matter how faulty their perceptions. In the face of Iran's monumental weaknesses, the tactical solutions the authors commend do not offer compelling alternatives.

Debacle succeeds as a history of the Iranian revolution in the narrowest sense—a who, what, where account presented in a readable way. But historical analysis must achieve more. The authors focus so much on short-term causes that the reader loses sight of the longer-term causes that shaped the context in which events unfolded. As a consequence, a history of America's role in the Iranian revolution that will satisfy the canons of enduring scholarship has yet to be written.

MARK HAMILTON LYTLE
Bard College

Retrospective Voting in American National Elections *by Morris P. Fiorina. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1981. 249 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $9.95.*

No short review can possibly do justice to this tightly reasoned, elegantly written, and richly documented analysis of the American electorate's behavior over the last twenty-five years. I can only indicate, in broad strokes, the book's architecture, which shows an extraordinarily high intelligence at work. Indeed, an outstanding and perhaps unintended "pedagogical" feature of the book is Fiorina's taking readers by the hand and leading them through both the crucible of relevant theorizing and the mysteries of computerland —from the assumptions programmed into the exercise through conceptual adaptations and empirical concessions made in the analyses to findings and interpretations. In other words, in exposing the problematics of the research process itself Fiorina exposes his thinking and doing to more scrutiny than is common in such enterprises. Hence it is likely that much of what he says and finds is easier to challenge than is normally the case. This is of considerable advantage in a field whose vigor is reflected in the more or less friendly controversies that have raged in the last decade over such matters as the capacity of the American voter to sort out the issues or the meaning and measurement of party identification.

Fiorina's theoretical point of departure is V.O. Key's perceptive formulation of the role of "retrospective evaluations," on the one hand, and Anthony Downs's imaginative for-

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mulation of the role of "future expectations," on the other, in vote choice; his empirical point of departure is the set of data collected since the 1950s by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies (CPS); and his methodological point of departure is a multivariate technique known as "probit analysis" which is particularly suited to the statistical treatment of dichotomous and trichotomous variables but which can be complemented by a rank-order technique in the case of polytomous measures. Formidable as this may sound, the equations, methods, and models that serve Fiorina in his analyses are clearly described, easy to follow (even by those who may be unfamiliar with newer modes of analysis), and quite persuasive. This is not to say that the book does not require close study; but such close study is facilitated by Fiorina's cautious and patient building of the "case" he makes as he proceeds from simple bivariate inspection of the data (chap. 2) to complex simultaneous-equation modeling (chap. 9).

What, then, is Fiorina's "case"? In starkest outline, Fiorina's final model of the simple act of voting posits that expectations concerning the future are dwarfing the effects of retrospective judgments but that there is a determinable developmental sequence. As Fiorina puts it in a succinct summary statement: "Directly experienced and/or perceived events and conditions first contribute to performance evaluations, and both in turn contribute to future expectations. At both stages the mediating influence of past party identification operates, but it too incorporates the retrospective judgments of past periods. Future expectations are so important empirically because they are the end of the chain, the distillation of numerous evaluations and experiences from a voter's past" (p. 197). If this sounds like so much gobbledygook, there is only one remedy—reading the book.

Of course, no highly stylized summation can capture the careful and elaborate analyses that precede it. There are many high points throughout the book that will agitate the relevant research community for some time to come. Fiorina's arrows not only connect the points of his causal diagrams but also are directed at alternative models, both those constructed in the social-psychological tradition of that classic, *The American Voter*, and those constructed by revisionists, so-called, who tasted and tested the waters of the fountain called "rationality." My hunch is that neither discussions of "issue voting" nor colloquies on "party identification" will ever be the same again. My own and only trouble at this point, at a first reading, is the question of whether Fiorina's empirical measures, for which he depended on the CPS data, necessarily and invariably tap the central concepts he uses and needs in order to make the case for his models. But this is perhaps a trivial concern and, I suppose, the fate of all "secondary" analysis. In any case, Fiorina's arguments and demonstrations are presented with considerable caution, admirable skill, and, last but not least, good humor. His is the most spirited book of its kind I have come across in a long while.

HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University

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The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950 *by Gregg Herken. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1981. 425 pp. $15.00.*

This book traces the rise and fall of the notion that exclusive possession of the atomic bomb would confer upon the United States lasting advantages in diplomacy and strategy. That idea proved empty of substance and tragic in consequence.

The book's first section probes "atomic diplomacy" in 1945–1946. That term quickly changed meaning for American statesmen. Stalin's seeming disinterest in the bomb at Potsdam and Molotov's adamancy on other issues at the London foreign ministers' meeting disabused Secretary of State James Byrnes of the notion that he could frighten the Soviets into cooperation. Although he then tried to lure them into friendliness with the bait of sharing nuclear information, Republican criticism and lack of presidential support undermined his efforts.

A second section chronicles the domestic political fight over atomic arms control. Anxious to assure military representation on the Atomic Energy Commission, Manhattan District Project Director General Leslie Groves perpetuated the myth that there was an atomic "secret" to keep and exaggerated the importance of Soviet espionage. Although Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal then tried to manage nuclear arms limitation diplomacy, President Truman gave control of the negotiations to Bernard Baruch. The result was an American negotiating position that assured failure of talks at the United Nations in 1946–1947.

In the book's third and longest section, Herken argues that ignorance and force of circumstance drove Washington into dependence on nuclear weapons. Joint Chiefs of Staff planners did not even know how few atomic bombs the United States had. But faced first with rapid demobilization, then with the Berlin Blockade crisis of 1948, and finally with a parsimonious fiscal 1950 budget, they drifted into dependence on the atomic bomb. Soviet detonation of a bomb in 1949 intensified that dependence and triggered the 1950 decision to build a hydrogen weapon.

While the book is extremely well written, its arguments are not always convincing. Herken is at his best in the first section, using aide Walter Brown's papers to dissect Byrnes's inner thoughts. Book two is less persuasive precisely because it relies so heavily on personal documents and perspectives. Herken exaggerates the importance of Groves's and Baruch's machinations and of President Truman's vacillation. He seems insensitive to the logical implications of Sherwin's *A World Destroyed* (1975) and to the theoretical literature on arms control. Both suggest the same point: FDR's wartime refusal to share atomic information with the Soviets triggered a nuclear arms race; with Moscow rushing its bomb to completion, there was little hope for success in atomic arms-control talks.

Herken's discussion of the evolution of American strategy proves least satisfactory of all. Too often he strains to tease a major conclusion from minor shreds of evidence. He suggests that the movement of B-29s to England during the Berlin Blockade of 1948 and the formal conclusion of the NATO treaty a year later were important events in the development of American nuclear strategy but provides only a few words in footnotes to support the argument. His picture of the strategic planning process is distorted and limited principally because he has not used Navy Department archives, personal manuscripts of individual service chiefs, and Strategic Air Commander Curtis LeMay's

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papers to elucidate the complex motives that shaped formal plans and position papers. Finally, by focusing so narrowly on particular plans, Herken underestimates the importance of such competing designs for national security as mass mobilization and projective sea power which qualified Washington's reliance on nuclear weaponry.

In short, this is an ambitious first book that should be approached with caution. Its fresh data are useful, but its conclusions are questionable. Its value in stimulating further research and debate is beyond doubt.

ROGER DINGMAN
University of Southern California

Regulation and Planning: The Case of Environmental Politics *by Guy Benveniste. San Francisco, Calif., Boyd & Fraser Publishing Co., 1981. 207 pp. Cloth, $14.00; paper, $8.95.*

According to the author, a professor of policy studies in the Graduate School of Education at the University of California, Berkeley, this book has three objectives: "to explain why and how organizations control each other," "to analyze the consequences of control on policy formation," and "to suggest potential avenues of change from excessive reliance on regulation" (p. xi). This general set of objectives is pursued through a special focus on environmental and natural-resource politics, although the book is not a text on environmental politics as such.

There are separate (and quite brief) chapters on numerous subjects: organizational and social "errors" leading to environmental problems; organizational behavior; the characteristics and activities of interest groups; the impact of government regulation on the private sector; policy implementation in agencies of the executive branch; the structure and operation of regulatory agencies; the role of the judiciary in regulation; the value and role of planning; and alternatives to government regulation. There is also an epilogue on planning in the year 2050. As is evident from this outline, the book is part introductory textbook and part thematic analysis. Sections of each chapter deal with basic information about, for example, governmental structures or the constitutional authority of the judiciary. But Benveniste is more interested in exploring the failure of organizations to respond effectively to environmental problems and in seeking workable solutions. In that vein he offers succinct appraisals of a variety of governmental regulatory activities. For the most part these reveal a good grasp of a diverse professional literature and a familiarity with environmental decision making in recent years. In short, the analysis is informed and insightful, the writing crisp, and the tone understandably critical.

If there is an overall theme to the book, it is the superiority of planning over regulation, especially in cases of large-scale change. Benveniste argues that planning and regulation are complementary, but he clearly believes contemporary environmental regulation to be, among other things, excessively legalistic, complex, fragmented, undemocratic, slow, inefficient, and expensive. He seems convinced that planning is subject to fewer defects. To his credit, Benveniste encourages the reader to seek innovative alternatives to the typical market approaches and to conventional forms of planning as well as to the regulation he

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attacks so thoroughly. His proposals (particularly in the chapter on "Alternatives Today and Tomorrow") are often refreshingly free of the usual ideological or professional biases one comes to expect in discussions of these issues.

This book does not represent original research or theoretical refinement of a particular professional literature. The level of writing and the author's own preface suggest that it is intended as a text for undergraduate courses in public administration, regulation, management, public policy, and environmental or natural-resources planning. Yet with its rather broad focus, the book is likely to fall short of expectations for a core text in any one of these areas. It might be assigned, however, as a supplemental text in courses on environmental management or planning and possibly in more general courses on regulation and planning. It is relatively light on reference notes, but does contain a substantial (ten-page) bibliography on regulation, planning, social change, and environmental policy.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

International Energy Futures: Petroleum Prices, Power, and Payments *by Nazli Choucri. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 247 pp. $27.50.*

Choucri has selected an interesting issue and written a frustrating book about it. The issue is the relative fates of the three major actors in the world oil market—consuming nations, producing nations, and transnational corporations—under different price regimes. Choucri develops some interesting answers to these questions, some of which are noted below. The frustration results from both the economics and the presentation of the model Choucri employs.

The substantive problems are discomforting. Choucri attempts to build a model that will reach beyond the simple economics of the petroleum market to the general strategic condition of its participants. Yet in doing so, the economics are often finessed. Two important examples are oil prices and interest rates. Oil prices are never explicitly called upon to perform their traditional function of clearing markets. Rather, the author suggests several ways in which markets may clear (among them, through corporate markup, through changes in production rates outside the Persian Gulf, and through a dynamic "cobweb" process with which only economists would care to be familiar) and then fails to resolve the issue. This kind of vaguery detracts from the purposes of the book.

Interest rates are omitted completely, and with them, any notion of a "portfolio theory" for producers. Choucri specifies that (Persian Gulf) producers produce the minimum of three values—the demands for their oil, their production capacity, and their reserves. But for the Gulf producers, this essentially means that production is set to equal demand. Yet if this were true, then the Gulf would be the world's "marginal" source of energy, a role Choucri has already allocated to producers outside the Gulf. Moreover, this type of specification assumes away the subtleties regarding Gulf output: how should present and future production be weighed against Western paper assets? How will production now influence the value of remaining reserves? How can producer "absorptive capacity" be measured, and how do political factors weigh in determining the "optimal"

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rate of development in producer nations? How will output be shared by OPEC members? These questions are lost in the formulation of the model.

Part of the price problem lies in frequently imprecise semantics. Changes "in" and "of" supply or demands are confused, and price is described as "a function" of elements of which it is really a "sum." Other strict relationships are left comparably vague. These annoyances add to a difficult reading that distracts the reader from the underlying substance.

The omission of interest rates is a separate problem. Producers are held to invest abroad that portion of their incomes in excess of the financial requirements of development once remission or repatriation of foreign income is accounted for. Keeping oil in the ground is not an option. Thus, producers become money pumps that push revenue out the door once incomes rise beyond the level associated with development (or, in Choucri's terms, "imports of consumption and investment goods" [p. 86]). In the real world, producers are unwilling to become such pumps. Rather, now that producer incomes have risen beyond the level that can be meaningfully absorbed, the issue they face is whether to keep on producing—for either short-term political gain or to dampen prices in an attempt to prolong the marketability of their oil—or husband their resources. Few producer regimes may be willing to return to their constituencies having traded their nonrenewable resource for paper and promises issued by the West. Yet Choucri's model forces producers to adopt this position by disallowing any other way for trade balances, tilted by oil outflows, to be restored. As recent history has demonstrated, this balancing is often accomplished through short-term (or perhaps longer) upward movements in interest rates, wooing petrodollars back to their homelands with promises of lucrative rates of return. This interest rate competition for petrosurpluses may be the only alternative for consuming-nation governments that fear the inflationary consequences of currency devaluations. In fact, the reinvestment of petrosurpluses—and the willingness of producers to hold them—may be the most important unresolved aspect of the world oil market. If petrosurpluses are maintained only in high-return short-term instruments, then the prospects for global economic growth, monetary stability, and capital formation must be reassessed. This assessment, however, begins with a discussion of interest rates and capital markets that Choucri sidesteps.

These difficulties are all the more unfortunate because Choucri has usefully demonstrated outcomes, some obvious, some not. The most important of these are the inevitability of high oil prices in most cases, and the tradeoff between higher oil prices and increased strategic vulnerability by consumers. By lowering demands, rationalizing substitute energy forms, and creating excess production capacity abroad, higher oil prices can create advantages for consumers. These results are interesting and often provocative. While her economic formulation of the problem may be incomplete, Choucri has correctly attempted to expand our approach to the world oil market.

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Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion After All? A New Approach to Effects Analysis *by James B. Lemert. Chicago, Ill., Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1981. 253 pp. Cloth, $17.95; paper, $8.95.*

Communications research has rarely yielded clear propositions about the political effects of the mass media. This, says James Lemert, is largely the result of a sterile theoretical view of how mass media actually function to define public opinion to mass and elite alike. In his view, public opinion is "a perception imposed by the perceiver on information about citizen attitudes toward a publicly debated issue, personality, candidate, practice, or outcome" (p. 12). Public opinion is thus subjective, but it is not necessarily idiosyncratic, for "a large number of political forces act to modify, 'correct,' or at least set limits to discrepancies among versions of public opinion that may be held by key decision-makers" (p. 21). Perhaps the most significant of these forces is mass communication.

The dominant paradigm of communications research has been that of identifying the effects of messages on individual attitudes and then considering the sum of the individual attitudes to be "public opinion." This "simple reductionist" position is flawed in many ways, but most importantly in the degree to which alternative conceptions of public opinion are excluded. The simple reductionist position has been popular in large part, Lemert argues, because of its convenience. The setting of elections, in which votes do add up to public opinion, and the ease with which sample survey data may be collected, have led to a research strategy focused on the individual, with little effort to link the relevance of attitudes to larger political questions. Nowhere is Lemert's criticism more apt than in the area of political participation. He rightly chastises mainstream political science for its obsession with electoral behavior at the expense of a richer understanding of participation within the "influence framework"—the milieu in which decision makers sniff the political winds for guidance in making choices. Extensive anecdotal evidence points to the efficacy of political participation in nonelectoral settings, and Lemert feels that closer attention to such participation (and nonparticipation) would illuminate the role of mass communication in providing (or omitting) information that motivates and facilitates citizen involvement in politics.

Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion After All? is a personal statement of the frustrations of a researcher who has spent many years thinking and writing about the mass media. The first third of the book is a series of floggings administered to the disciplines of political science, psychology, sociology, and mass communications for sins of commission (for example, adherence to the simple reductionist model of public opinion) and of omission (for example, paucity of cross-disciplinary research). Lemert's own notion of public opinion and communication, described above, is not as fully elaborated as one might like, given the attack he makes on conventional models. Nevertheless, it is an adequate base for the remainder of the book, a rambling discussion of research in need of researchers. Along with colleagues and students, Lemert has conducted a number of small pilot studies in many of the areas he describes, including an innovative study of bandwagon effects associated with the New Hampshire and Massachusetts presidential primaries in 1976, and a study of why journalists omit from news stories information that could be used by readers to make their policy preferences known—so-called mobilizing information. One of his strongest recommendations is a call for more studies of how

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public officials become informed about public opinion. Here, the mass media clearly have a direct impact by interpreting opinion polls and election results (for example, was there really a "tax revolt," and is there a national "swing to the right"?). But he argues persuasively that journalists engage in non-decision making when they decline to offer readers and viewers the information necessary to facilitate public expression of issue sentiment with tools other than blunt elections or ambiguous opinion polls.

Lemert's notion of the role played by the mass media is akin to the formulation offered by the work of Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang. It is a recognition that the important question is not how communication affects politics, but that politics exists in communication. This book is a useful corrective to narrower conceptions of media influence that have characterized behavioral political science.

SCOTT KEETER
Rutgers University

Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics *by Stanley Hoffmann. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1981. 252 pp. Cloth, $18.00; paper, $9.95.*

This is a smart, unrefined set of essays, originally presented as the first annual Frank W. Abrams lectures at Syracuse University. They deal with an extraordinarily timely and important subject: "Where, if at all, do norms for moral behavior, considerations of right and wrong fit into the relations between states" (p. 1)? Specifically, Hoffmann addresses "three of the most burning contemporary issues": moral restraints on the use of force; human rights; and distributive justice. In addition, the author fleshes out the parameters of a hard idealist approach to world politics and presents his own liberal view of what a morally livable world order would look like, given the world as it is.

As is implied by his notion of the proper approach to world-order modelling, throughout the book Hoffmann takes the position of a political scientist, not a philosopher. He is concerned less with what should be done, than he is with how one can get to what should be done. In many of the chapters, the difficulty of maintaining this dichotomy is all too apparent. He continually and quite appropriately points out the philosophical inadequacies of some of the positions he takes. This is most apparent in the case of distributive justice, wherein he surveys and criticizes the current justifications for increased Western support for the demands of the less-developed countries in the North-South dialogue. He is equally eloquent in identifying the philosophical and perhaps logical inconsistencies in the liberals' answer to support of movements of self-determination, but not always for self-government. But the bias of a political scientist is most apparent in Hoffmann's final chapter wherein he sketches his conception of the proper world order, which looks much like a sophisticated rendition of the Trilateral Commission's vision of the world.

Unfortunately, the contribution of these essays to students of international relations, who desperately need a political scientist of Hoffmann's talents to address this subject, is severely limited by the mode of discourse that he has intentionally selected: somewhat

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"sketchy" and "a bit didactic," risking the loss of "fine points, qualifications, exceptions, and precision" (p. xi). Indeed it is almost impossible to see who is the proper audience for these essays. For example, in questioning and refining Michael Walzer's work on a theory of just wars and Charles Beitz's on distributive justice, Hoffmann rarely dissects the sources of their deficiencies. Thus the scholar reading Hoffmann's essays comes away frustrated. On the other hand, more general readers will be similarly affected by these essays for they will find too little about the substantive and theoretical underpinnings of the arguments being alluded to to comprehend them, much less be able to assess the validity of Hoffmann's often quite apt comments. Similarly, Hoffmann's attack on the students of the world-order models project, especially Richard Falk, and on the dependency theorists is too skimpy to be of much use to the scholar or the more general reader.

Frustration of a somewhat different variety is likely to be experienced by the scholar confronting Hoffmann's brilliant, albeit much too cryptic, comments about the United Nations, which provides the international community a "common vocabulary," which is "not the same thing as a community of values" (p. 20). Indeed, an underdeveloped theme throughout the book deals with the limits of international law and organization operating in a community of conflicting value systems. There, as elsewhere, Hoffmann makes his points through the use of seemingly convincing examples rather than through the use of carefully articulated, consistent, and theoretically grounded arguments.

All in all, however, these essays provide the impetus for much further thought on an extraordinarily important and relevant subject and one infrequently addressed by political scientists.

MICHAEL G. SCHECHTER
Michigan State University

The Secretary of Defense *by Douglas Kinnard. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1981. 252 pp. $19.50.*

This brief study of six secretaries of defense will be of great value to general readers and students who seek a literate and well-documented account of U.S. defense strategy, policies, and organization since 1947. Secretaries included are James V. Forrestal, Charles E. Wilson, Neil H. McElroy, Robert S. McNamara, Melvin R. Laird, and James R. Schlesinger. For each the author provides a brief biography, an account of the international and domestic setting during his incumbency, a sketch of key contemporaries and organizational developments, and a case study through which the incumbent's performance is exemplified. The author concludes that: the authority of the secretary of defense was inadequately defined by the National Security Act of 1947 but appropriately strengthened by 1958; Robert McNamara achieved "the high point of central control by a Secretary, [that is] true civilian control below the Presidential level" (p. 194); the budget – dependent on domestic political considerations – plays a central role in determining strategy; the role available to the secretary is dependent upon the president; and the influence of the senior military and of the military services on defense issues is declining.

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The study draws heavily on existing sources for interpretations and conclusions. An impressive number of texts, memoirs, oral histories, and public documents have been supplemented by seventy-seven interviews with many of the principals, lesser public officials and military officers, and academics. The author also gained access to sources not generally available, namely, memoranda of conferences with President Eisenhower—notes taken by members of his staff during meetings with the president. The author's erudition and extensive use of footnotes will be a boon to the nonspecialist who wishes to pursue specific events, issues, and persons in greater depth.

The book offers little that is new for the specialist familiar with post-World War II defense policy, politics, and organization. It draws no independent conclusions about the office, the incumbents, the issues, the institutions, the policies, or performance. Such key concepts as "role" and "civilian control" are neither well defined nor used in any systematic way to illuminate the office or compare its incumbents. Most disappointing, the author refrains from any overall assessment of the office of the secretary of defense. Although he seems skeptical, if not critical, of trends such as the reduced access of the senior military to the president and the declining position of the military departments, the author does not elaborate their consequences. Similarly, Kinnard seems to approve of James Schlesinger's ability to avoid domination by the bureaucracy, but does not really explain how he managed where others failed. In the very last sentence of the book, the author emphasizes the need of each president for a "secretary of defense who can provide him the best advice from a dedicated military-civilian team" (p. 206); however, he directly assesses the quality of neither the advice nor the teams providing it.

On the other hand, in covering six secretaries and characterizing their times and institutional environment in 206 pages of text and doing so accurately and literately, the author has done a lot indeed.

Given the author's extensive research for this study, especially his interviews and access to sources not generally available, one can only hope there will be more analytical and evaluative treatments forthcoming.

JOHN C. RIES
University of California, Los Angeles

Congressional Elections *by Barbara Hinckley. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, Inc., 1981. 173 pp. $7.50.*

Congressional Elections *edited by Louis Sandy Maisel and Joseph Cooper. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, Inc., 1981. 288 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $9.95.*

These two books provide a comprehensive summary of recent scholarly work on congressional elections. Both the Hinckley book and the Maisel and Cooper reader draw extensively on the 1978 study of American national elections conducted by the Center for Political Studies (CPS) at the University of Michigan. The 1978 study included, for the first time, a series of questions about House and Senate elections that were designed to allow scholars to study congressional elections in more depth than had been possible with

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previous CPS national-election studies. More specifically, the study included a series of questions constructed to explore constituents' knowledge of incumbents, challengers, and candidates for open seats and the importance of such information to voting decisions.

The Hinckley book provides an extensive treatment of the factors that influence congressional elections. The author begins by suggesting a framework for studying congressional elections and then systematically examines the roles that information, incumbency, party, candidate traits, and issues play in both House and Senate elections. Briefly, Hinckley suggests that voters in congressional elections engage in a two-part voting decision; they first decide how to decide, and then make either a "general-choice decision or a specific-choice decision" (p. 11). Both the first decision, how to decide, and the second, whom to vote for, are based on the information available to voters and the political context in which the decisions are made. Voters who have little information or who are satisfied with the status quo, for example, may decide to make a general-choice decision, based on general factors such as party identification or incumbency, and vote for their party's candidate or for the incumbent. Alternatively, voters who have some information or who are dissatisfied with the incumbent may examine the specific candidates and issues in an election and make a decision based on the specific electoral situation.

Hinckley's framework is useful because it provides a broad context within which to evaluate the specific influences of information, incumbency, candidates, parties, issues, and presidential voting discussed in subsequent chapters. The Hinckley book is valuable because it combines a discussion of previously published work on congressional elections with new material gleaned from the 1978 CPS survey. The book also includes a chapter on mid-term elections which summarizes and critiques earlier findings and suggests areas for future research. In short, the book is well-organized, clearly written, and presents succinctly and in detail an excellent summation and analysis of current information about congressional elections.

While the Hinckley book is a general compilation of information on congressional elections, the Maisel and Cooper reader addresses more specific questions raised by research on congressional elections prior to 1978. The book has two parts: a presentation of much of the basic data on congressional elections found in the 1978 CPS study; and a collection of five articles that draw on the findings of the 1978 study and discuss various aspects of congressional elections. Part one begins with a description of the 1978 sample and survey design by Warren Miller and John Katosh, which is followed by 176 tables drawn from the 1978 data set. The tables are grouped into seven subgroups, each organized around a specific concept. For example, the second subsection examines the relationship between a citizen's involvement in politics, as an independent variable, and turnout, partisan voting, and incumbency voting, as dependent variables. Miller and Katosh provide a brief description of each of the subsections to help guide the reader through the wealth of data presented. Part one also includes two summary tables, one that lists the specific tables in which each variable is found, and the other that lists the variables used in each of the articles in part two.

Part two contains five articles that deal directly, but not exclusively, with the 1978 CPS study. Two of the articles (Thomas Mann and Raymond Wolfinger, and Barbara Hinckley) have been published elsewhere, the others have not. While each article concentrates on different explanatory variables included in the 1978 study, all five articles ad-

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dress the question of incumbent recognition and evaluation. Mann and Wolfinger address the importance of name recognition and candidate reputation in congressional voting decisions. Alan Abramowitz compares voter evaluations of individual House and Senate members with evaluations of national parties and concludes that the former are more important in congressional elections. Both Hinckley and Gary Jacobson address the question of differences between incumbents and challengers; Hinckley looks at both the House and Senate, Jacobson only the House. All four articles make the point, in somewhat different ways and using different explanatory variables, that House incumbents are a breed apart, advantaged by recognition and reputation, and benefiting from their challengers' inability to gain satisfactory recognition among voters. Finally, Glenn Parker explores the reasons for incumbents' popularity, combining data from the 1978 election with data from the Obey Commission's study of House members, and presents findings that support the earlier work of Richard Fenno and David Mayhew.

The Maisel and Cooper reader provides both an excellent reference source for students of congressional elections and a valuable collection of recent scholarly work in the field. Together, the Hinckley book and the Maisel and Cooper reader present a current and stimulating discussion of a subject that just a few years ago suffered from a shortage of empirical information.

CANDICE J. NELSON
Georgetown University

The Washington Reporters *by Stephen Hess. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 174 pp. Cloth, $17.95; paper, $6.95.*

Stephen Hess has written a long-needed study about the Washington press corps. In 1978, 476 out of 1,250 Washington reporters responded to one of two Brookings questionnaires. Nearly 300 kept a one-week log describing the stories they worked on, whom they interviewed, how many hours they worked, and so forth. The remaining reporters were interviewed over the phone by six research assistants and asked open-ended questions about such subjects as "pack journalism" and allegations of political bias. Another part of the project was a content analysis of how Washington news was played in twenty-two newspapers and network newscasts during one week. Over 200 interviews preceded and supplemented the main research; 22 Washington journalists reviewed early drafts. A characteristically thorough, large-scale Brookings project unfolded.

Those who begin with an appreciation of the workings and impacts (and lack of impacts) of Washington journalism are likely to conclude that Hess's book is important. Those who do not start in this state of informed grace may find it difficult to finish the detailed, tightly woven (and on rare occasions finely spun) narrative analyses. Too bad for the quitters! Hess discusses the findings insightfully. (It is one of the few studies to take notice of the growing role of special-interest publications in Washington journalism.) He sharpens the research project by bringing in original concepts of such writers as Herbert Gans, Leon Sigal, Ben Bagdikian, and Paul Weaver. And he presents

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ideas of his own, some connected to research data, some not – it is not always clear which is which. A short review cannot even summarize the headings of this rich presentation.

Hess's data show that reporters get little editing or direction from topside except on newsmagazines and a few prestigious independent (not chain) newspapers. Mostly, they select what they want to write about; consult, wherever possible, sources they find congenial (congressional types rather than civil servants, even when writing about the executive branch); and turn out copy that they think their peers rather than the public will appreciate. "Washington news," Hess concludes, "is produced . . . without regard for how its operation affects . . . the totality of information that reaches the public" (p. 132).

Reporters' autonomy concerns Hess. He wishes they were not so elitishly different from the public – by virtue of their higher education and because they stay in Washington. Hess says reporters are steered by behavioral traits peculiar to a "journalistic personality." Their need for excitement and for proximity to interesting people, he guesses, brought them to Washington journalism. (Questions about salary and power motivations were apparently not asked.) Reporters, writes Hess, fancy themselves as Lone Rangers. They fear the confinements of specialization, refuse to do long-term planning, and cannot endure the delayed gratifications required in taking time for deeper research. They dislike any documentary research (hence the unpopularity of covering regulatory agencies), preferring interesting human conversations to library study. These special journalistic personality traits also include dislike of the kinds of rules associated with large organizations and of bureaucratic processes, and distaste for any stories or work responsibilities involving management. Hess even found reporters cold to suggestions that they hire research assistants and detected some heads of Washington news bureaus who type their own letters.

The Brookings project staff may have reason for concern about these journalistic behaviors now that U.S. culture is becoming increasingly specialized and influenced by those with advanced degrees from prestigious business schools. (I worry about a few elite journalists who behave arrogantly to all but their sources.) But as long as Washington reporters continue to act in such human ways as avoiding libraries and dialing their own phone calls, there may be no urgent alarm about these particular 1,250 higher-educated persons getting completely out of touch with our citizenry. Perhaps we social scientists should ask them what whisky they drink?

EDWIN A. BOCK
Syracuse University

Black Representation and Urban Policy *by Albert K. Karnig and Susan Welch. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 179 pp. $20.00.*

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of black elected officials in the past fifteen years. In 1964, of the more than half-million elected officials in the United States, 280 were black. By 1978, the number of elected blacks had increased to 4,503. This increase in black officeholders is the focus of the Karnig and Welch study. As the authors

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put it: "Though black officials are a tiny fraction (less than 1%) of the more than 520,000 elected officials in the United States, their increase has been sudden and to some extent unexpected" (p. viii). Specifically, Karnig and Welch analyze the increase in black mayors and city council members and evaluate their effect on urban public policy. Their book is excellent.

Karnig and Welch derive their data from the 264 American cities with over 25,000 population (1970 Census) that are at least 10 percent black. Their aggregate analysis of the data departs from most of the other studies of the subject that are either single cases or analyses of small comparative samples. Their ambitious effort thus allows them to test their major hypotheses and forward their conclusions more confidently. In addition, Karnig and Welch enrich their analysis with a thorough review of the appropriate literature, which they use as a basis for establishing the hypotheses to be tested. They first explore some of the conditions that affect the number of black officials elected to urban offices. They test the effects of such variables as demography, antipoverty programs and funding, electoral rules, and black resources on the election of black urban officials. They dismiss such propositions as the influx of federal resources and poverty programs encourages electoral participation (p. 63); black urban officials are more likely to be elected in Northeastern cities (p. 95); and the number of foreign born in a city is inversely related to black representation (p. 75). And they conclude that black resources, particularly population size and socioeconomic factors, are directly related to the election of black urban officeholders (p. 108). Though not a startling revelation in and of itself, Karnig and Welch clarify important issues and carefully analyze their data to make a persuasive and instructive argument. The second section of their work concerns the most important implication of black electoral representation, namely, its effect on urban public policy. Here Karnig and Welch are not sanguine in their conclusions. They suggest that "simply clinging to the status quo may be the best attainable objective at least in the short run" (p. 152).

Karnig and Welch have written a book that makes an important contribution to the literature. Though some of their methodological explanations may be too simplistic for the scholar sophisticated in quantitative research and their analysis may lack an evaluation of such important variables as the increase in black municipal employment or the change in contract-letting policies in cities with increased black representation, their work is valuable for its assessment of some of the major reasons why blacks are elected to urban political office and why it matters. They diligently set forth and test their hypotheses, weave their conclusions into the body of existing literature, and carefully note the limitations of their data.

KATHRYN B. YATRAKIS
The Twentieth Century Fund

Health Policy and the Bureaucracy: Politics and Implementation *by Frank J. Thompson. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 334 pp. $25.00.*

The role of the bureaucracy in shaping policy, particularly the manner in which politics pervades efforts to improve public health, is the subject of this book. Frank J. Thomp-

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son's new work contributes to the implementation literature and, more specifically, to the smaller subset of studies concerning health policy. Drawn primarily from published materials, principally government documents, the book presents a superb overview of certain policies, compiles data on federal implementation activities, and offers a good description of the health-policy subgovernment. Eight federal health policies are separately examined: Medicare, Medicaid, the Hill-Burton program, Health Maintenance Organizations, Health Planning and Resources Development, the Veterans Administration Medical Program, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the National Health Service Corps. These constitute the major federal health initiatives of the last thirty-five years and cover a wide range of policies. Each case study is organized around the concepts of policy (which the author defines as hypothesis), implementation (which "features both strategic behavior and routine" and which is influenced by "qualities associated with . . . the political culture, interest groups, and oversight actors"—p. 11), and scorekeeping (by which the author means the outputs and outcomes of government intervention).

Thompson focuses on the process by which the bureaucracy interprets a program's governing statute but does not provide a comprehensive analysis of either the policy or its implementation. Thus, some attention is paid to the balance of federal-state responsibilities, but the specifics of state or local implementation are not addressed. The author's concern is only with the "patterns of implementation" (p. 2) at the federal level, though the reader may sometimes feel the need for additional information on events at the lower levels of government. This is true of programs where the major responsibilities have been delegated to the states and to the localities and where their activities influence the bureaucracy. Thompson mentions some of this, as in the chapter on Medicaid, but devotes insufficient attention to it elsewhere, particularly in his discussion of the program on health planning.

Perhaps inevitable from a study of this breadth, certain aspects and questions are not dealt with. For instance, the section on the political nature of the technical calculation of need for placement of National Health Service Corps physicians states that consumer demand was never factored into the formula. This oversight contributed to the placement of physicians in areas of little demand, resulting in their underutilization. In some cases, however, there was demand for medical care; the real problem was hostility to the corps, which Thompson overlooks. It is difficult, thus, to draw lessons from some examples and to identify the requisites for successful federal interventions without further probing such issues.

Thompson proffers no theory of implementation but aims to contribute to its development by refining some of the variables previously found in the literature to influence the implementation process. In the final chapter, Thompson systematically discusses those factors that either ensnared or encouraged the implementation of the policies discussed. It is a very evenhanded analysis that seeks to isolate the influence of various factors and is one that defrocks the conventional wisdom that delay or imprecise statutes will always spell disaster. The speed with which Medicaid and the Occupational Health and Safety Act were implemented and the precision of the Health Maintenance Organization Act impeded as much as helped. Each program is a product of tradeoffs made by the agency in a complex, sometimes hostile environment, as it interprets the congressional statute. The "bureaucratic propensity to err" (p. 281) aside, Thompson concludes that the problems of

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implementation ultimately flow from an organizationally weak Congress, itself incapacitated by diminished political parties. His conclusions and injunction to study Congress in order to understand implementation will be familiar to students of public policy and of bureaucratic politics, though Thompson argues not for more congressional control but for better congressional oversight and policy formulation. Finally, Thompson suggests that "the appropriate question is not whether a policy solves a problem once and for all. Past reforms are almost invariably the problems of the future. Thus, the central question becomes: Does a policy give us a better set of problems to work on" (p. 282)? Ineffectiveness and inefficiencies notwithstanding, he concludes that most of the programs in his study met this test. This approach is not likely to gain much adherence in the current governmental effort to cut all public programs that have not demonstrated unequivocal success, but it embodies a realistic view of the United States's incremental and complex public-policy system.

BONITA WLODKOWSKI
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Florida's Gubernatorial Politics in the 20th Century *by David R. Colburn and Richard K. Scher. Gainsville, The University Presses of Florida, 1981. 342 pp. $19.95.*

There has been an understandable tendency among scholars of the governorship to focus their attention on either those aspects most easily measured (formal powers, election returns) or the most visible governors, those with charismatic personalities serving in states in which the office has been a traditional springboard to the presidency. As a consequence, generalizations about the modern state chief executive rest upon a rather narrow base. This volume, one of a small but growing list of studies of the governorship of a single state, provides a healthy corrective by exploring in depth the possibilities for gubernatorial leadership in a state that continues to be skeptical about executive power.

Florida's political system is one of the most limiting of gubernatorial power in the United States. The 1885 state constitution provided for six statewide elected officials in addition to the governor, and later amendment, law, and practice vested this "cabinet" with considerable collective authority. Moreover, whereas cabinet officers were permitted to succeed themselves, and often did, the governor's tenure was limited by the constitution, and informal norms even precluded the governor's heavy involvement in the choice of a successor. It is important to note, too, that this arrangement is not a simple vestige of the past: Floridians chose to continue it in 1968, after a major reconsideration of their constitution.

Can a governor lead in such an environment? After a review of Florida's socioeconomic and political context, Colburn and Scher analyze three policy areas: economic development, race, and social welfare. Generally, they find that governors in Florida have responded to two fiscal priorities: tax limitation and economic growth. Of the twenty executives discussed in this volume, sixteen are classified as economic conservatives and only two, Fuller Warren and Reuben Askew, were "moderate" or "liberal" in

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all three policy areas. Yet despite scant resources, the political system does allow the determined chief executive to make his mark. Witness the positive impact on Florida of LeRoy Collins's and Reuben Askew's progressive leadership on race. The implicit message is clear: even where economic constraints are strong and formal powers limited, gubernatorial leadership may make a substantial difference.

Florida's Gubernatorial Politics is not without faults. Though published in 1980, its tables are complete only through the mid-1970s, and some reflect inconsistencies. Was federal aid to Florida in 1940, $7 million plus or $12 million plus (pp. 23, 194)? Grounding in the political-science literature is stronger in some areas (for example, legislative politics) than in others (for example, campaigning), and the authors seem insufficiently aware of the large body of comparative literature in the field of state government that has been produced over the past two decades. Finally, some topics—the dynamics of the growth of Republicanism in state politics, the role of the governor in dealing with local governments and the national government—might have been more fully discussed. Nevertheless, on balance this book makes a useful contribution to our understanding of both the politics of Florida and the institution of the governorship in America.

GERALD BENJAMIN
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Corrections at the Crossroads: Designing Policy *edited by Sherwood E. Zimmerman and Harold D. Miller. Beverly Hills, Calif.; Sage Publications, Inc., 1981. 176 pp. Cloth, $16.00; paper, $7.95.*

Political scientists who become interested in corrections policy soon discover that this interest is shared by few of their colleagues. As a fruitful area for academic research, corrections has been largely dominated by sociologists, psychologists, and criminologists. Yet there are few areas of government where there is more critical need for public-policy research, and political scientists need to be aware of current policy debates within the corrections community. What should be done about overcrowded and inhumane prisons—build newer and better facilities or incarcerate fewer offenders? What kinds of rehabilitation programs work—or do any of them? Should we have more uniformity in punishment, or continue to leave a great deal of discretion to judges and parole boards? Ultimately these are political questions of resource and benefit allocation.

This book is a modest effort to open discussion on some of these topics, by presenting seven articles on various aspects of corrections policy. An excellent introduction by the editors points out the demographic and political dimensions of the prison overcrowding problem: the maturing of the post-World War II "baby boom" cohorts into the age groups most likely to be incarcerated, and the public attention given to crime rather than to prison problems. The prison population mushroomed by 55 percent between 1971 and 1977, they note, and it will keep climbing through the 1980s if the United States continues present incarceration policies. Three basic policy decisions, the editors feel, must be made. A society must determine first the number of people that it wishes to incarcerate, considering the available resources and public clamor for incarceration; second, the kind

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of offenders it most wants to imprison; and third, the kind of prison environment it wants to maintain.

Each article deals with research on a narrow aspect of a current policy problem; consequently, some do little more than whet the appetite for more empirical data on the subject. Most of the authors, however, provide useful references for further study.

Perhaps the most controversial essay is on juvenile decarceration. Arguing strongly for a "surgical strike" at juvenile correctional institutions by closing them all at once, the authors contend that gradual closing of such facilities will not work. In the four states studied, the "gradual change" philosophy yielded either a limited reduction in the number of institutionalized youths or an increase in the number of youths under the control of correctional systems (p. 166). Waiting for appropriate community facilities to be developed, they argue, only gives time for proponents of existing institutions to mobilize their political resources against change. These conclusions are based on experience in only four states; such an important movement (in which one of the authors was personally involved) should be represented by additional longitudinal studies.

Other articles discuss correctional program evaluation, the effects of extralegal factors on perceptions of punishment, the impact of "cocorrections" (sexually integrated prisons), the institutional consequences of stress in correctional officers, and the current vogue for sentencing guidelines (classifying offenders by crime and background and prescribing, or strongly suggesting, sentences within a narrow range to avoid disparities in punishment). Although the book was not intended to be comprehensive, the lack of an essay on community corrections facilities for adults as an alternative to building more prisons is regrettable. Some articles will be of limited interest to political scientists, since they are designed for professionals and students in criminal justice. Taken together, however, they offer some much-needed insights into correctional policy issues that ultimately will have to be confronted in the political arena.

JEAN BICKMORE WHITE
Weber State College

The State as Defendant: Governmental Accountability and the Redress of Individual Grievances *by Leon Hurwitz. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 211 pp. $27.50.*

Accountability is a term that has acquired both currency and visibility in the last decade, especially in this country. It has become a key word for the powerholders and the powerless alike. It is a symbol, as it were, of the desire of free people to have recourse against arbitrary or oppressive governmental action.

Leon Hurwitz reminds readers that the availability of such recourse is not the rule but the exception. History reveals that the norm has almost always and everywhere been the doctrine of *rex gratia dei*, the concept that power in the state is a gift of God and its exercise therefore not to be questioned. Modern legal parlance employs the more secular term "governmental immunity"—but the result is the same: there is no recourse as a matter of right.

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Hurwitz discusses this global backdrop in an "Introductory Essay" that has both sweep and scope. He follows this by what are really case studies, examples of Western practices that—as he repeatedly stresses—are still "abnormal and atypical." The case studies run the gamut from the legalistic—the use of the regular courts in the United States, with cases of passport denials as specific examples—to the amorphous world of private international agencies and their potential, but still uncertain, roles as protectors of individuals or groups aggrieved—here focusing on Amnesty International.

The common denominator of the case studies is that "the state *is* (and not just should be) responsible and liable for its actions" (p. 194). But can it be expected that this premise will be accepted by societies outside the realm of Western democracy? Hurwitz warns against such sanguine expectations. Whether it is cause or effect—an issue he does not purport to resolve—wherever redress against the government is effective, the institutions that provide such redress are held in high regard. This is as true of the *Conseil d'Etat* in France and the ombudsman in the Scandinavian countries as it is of the Supreme Court in the United States. But, in the absence of comparable societal values, to replicate these agencies in no way assures the same or even similar results.

Although he recognizes the inherent weakness of international agencies (public or private), Hurwitz is more hopeful about their eventual impact on behalf of the protection of individual rights than he is about institutionalized arrangements within nation-states. In this, he may well be too optimistic. Alternatively, one may observe that there is really far less of a basis for judgment on the use of the European Convention on Human Rights or the effectiveness of Amnesty International than there is for the U.S. Supreme Court or the ombudsman in Sweden.

The merit of Hurwitz's approach is, however, not so much in his projections for the future as in the scope of his inquiry and in its conceptual framework. His "Introductory Essay" places the individual's right to redress against the state in the broad panorama of political thought, not only of the Western world but of classical China and traditional Hinduism. The paradigm is convincing and invites further case studies of the kind that comprise the bulk of this book.

There are, regrettably, some flaws of a technical nature. That "faculty" becomes "faulty" (p. 98) may be a Freudian slip by the editor. Readers with a moderate knowledge of geography will recognize that "Taureg" (p. 58) should be "Tuareg"—and there are other evidences of typographical carelessness. Footnotes 33 and 34 on page 55 are particularly puzzling. In note 33, reference is made to a Supreme Court case (*United States* v. *Travis*) which begins at page 491 of the respective volume of the reports. This is a very brief opinion, running for two pages only; but the footnote refers to "491 at 131"—obviously an impossibility. The same footnote cites the comparison case, *United States* v. *Laub*, but styles it "U.S. v. Lee, Levi, Laub." The same form appears in footnote 34 but here, incongruously, with a citation to an unofficial, rather than the official report. In fact, Levi and Lee were Mr. Laub's first and middle names, not his codefendants. The codefendants are named in the lower court decision as Luce, Martinot, and Schlosser. (The same misconception, stated even more explicitly, also occurs in the 1971 law review article, on which this chapter is based. Thus Hurwitz has been twice let down by his editors.)

But this is carping at what in all other respects is a meritorious contribution, both to

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scholarship and to civic understanding. Hurwitz has given us a fine book, typographical and editoral slips notwithstanding.

FRANCIS H. HELLER
University of Kansas

Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits *by J. Woodford Howard, Jr. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 415 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $12.50.*

Prior to the mid-twentieth century, students of judicial behavior concentrated almost exclusively on the Supreme Court, but in recent decades they have broadened their horizons by studying courts, judges, and judging at all levels. J. Woodford Howard is the first, however, to subject the United States Courts of Appeals to a rigorous analysis, and he does so thoroughly and incisively. Given the limits of time and money, Howard focuses his research microscope on only three of the twelve federal circuits: the second, which covers New York, Connecticut, and Vermont; the fifth, which comprises six states in the deep South and the Canal Zone; and the District of Columbia, which has a unique jurisdiction as well as a responsibility for administrative appeals in the nation's capital. To determine the effectiveness of the federal appellate system Howard relies essentially on two sources: the roughly 5000 cases reported in the three circuits during fiscal years 1965 to 1967, and interviews with thirty-five active, senior judges. Using the information thus obtained he organizes his findings around two basic themes—the flow of litigation, and the roles of the judges.

The past two decades have witnessed an exponential explosion in litigation, one result of which is a judiciary that is no longer an "interstitial" lawmaker but the final source of solutions to the nation's problems. Therefore, says Howard, the paramount issue of the 1970s was the pressure of quantity on quality in appellate judging, and quality in the circuit courts may well be more critical than in the Supreme Court itself. Only 20 percent of the circuit courts' decisions are appealed to the Supreme Court, and of those only 9 percent are granted certiorari; all of which means that the circuit courts are the courts of last resort for 98 percent of the litigants. To a large extent, therefore, circuit-court decisions become regional law and the "notion that the Supreme Court review . . . compels uniformity in every circuit is a mirage and has been for some time" (p. 73). Circuit courts not only correct errors in the trial courts, settle disputes—usually finally—and enforce national law but also filter and shape review-worthy claims on their way to the Supreme Court. But is not the regionalization of national law an evil consequence of the autonomy of the circuit courts? Not so, says Howard, since the Supreme Court need not review every last case to guide the behavior of inferior courts. It must only maintain a credible *threat* of review. Furthermore, uniformity of national law "is not an absolute but an organizational objective to be weighed against competing goals . . . permitting regional experimentation and adaption of national law to continental diversity" (p. 81).

Howard's characterization of the circuit judges as a competent professional group among whom personal animosities are rare and whose dissent rates are lower than those

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of the Supreme Court suggests that they form a cohesive elite of honorable men and women who wield power responsibly and effectively. But they are swamped with controversies begging for resolution that cannot help impairing the quality of their work. What to do? Howard views the basic relief strategies with some skepticism, suggesting that "jumboism" and "proliferation" (more judges and more courts) should come last and that a prudent course would embrace limited reforms such as eliminating three-judge district courts and diversity jurisdiction and creating specialized appellate courts where forum shopping is worst—patents, copyrights, civil taxation, and contract claims against the government.

In the section on judging there is a tendency to accept the pronouncements of psychologists uncritically when often they are overgeneralized or too obvious to bear repeating. But this is merely a quibble. Anyone who wishes to understand the intricacies, complexities, and subtleties of the federal appellate system could do no better than to read this book. It is insightful scholarship at its best.

ROBERT J. STEAMER
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Economic Liberties and the Constitution *by Bernard H. Siegan. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 383 pp. $19.50.*

Substantive economic due process exhumed but not, following Robert G. McCloskey, reburied, that is the thesis of this sometimes tedious, often wrongheaded, and thoroughly provocative book.

Bernard Siegan's argument develops along five lines. First, judicial review of economic regulation is rooted in the Constitution. Second, the judiciary has no constitutional authority for "discriminating against economic liberties" (p. 327) while offering fulsome protection to political rights—that is, speech, press, religion, privacy, and travel—and to specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Third, judicial review serves pragmatic policymaking purposes, since much regulatory legislation has proved economically harmful. Fourth, the legislature is neither representative enough nor competent to be the final arbiter of regulatory policy. Finally, contemporary judicial policy toward economic regulation "is not coherent or principled," because it selectively protects only a few commercial activities that happen to be connected to political liberties—for example, the advertising of lawyers or realtors that claims First Amendment protection.

Siegan prescribes sterner rules for protecting economic interests than were ever advanced by the Old Court. Transporting Justice Brennan's equal protection analysis in gender discrimination cases into the due process clause, Siegan argues that valid economic regulations "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." To this standard he would add a less drastic means test: government must be unable to find a less sweeping means to accomplish its regulatory objective. Finally, Siegan would revise century-and-a-half-old interpretations of the ex post facto clause, to apply it to civil (property) as well as criminal

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matters, and the contract clause, to protect all contracts rather than only those made prior to the enactment of regulatory legislation.

Siegan's argument is often inconsistent. He asserts that the Framers intended judicial protection of economic interests, but he ignores intent in asserting that corporations as well as individuals are "persons" under the due process clause. Similarly, he at times treats economic rights as adjuncts to political freedom, since "one would be reluctant to speak, write, pray, or petition in a manner displeasing to the authorities lest he lose what he already has earned and possesses" (p. 38). At other times his argument is that property interests are independent "rights" inhering in the natural-law ideals of the Framers. His argument is also unidimensional. He cites more than fifty studies to show that economic regulation generally fails, but his sole measure of success is economic consequences. In an ironic turnabout, he castigates "environmentalists" who reject economic analysis in favor of the aesthetic and conserving benefits of environmental and zoning regulations for applying "an isolated standard of achievement." Their analysis he dismisses by noting that "although Mussolini made the trains run on time, he subjected his country to tyranny" (p. 302).

Siegan deeply distrusts republicanism, which stands alongside liberty as a fundamental constitutional value. He portrays the legislature as unfit to make economic regulations because it is influenced by powerful interests. Moreover, legislators are not competent in economic matters and are too busy to act effectively even if competent. He ignores arguments of other commentators that the elected departments are at least comparatively more representative than the courts; that legislators, supported by staff and involved in an information-laden process, are better able than judges to shape and evaluate complex policies; and that pressures in the legislative process, subject to continual political correction, may be less objectionable than are the fixed personal ideologies that modern social science has shown to affect greatly voting by judges appointed for life.

Siegan's kin are found in the contemporary libertarian movement. He stoutly defends judicial protection of political as well as economic liberties, but he opposes "affirmative jurisprudence" that orders positive governmental acts, especially spending, to protect or advance interests of disadvantaged groups. This attractive consistency appears naive, however. Unfettered economic power has often threatened both republican government and individual political liberty. Through conspiracy and conglomeration the unregulated economic activity of some may deny economic freedom to others, producers and consumers. If regulation has run riot, its roots are nonetheless in felt and demonstrated needs, both economic and noneconomic. And the political process is distinctively able to curb excess regulation, as is clear from the contemporary antiregulatory postures struck by such diverse politicians as Edward Kennedy and Ronald Reagan.

DAVID ADAMANY
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The Supreme Court and the Second Bill of Rights: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Nationalization of Civil Liberties *by Richard C. Cortner. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. 360 pp. $29.50.*

In the *Harvard Law Review* for November 1964, Philip Kurland testily proposed that, given the politicization of the Supreme Court, "the subject of constitutional law should be turned back to the political scientists." This suggestion had perhaps more merit than Kurland realized. Richard Cortner's book brilliantly demonstrates the special contribution that political scientists can in fact make to the understanding of constitutional development and the role of the judicial process in the political system. Cortner has taken as his subject the nationalization of American civil liberties through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a development of the utmost importance that between 1925 and 1969 "transformed the structure of constitutional protection for political and civil liberties in the United States and . . . profoundly altered the nature of the federal system" (p. 279).

The Supreme Court's creation of this "second Bill of Rights," which has made nearly all the protections of the "first" Bill of Rights applicable to the states, has been perhaps the most widely discussed theme of recent constitutional scholarship. But Cortner's book is novel in method and an extremely important addition to the dialogue. He traces the intellectual history of the nationalization (or incorporation) idea over the almost one-hundred years from *Slaughter House Cases* (1873) to *Benton* v. *Maryland* (1969) through in-depth discussions of some twenty-four landmark cases. The author guides the reader from the rejectionist decades of *Hurtado* v. *California* (1884) and *Twining* v. *New Jersey* (1908) through the assumption in *Gitlow* v. *New York* (1925) that the First Amendment applies to the states, then into the "fair trial" rationale of the fifties, and finally the triumph of selective incorporationism in the sixties.

Cortner's presentation of the cast of characters, the maneuvering of the parties, and the stages of judicial consideration provide, to the degree possible within eight or ten pages, the same kind of immersion in the litigation and understanding of the issues and their consequences provided by Anthony Lewis's classic account of the *Gideon* v. *Wainwright* (1925) case or, more recently, Fred Friendly's *Minnesota Rag.* While the author has not found it possible to exploit the archival material on intracourt bargaining that Walter Murphy, Woodford Howard, and other political scientists have used, he does quote from the tapes of the Court's oral arguments in all the cases from *Mapp* v. *Ohio* (1961) on. (Regrettably, his use of the taped argument in *Duncan* v. *Louisiana* wholly fails to convey the hilarious incompetence of Louisiana's assistant attorney general.)

Throughout, and particularly in a solid concluding chapter, Cortner deals with the kinds of questions that interest political scientists. What was the nature of interest-group participation in the nationalization movement? To what extent were test cases employed? How did nationalization affect the nature of the federal system? Why did representatives of the states not resist nationalization more effectively? Why did the Court not develop more rational justifications and explanations to legitimate this major constitutional change?

Teachers of constitutional law can enliven their lectures with vignettes from Cortner's accounts. For example, he reports that Benjamin Gitlow could have secured a pardon

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from Governor Al Smith after his conviction had been affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals in 1923, but Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) advised against it because that would abort the planned appeal to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, Smith was still governor after Gitlow had lost in the Supreme Court, and the pardon was belatedly granted.

Benton v. *Maryland* was the final decision in nationalization of the Bill of Rights, the culmination of one of the Warren Court's major achievements. *Benton* was decided on 23 June 1969. In one of history's little ironies, this was also the last day of Warren's service on the Court. At the close of the session and in the presence of President Nixon, Warren E. Burger took the oath as chief justice. Cortner rings down the curtain: "The era of the Warren Court had come to an end."

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
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Managing a Federal Agency: The Hidden Stimulus *by Louis K. Bragaw. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 300 pp. $20.00.*

The great sin of government agencies, critics claim, is that they "lack the stimulus to effectiveness, efficiency, and innovation that is provided in the private sector by the market mechanism and by competition" (p. 4). Public managers—unlike their private counterparts—are not driven toward successful performance. To look at this charge, Bragaw presents a detailed case study of the U.S. Coast Guard that starts with a general consideration of the guard's theory and process of management; treats extended examples of how the Coast Guard managed the "Loran" (long-range navigation) program and the Marine Environmental Protection program (these two cases covering well over half the book); and concludes with a brief chapter on public and private management.

The author argues that evidence from the Coast Guard indicates that the increasingly drastic threats of financial cutbacks, of partial takeover of one or more programs by a competing agency, and of liquidation of the entire agency substitute for the market so as to act as a hidden stimulus. "The hidden stimulus is a form of the survival instinct" (p. 248). But does this intense study of a handful of cases make a definitive argument that the hidden stimulus provides an effective incentive in the Coast Guard? And even if that argument is sound and adequate, can it be generalized to other agencies in the public sector?

I knew nothing about the two programs put under scrutiny by Bragaw and certainly lack the technical background to judge whether the two have been as successful as the author claims. Bragaw's assessment is therefore accepted partly for want of other information. Generalizing that effect to the public sector at large, however, would seem to raise questions.

The Coast Guard is unusual, if not unique, in being the only military service to provide extensive *direct* services to civilians. Being a uniformed service brings the rare case in government of continuity of leadership. Political executives at the top in civilian agencies last a couple of years on the average; several of the Coast Guard commandants Bragaw discusses served in that position for eight to ten years. Also unlike civilian managers,

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commandants work their way up so that they come to the top of a management team in an organization they know from long experience. I wonder how well businesses would do, even under the hard spur of competition, if every two years an entirely new management team from outside came in at the top. Clearly there is much greater continuity in the Coast Guard than in most government organizations.

It is also becoming increasingly unusual for federal agencies to provide direct services. At least in the domestic policy areas, organizations at the subnational government level more often operate programs under grants-in-aid managed by federal agencies. Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and the Labor Department, for example, all operate so differently from the Coast Guard as to raise basic questions about the wider applicability of Bragaw's conclusions, particularly the much emphasized hidden stimulus.

The book is, however, well worth reading for its extended treatment of a federal agency, its discussion of public and private management issues, and its stress on the critical need for management to concentrate on basic organizational capacity. A striking theme is Coast Guard management's concentration on competence to deliver and its long recognition of the continuing need to develop sufficient junior officer and enlisted staff capacity to handle complex situations. What has so blighted the managerial performance of the domestic agencies administering grants-in-aid is their excessive emphasis on compliance and the short shrift given to the underlying capacity of the grantee organizations to deliver services. The failure to understand that capacity at the point of service delivery is fundamental strikes me as the greatest weakness of public-sector management efforts. In the admittedly more simple and straightforward case of the Coast Guard, documentation of the importance of competence in delivery, rather than the hidden stimulus, may be the significant generality.

WALTER WILLIAMS
University of Washington

Eisenhower and the Cold War *by Robert A. Divine. New York, Oxford University Press, 1981. 182 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $3.95.*

The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare *by Blanche Wiesen Cook. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1981. 432 pp. $17.95.*

Robert A. Divine and Blanche Wiesen Cook follow the banner of Eisenhower revisionism but reveal the diversity among the ranks of that growing army. Both authors share the view that Eisenhower can no longer be dismissed as a cherubic, apolitical golfer who delegated statecraft to John Foster Dulles and a protective staff. Both historians recognize a politician far deeper and shrewder than critics ever fathomed, one whose indirect leadership techniques obscured the fact that the policies were invariably his. The two authors laud Eisenhower's success in curbing excessive military spending and adventurism that might have led to armed conflict.

In other ways, however, the books vary considerably. They are based on different sets

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of sources. Divine relies mainly on published accounts, while Cook tacks through seas of unpublished, sometimes recently declassified documents. These evidentiary differences also reflect divergent focuses. Divine generally deals with the public (or at least publicly acknowledged) diplomatic record and, save for the 1953 coup in Iran, eschews "covert operations." The latter, in contrast, are Cook's chief interest. Divine's Eisenhower is a pragmatist and manager whose overall policy fell within the cold war consensus—as does generally the author's perspective. Cook, on the other hand, adopts the emphasis of William A. Williams and others who stress America's quest for world markets and raw materials. She is more concerned with defining Eisenhower's ideology and that of the likeminded corporate elite that, she argues, helped shape his policies and stood to benefit from them.

Divine and Cook concur on Eisenhower's positive accomplishments: avoiding or liquidating dangerous involvements, as in Korea and Indochina, and searching for means to dampen the Soviet-American conflict. Though by no means uncritical, Divine finds more to praise than does Cook, who indicts Eisenhower for elaborating a policy of economic and military support for dictators and for undertaking efforts to destabilize regimes inimical to American political and economic interests.

Divine provides a tight précis of the commonly agreed-upon high points of Eisenhower's foreign policy. Ending the Korean War, escaping the Indochinese trap, handling the Formosa Straits embroilments with studied ambiguity and restraint, and resolving the Suez crisis all constituted triumphs. Iran and Lebanon revealed less laudable aspects of Eisenhower's foreign policy, including a failure to distinguish nationalism from communism. Eisenhower's quest for détente and nuclear arms limits receives high grades for effort.

Cook would consider these findings only part of the story. She focuses on Eisenhower's support for strenuous efforts at psychological warfare, undercover political plottings around the globe, and a dovetailing set of economic policies designed to maintain an environment friendly to American enterprise. She locates the germs of Eisenhower's commitment to such programs in the prepresidential years (which occupy nearly half the book). Thus, he had early experience with intelligence, covert operations, psychological warfare, and the misguided reliance on right-wing political leaders in the North African campaign. Several of the advisers of later years, including brother Milton, C.D. Jackson, and Robert Murphy, made their debuts in that theater.

Eisenhower required little tutoring, Cook says, to see the strategic need for raw materials, and World War II taught him the folly of isolationism. The postwar years brought him in contact with a corporate elite concerned with projecting American capitalism around the globe, whose members groomed him carefully for his eventual service. He relaxed at the exclusive Bohemian Grove, supped with the mighty at stag dinners arranged by his friend and sponsor, Edward Bermingham, and sealed his marriage with the world of multinational conglomerates later when he "worked closely" (p. 342) with the Bilderberg group, a forerunner of today's Trilateral Commission.

If Eisenhower shied away from the thornier aspects of containment such as limited wars, he welcomed such programs as Radio Free Europe, balloon-carried propaganda for Eastern Europe, intrigues against Communists in Italy, and other artifices; Cook sees a greater, longer-lived interest in "liberation" by such means than do other historians (in-

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cluding Divine). She finds the true flavor of the Eisenhower years in the activities of various presidential commissions devoted to psychological warfare and of such practitioners as Nelson Rockefeller and C.D. Jackson. She scrutinizes the formulation of Eisenhower's foreign economic policies, although an explicit statement of the contents of these policies is lacking. The centerpiece of her book is a two-chapter account of the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, which in motive, method, and implications served as a model for subsequent disastrous interventions around the world. Though Eisenhower warned eloquently of the threat of a military-industrial complex, it "was empowered," Cook claims, "as never before during his presidency" (p. vii).

Divine provides a useful synthesis of previous work and thoughtful analysis but, confessedly, offers little new material. If his book can be likened to an appetizer, then Cook's is a veritable slumgullion of findings and speculations offered up in a spicy theoretical sauce. The ingredients do not all blend happily, however. While her sociological and ideological analysis of the roots of export capitalism is interesting, her argument about the extent to which Eisenhower shared this imperial mindset is not fully convincing. Eisenhower's rhetoric often appeared to be at least as much a rationale to sell costly programs as it was a true motive; moreover, statistical evidence of American dependence on trade is not impressive. Nor is it always clear that the theories or musings of friends and advisers had heavy impact on policy: after all, C.D. Jackson was ultimately frustrated by his failure to implement his ideas. The book is also marred by haphazard organization and by casual editing, which has left typos, errata, awkward paragraph transitions, and overlong, shambling chapters.

In different ways, both books add to our knowledge of the legacy of the Eisenhower years—a "divided" one according to Cook, "mixed" according to Divine.

RICHARD M. FRIED
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Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days, 1951–1960 *by William Bragg Ewald, Jr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981. 336 pp. $12.95.*

William Ewald joins those recent analysts who believe that Dwight D. Eisenhower did not prefer the putting green to the Oval Office, read more than paperback westerns, and was well versed in English grammar. Nor did Ewald's Eisenhower abrogate his responsibilities to such cold war ideologues as John Foster Dulles or fiscal dinosaurs as George Humphrey. Rather, the author depicts a commanding figure who skillfully practiced the art of politics from behind a carefully cultivated mask of uninformed congeniality. Thus, it was Eisenhower who orchestrated McCarthy's destruction, Eisenhower who decided Sherman Adams must resign, and Eisenhower who charted the tortuous course resulting in seven-and-one-half years of peace.

Formerly a Harvard English instructor, Eisenhower speech writer and cabinet officer, and an assistant in preparing the presidential memoirs, Ewald has fashioned a breezy, anecdotal narrative. He makes a point of including passages certain to evoke popular interest. For example, without adding anything to Ewald's thesis, the book contains the

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obligatory references to Kay Summersby and to Mamie's alleged alcoholism. Wherever possible, he interjects a comparison between Eisenhower and Johnson, and he spends an inordinate amount of space discussing Nixon, despite the vice-president's relatively minor contribution to the administration. These digressions, nevertheless, do not solely add color. The study is unquestionably a defense of Eisenhower, albeit with qualifications. For this purpose, Ewald must underscore that it was Johnson, not Eisenhower, who committed American troops to Vietnam and show that the president's feelings toward Nixon were always ambivalent.

Ewald is the first Eisenhower biographer to draw extensively on the massive amount of newly released material at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. He initially used these documents while working on the memoirs at Gettysburg; hence, he had access to many that remain classified. Also, since Ewald worked closely with Eisenhower in varous capacities, he was able to interview a wide array of principal actors. The result is a perceptive and convincing account, focusing on seventeen representative incidents. Among the topics covered are Eisenhower's techniques as a leader; his personal aspirations; his relations with members of his administration, Congress, and influential outsiders; his numerous political maneuverings; and his handling of foreign-policy crises. Without concealing his sympathies, Ewald does try to be objective. He concedes that Eisenhower erred in not defending George Marshall in Milwaukee against McCarthy's charges (p. 63). He describes the president's denial that he wanted to replace Nixon in 1956 as "disingenuous" (p. 200). He reveals how Eisenhower prevailed upon Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn to do the "dirtiest" work of getting rid of Adams (p. 257). We even learn of Eisenhower's extreme sensitivity to criticism and, on occasion, reluctance to forgive his critics.

Although Ewald's work is a welcome corrective to the extant literature, it has major shortcomings. Above all, because there are no footnotes, the reader cannot differentiate among contentions derived from documents, interviews, or the author's interpretation. Not only is this frustrating, but one is left to wonder whether the author's research is as thorough as it first appears. His treatment of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, for instance, suggests that Ewald did not consult several relevant collections. Similarly, there is no way to determine how selectively he used his information. His categorization of Eisenhower's "brilliant" strategy toward Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait in 1954–1955 as a "triumph" (pp. 210–11), but failure to mention the more volatile 1958 episode, makes his objectivity suspect. His convoluted assessment of Eisenhower's possible implication in Patrice Lumumba's assassination illustrates that Ewald at times anguished over the evidence. By not referencing sources, he has deprived the reader of the opportunity to do the same.

RICHARD H. IMMERMAN
Princeton University

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Independent Journey: The Life of William O. Douglas *by James F. Simon. New York, Harper & Row, 1981. 502 pp. $16.95.*

The Court Years 1939–1975: The Autobiography of William O. Douglas. *New York, Random House, 1980. 434 pp. $16.95.*

Most public officials share with the rest of humankind a common fate: after death, passing years and fading memories soon consign almost all of us to oblivion. Even justices of the Supreme Court have not escaped this end. Yet a few surely seem destined by their decisions, deeds, and doctrines to be ranked among the remembered, to remain near the gateway of scholarly and popular interest for a very long time. William O. Douglas occupies one of those places.

Testimony to this fact is the nearly simultaneous appearance of Simon's biography and Douglas's autobiography, part two. This occurrence is noteworthy if only for its rarity. The rush to publish has not attracted many justices. While many have lectured and written extrajudicially, there is so far no expectation for judicial, as opposed to presidential, memoirs. The Douglas effort (*Go East, Young Man*, now completed by *The Court Years*) thus joins sparse company.

Those justices who have spoken about their lives and work have customarily done so indirectly through their private papers and correspondence. Indeed, some of the clearest insights into the internal operation of the United States Supreme Court have come from scholars who had access to such collections. Simon did not have the advantages that a large, relatively untapped manuscript collection might have presented, advantages that have contributed much to other judicial biographies. At last report, the 30,000 items in the Douglas Papers at the Library of Congress remain "completely restricted." With profit, however, Simon painstakingly mined the Frankfurter and Burton Papers and smaller collections, such as the Fred Rodell Papers at Yale, containing Douglas correspondence. He gleaned much as well from interviews with colleagues, clerks, and family. There is no indication that he saw the second volume of the Douglas autobiography in manuscript form, although Simon naturally made extensive use of the first, which appeared in 1974.

A judicial biography should attempt at least two objectives: the portrayal of the life of the subject, especially in terms of personal and intellectual growth, interests, and accomplishments; and the depiction of the Court at work. The two are related of course, and the goal of each is increased understanding of the institution by way of the individual. For example, Simon makes the important connection between Douglas's *Right of the People* (1958) and his votes and opinions on privacy during the next seventeen years (p. 347).

On the first objective alone, Simon's biography is a significant addition to the literature. He is graphic in revealing Douglas as a law teacher at Yale and as a fierce advocate and administrator at the Securities and Exchange Commission, yet skilled in writing about a troubled, self-centered man in his dealings with spouses, children, and colleagues. If the overall effect is praise of Douglas, the praise is by no means unqualified. Simon's book is less remarkable on the second objective only because he did not have access to Douglas's Court papers or to those of any of the justice's more recent colleagues. Still, Simon provides insight and some new information.

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For an autobiography of a public official to be significant as a scholarly work, the reader should find the author's perspective on events, himself, his thinking, and other people. In greatly varying degrees, *The Court Years* meets this test. Three problems beset the volume, however, that severely restrict its usefulness. First, the book is disjointed and sorely in need of editing, even though the "Publisher's Note" states that the "greater part" was written before 1973 (pp. ix-xi). What we know of Douglas's years after his tragic stroke in 1974 would not lead many to conclude that he was capable of sustained work on the project. This defect, therefore, is perplexing and was probably avoidable. (Douglas died in early 1980.)

Second, and more serious, the volume is not altogether straightforward. While this is not an uncommon failing in memoir writing, it seems more pronounced here. For example, in the very first paragraph Douglas declares, "I never wanted to run for office" (p. 3). Very little comment appears elsewhere on this issue, even though Simon plainly shows in *Independent Journey* that, as a justice, Douglas's views on the subject were *at best* ambivalent (pp. 257-75). The solitary declaration is at odds with the record. *The Court Years* also glosses over Douglas's role in the Rosenberg spy case (pp. 78-82) in a way Simon does not (pp. 298-313).

Third, and perhaps related to the first, few important issues are treated profoundly. The reader discovers, for example, an almost casual review of one of the most controversial aspects of Douglas's life: his extracurial activities (pp. 357-65). In his discussion of the Fortas Affair (1969), he defends Abe Fortas and in turn himself without ever seeming to realize that proprieties matter, at least for judges. The problem lies not in Douglas's point of view but in the anemic and shallow defense he gives it. As a justice, Douglas holds the longevity record, but even in his extended tenure he apparently did not learn that the constitutional prerogatives of independence the Court enjoys in turn make unique demands on its members.

The Court Years is entertaining and readable in places and contains an ample supply of anecdotes and observations that will spice up the lectures of countless teachers for years to come. Yet, a student will come to know Douglas far better through his judicial opinions, other books, and Simon's *Independent Journey*.

D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.
Franklin and Marshall College

The Taming of Fidel Castro *by Maurice Halperin. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. 345 pp. $18.95.*

A sequel to Halperin's *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro* (1972), which covered the early years of the Cuban Revolution to 1964, this book studies the period from 1964 to 1968. Halperin unequivocally argues that a reckless Fidel Castro got himself into such economic trouble at home that he had to submit his nation to Soviet influence in order to survive. In short, the Soviets tamed him. In the process Castro abandoned the Cuban Revolution. Halperin himself witnessed some of the events about which he writes, having

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spent the years 1962–1968 as a lecturer in economic geography at the University of Havana. He is now Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, British Columbia.

The Taming of Fidel Castro is a disappointing volume. It is part historical narrative, part autobiography, part biography, part content analysis, and part polemic—yet no part is strong enough to sustain the disjointed work. The book is annoyingly episodic, moving hurriedly from topic to topic in short, subdivided chapters, which, counting a prologue and epilogue, number forty-one. Most simply do not warrant status as chapters. Domestic and international subjects are intermixed but not integrated well. Transitions are often abrupt: from Che Guevara in the Congo to grasslands policy in Cuba, for example. Too seldom does the author pause to discuss the significance of this wearying set of episodes or to connect the myriad subsections. (Halperin's structure might be defended with the argument that Castro himself jumped from one issue to another.) In many places the book becomes a string of quotations from Fidel's notoriously long speeches. Halperin's comments do little to break the sheer dullness of Castro's hackneyed slogan-mongering and monotonous revolutionary rhetoric. The author's harsh indictment of the "Maximum Leader" as a whimsical, erratic, authoritarian, demagogic egomaniac makes for lively reading here and there, but this too becomes tiresome because Halperin brings so little scholarship to bear upon his unvarnished hatred for Castro. This is not the place to turn for a thorough, well-researched study of the Cuban Revolution.

The story begins with Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in early 1964. That brief reconciliation between Havana and Moscow was followed by several years of discord over trade terms, China, peaceful coexistence, and Cuban support for Third World revolutions. Fearing that he was becoming too dependent on the Soviet Union—Halperin catalogs the considerable Soviet economic, military, and technical assistance—Castro sought accommodation with the United States. Halperin faults American officials for snubbing the overture. Castro also sent Che Guevara to Africa, proclaimed Cuba a leader of revolutionary ferment around the globe, and bitterly denounced the Soviets for dragging their feet in the revolutionary parade. Whereas the Soviets wanted to work through the Communist parties of Latin America, many of which were attempting to gain political legitimacy, Castro backed guerilla groups. At home, meanwhile, Castro's ill-begot decisions and chaotic management wrecked the Cuban economy, argues Halperin, making Soviet aid urgent and essential. The Cuban endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and internal adjustments along the Soviet model signaled Castro's capitulation to Moscow in order to keep the Soviet subsidy flowing.

Halperin makes it seem so simple: Castro made stupid decisions and the crafty Soviets maneuvered him into their cage and tamed his revolutionary fervor. Maybe. One might be convinced by this argument had Halperin presented more careful evidence and had he addressed two questions that bear on any study of Castro's decisions. What impact did United States trade restrictions and clandestine activities against Cuba have on Castro's economic troubles and reliance on Soviet assistance? And, second, what conditions in the interdependent world economy might have affected the Cuban economy? Finally, there seems to be a contradiction in Halperin's treatment of Castro. He presents the Cuban leader as incurably and demonstrably volatile and erratic, capable of changing directions

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suddenly. So how can Halperin be so sure at the end of the book that Fidel has been domesticated by the Soviets? Halperin is probably more certain than Moscow was or is.

THOMAS G. PATERSON
University of Connecticut

The Intellectual Resistance in Europe *by James D. Wilkinson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 358 pp. $20.00.*

Wilkinson's excellent first book is more specific than its title suggests. Rather than giving a general history of intellectual crosscurrents throughout Europe, the author confines his discussion to writers of a particular political outlook (that of the non-Communist Left) in France, Germany, and Italy. Nevertheless, this more limited focus highlights a complex variety of comparisons and contrasts among writers working under three forms of fascist oppression. These writers searched for ideals that would both oppose fascism and provide a basis for broad social and political change once fascism was defeated. Because of the extreme circumstances of war and occupation, they formed a clear and uncompromising set of ideals that Wilkinson notes was ill-suited to bringing change about when the war ended. The goals of these writers and the reasons why their goals were not achieved varied with the circumstances of oppression and liberation in each country.

Wilkinson discusses the work of the French writers as an exploration of the ethics of choice and engagement, reflecting the complex moral issues posed by the Vichy regime. They argued that if the French people could be shown how to make the correct choices and how to act upon them, great social and political change would inevitably follow. The writers themselves, however, believed that their instructional role constituted sufficient engagement, and they generally avoided direct political action. As a result, their influence was quickly superseded by that of de Gaulle and other politicians.

Given their lack of opportunity to engage in direct political action against the Nazis and the realization that their activities in politics immediately following the war would be limited by foreign occupiers, German writers sought to prepare for a moral rejuvenation that would one day complete Germany's liberation. Even this more narrow goal, however, was not realized, because the "economic miracle" which had begun in the late 1940s restored a measure of "normalcy" to German life and because the cold war made Germany again an important factor in international politics, thus enabling the Germans to ignore their past experience with Nazism. It might be noted, though, that a comparison with writers working under Soviet occupation in East Germany would have added to the discussion.

In Italy, for reasons not explained, the Mussolini regime allowed dissidents a surprising degree of freedom. As a result, their ideas were widely disseminated, helping to give the resistance in Italy a broader base of popular support and a greater amount of influence after the war than in either France or Germany. Yet the non-Communist Left proved unable effectively to exercise power in the one country in which it had achieved a position of leadership, as shown by the failure of the Parri government in 1946. Like their

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counterparts in France and Germany, these intellectuals returned to isolation soon after the war ended.

The most important contribution of Wilkinson's refreshingly lucid and well-argued book is that he follows the history of the writers he selects into the postwar period and examines in an objective and thoughtful manner why their influence was so limited. Wilkinson concludes that the unwillingness of these writers to risk compromising their ideals through effective engagement in the political process largely explains their failure to achieve their goals. In his not always sympathetic portrayal of their disillusionment, Wilkinson reveals two fundamental questions implied throughout the book: What is the proper relationship of intellectuals to their society, and to what extent should they expect to influence events directly?

Examining these questions from another perspective would have added to Wilkinson's study. The men who successfully exercised power during this period—de Gaulle, Adenauer, and DeGasperi—are portrayed as figures of restoration and reaction, to the limited extent that they are discussed at all. To be sure, none was an intellectual in the sense that Wilkinson used the term, but all had ideas that went beyond simply restoring the old order of the interwar period—ideas that, among other things, led to the formation of the modern welfare state. Such a discussion would have provided a more complete picture of the ideas that helped shape events during this period.

LEONARD V. SMITH
Columbia University

Economic Stabilization in Developing Countries *edited by William R. Cline and Sidney Weintraub. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 517 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $11.95.*

This book is the final, although somewhat belated, product of a conference organized by the Brookings Institution and held in October 1979 under the sponsorship of the Office of External Research of the U.S. Department of State. The volume contains thirteen papers, including an excellent overview chapter by the editors, that are packed with highly topical issues, theories with conflicting policy implications, empirical work supporting contradictory facts, and economic analyses reflecting rival social philosophies. The views that surround the ongoing monetarist-structuralist debate confront each other in different contexts throughout the volume. Despite the orthodox bias of the editors, the wide range of views expressed by the authors and the forty or so other participants and commentators bring out the array of rather discouragingly complex issues and the policy dilemmas that continue to afflict the developing countries.

Stanley Black attempts to determine the relative importance of internal and external factors that contributed to the instabilities of the 1970s and finds both factors guilty. He, therefore, supports the idea of International Monetary Fund (IMF) compensatory financing but argues against the move toward relaxing "IMF conditionability" on the grounds that it will encourage bad internal policies. In his critique, Sidney Dell, however,

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disagrees with Black and identifies OPEC and recession in the industrialized countries as the major sources of the payments problems of the less-developed countries (LDCs).

The effects of stabilization policies on long-term growth are discussed by Anne Krueger and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro. Both authors exploit their comparative advantage: While Krueger follows a global approach mainly drawing on the findings from the famous National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) study, Diaz-Alejandro carries out his analysis using the stylized facts of stabilization in Latin America's "Southern Cone" (Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile). Krueger assures readers that by eliminating the bias in their trade and payments regimes, the developing countries can expect to raise their long-term annual growth by 2 to 3 percentage points while incurring a short-term cost of only 1 to 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP) for a year to eighteen months. I suppose quantifying the net benefits of stabilization policies does strengthen the case for such policies; however, one cannot help being somewhat skeptical about the true worth of such universal economic laws. Diaz-Alejandro argues that the adoption of the typical IMF policy package usually improves the balance-of-payments situation but does little to control inflation. He would rather see, among other things, less stringent credit policies, more government investment in bottleneck sectors, and the use of price guidelines.

Two papers examine the relationship between stabilization policies and income distribution. While Montek Ahluwalia and Frank Lysy's study points to the contractionary effects of a devaluation, Alejandro Foxley emphasizes the inflationary effects; but both agree that stabilization programs are likely to have regressive consequences.

Lance Taylor presents a very interesting paper that by using the standard IS-LM (investment-savings-money supply-money demand) framework provides theoretical support for the structuralist argument that orthodox-monetarist stabilization policies are stagflationary. The model emphasizes the role of imported inputs and interest costs in aggregate supply. Hence, monetary and fiscal restraints can both reduce output and increase prices. Similarly, a devaluation can have stagflationary consequences. Kemal Dervis (and the editors) criticize Taylor's model on the ground that it is a short-run analysis. Granted that an analysis of the full-time path adjustment is highly desirable (which, however, may not necessarily show a reversal of the short-run effects), Taylor's contribution is significant since it elevates to a position of respectability the structuralist arguments that are often dismissed by Western economists as confused rhetoric lacking economic logic.

The increasing role of commercial lending in stabilization efforts of the LDCs is discussed by Irving Friedman. Drawing on case studies, Friedman illustrates the nature of interactions among the big commercial banks, the LDC governments, and the IMF staff and argues that the private banks have been prudent in lending to high-risk LDCs. The five case studies (Mexico by Sidney Weintraub, Peru by William Cline, Tanzania by James Weaver and Arne Anderson, Pakistan by Stephen Guisinger, and Korea by Roger Norton and Sueng Yoon Rhee) tell readers interesting stories of success and failure of stabilization programs, although the commentators such as Gustav Papanek and Daniel Schydlowsky would have told some of the stories somewhat differently.

As should be clear by now, some stylized facts notwithstanding, the book does not resolve any controversial issue. Our understanding of some of the issue increases a bit perhaps, but so does our confusion. It is interesting to point out that although this

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volume came out in 1981, it is innocent of the LDC experience arising from the second oil shock. Perhaps, a few years down the road, it will be worthwhile to compare the experiences of the early seventies with those of the early eighties. In the meantime, I would highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the theory and the practice of the open-economy macroeconomics of the LDCs.

SHAFIQUL ISLAM
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

The Local Fiscal Crisis in Western Europe: Myths and Realities *edited by L. James Sharpe. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, Inc., 1981. 277 pp. $20.00.*

This useful, if limited, book describes the structure of local finance in Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In his introduction L. James Sharpe uses the largely American public-finance literature to describe a "resource squeeze" that is pushing governments into fiscal crisis. Central government restrictions and mandates leave territorial units unable to control either how they raise revenue or how they spend what they are able to raise. Recent periods of inflation have tightened this squeeze as service costs increase more rapidly than the proceeds of cities' nonbuoyant tax bases.

The volume is useful if for no other reason than it provides basic material on several countries that are neglected in the literature on comparative urban politics. The authors describe each country's institutional framework for local government and in some instances its evolution, the outlines of its urbanization patterns, and its urban demographic changes. The papers on Great Britain, Italy, and to a lesser extent Germany indicate as well the principal political pressures on local government.

This last point is also an important weakness of the book: most of the accounts are remarkably apolitical. One set of authors goes so far as to report that the effect of political factors on expenditure is "practically non-existent" (p. 58). In fact this finding results from a narrow definition of politics as *party* politics. The issue of central-local political relations, for example, is implicit throughout the discussion but rarely treated directly. The authors do describe reforms of local government structure and finance and they point to pressures for further change. They do not, however, help readers to understand why central intervention has evolved as it has or how political pressures might shape responses to current pressures. Guido Martinotti's somewhat discursive discussion of the implications of Italian politics for local financial straits comes closest to providing explanations of this sort. Ken Newton also makes helpful connections to larger issues in British politics. It is surprising that the authors' several conferences did not lead them to draw more comparisons among their cases and ask what political factors contributed to making these cases different.

A second problem with the book is its emphasis on "crisis." Only in Italy do fiscal pressures appear anywhere near keeping cities from performing their principal police and social-service functions. In that country the central problem follows too directly from the

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weakness of both the economy and the state to be considered a local crisis. Not finding crises, the authors tend to deal with what they have called "resource squeeze" in an overly general fashion. Readers are told of shifting responsibilities and taxing powers among levels of government, but there is little analysis (apart from the "look out for number one" view of most central governments) of why those shifts have occurred and, especially, why they differ.

The authors draw, for example, on William Baumol's analysis of rising labor relative to output to help explain rapidly increasing local government expenditures. Political scientists might have pushed this question of public finance a step further. Can it be shown that services become public and, especially, local responsibilities because labor productivity does not rise relative to growth in the economy?

It is fortunate that financial issues have caught the interest of political scientists. If the resulting work is, however, to do more than document economists' theories in specific cases, then further, political analysis must be added. These six country reports demonstrate that economic forces, however powerful, will be shaped by political processes, thus variation among the cases. The institutional and process analysis that political scientists have used successfully (in contrast to most data-crunching exercises) to explain policy variation could have been interestingly employed. A cross-cutting comparative conclusion to this book would have made a substantial contribution to the understanding of comparative politics, finance, and public policy. Regrettably no such political analysis was written.

JERRY A. WEBMAN
Princeton University

The Limits of Professional Power: National Health Care in the Federal Republic of Germany *by Deborah A. Stone. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 212 pp. $18.50.*

Comparative studies of important health policy issues are rare enough to make this effort to use the German experience to guide policy choices facing the U.S. health-care system welcome and useful. Unlike in the United States, the German state and German medicine have mutually shaped one another for a century. German physicians are tightly organized. They negotiate collectively for their economic rewards. Strikes and boycotts are part of their past. Consumers of health care, again unlike those in the United States, enjoy a universal entitlement, largely through the sickness funds that negotiate with the organized physicians such important issues as fees, standards, and costs of health care. These organized counterpressures have not been very effective: German physicians are well paid—better in absolute and relative terms than American physicians; they control the content and standards of medical practice; they have restored fee-for-service as the dominant method of payment; and they show little interest in prevention, health maintenance, or occupational health. They have, at least until the 1977 reform legislation, defeated or dominated all efforts to curb the rise in health-care costs. The evidence that has been carefully assembled and analyzed here provides little ground for believing that German methods of cost control can be adapted to work in the United States.

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It is thus puzzling to read Stone's conclusion that, since the political power of medicine is "an artifact of political arrangements as well as technical expertise," policymakers can "be optimistic about the potential for reform" (p. 181). Her study clearly shows that after a century's efforts, organized medicine still dominates the policy process in Germany, as it does here. German medicine, like its American counterpart, controls the direct costs of health care, which continue to rise rapidly. Unlike doctors in the United States, however, German doctors also control the flow of substantial cash benefits payable under sickness and disability insurance to workers. Stone is silent about the class origin of German physicians, but class bias is clearly present in the pattern of more generous approval of sickness-related absence for white-collar than for blue-collar workers.

In Germany the private practice of medicine is small, but it exerts a decisive influence on the much larger publicly funded sector. Standards of care available to private patients become the norm that all other patients expect of their physicians; here tail indeed wags dog! Since group practice, prepayment, and other alternatives to private fee-for-service medicine are of minor dimension in the United States, the example suggests that little is likely to emerge from Health Maintenance Organizations and other innovations to challenge the dominance of traditional patterns of practice and payment in the United States, even with substantial official support. It is hard to escape the Draconian conclusion that without total control of the health-care system, the dominance of physicians will continue and reform will elude our best efforts.

The data are assiduously assembled and carefully presented. The analysis is clear and well organized, despite occasional excess of detail. Stone's overview of the U.S. system and its problems (chap. 1) is succinct and thoughtful, well worth assigning to students. Her assessment of physician oversight of other physicians in the German system makes clear that not much is to be expected of peer-review organizations and other monitoring devices. While the guild origins and the comprehensive structure of control over physicians in Germany are different from the American freewheeling capitalist-entrepreneurial model, German physicians prosper.

The book has some weaknesses. Galbraith's model of countervailing power is not aptly chosen or clearly tested. The view that any entitlement to health care is inherently expansionist of claims by those excluded—applied to Medicaid—is inaccurate; cutbacks in Medicaid began soon after its first enactment in 1965. But the overall level of presentation, analysis, and reflection is useful, though sobering, to Americans.

SUMNER M. ROSEN
Columbia University

Britain at the Polls, 1979: A Study of the General Election *edited by Howard R. Penniman. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981. 345 pp. Cloth, $16.25; paper, $8.25.*

This American Enterprise Institute (AEI) study has to be compared with the Nuffield College (Oxford) study, *The British General Election of 1979* by David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (Macmillan 1980). Both deal with the same event in terms of the same idiom of contemporary history that lies somewhere between history proper and high journalism.

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Both adopt a similar format: a brief summary of events since the previous general election—in the case of the AEI study an admirably succinct chapter by Anthony King—followed by very detailed descriptions of the campaigns waged by the principal parties. The latter constitutes the "meat course" in both cases, and by a skillful and careful use of inside gossip adds to our knowledge of political processes an element we cannot easily obtain from journalistic reports or historical archives. Both end with a provisional assessment of the historical significance of the event. Both include a chapter on opinion polls and choose different topics for further elaboration: In the AEI study Michael Pinto-Duschinsky provides a largely original study of campaign finance and Monica Charlot a somewhat pedestrian study of the role of women in British elections. Although none of the authors of the AEI study is a contributor to the Nuffield study of the 1979 election, half the authors of the AEI study have participated in earlier Nuffield studies. Both studies form part of a series going back, in the case of the Nuffield study, to the general election of 1945 and, in the case of the AEI study, to the general elections of 1974. Why given the Nuffield studies do we need the AEI series?

The similarity between the two studies is the more striking because Austin Ranney, one of the authors of the AEI study and a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, has published a penetrating evaluation of the series of Nuffield studies. A possible justification for publishing the AEI series, one may conjecture, was to remedy the deficiencies Ranney found in the Nuffield series. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Ranney's principal criticism of the Nuffield study was the paucity of theory, the absence of which is quite as marked in the AEI study. Moreover, the aspects of the Nuffield series, notably the statistical appendices, that Ranney found of greatest value to political scientists have actually been curtailed in the AEI series.

Another possible justification is that the AEI series is explicitly comparative whereas the Nuffield series is not. The first two sections, the preface by Howard Penniman and the introductory chapter by Ranney, are comparative. Yet pressure to get the book out fast leads to carelessness which a more leisurely pace could have avoided. Given time, for example, Ranney would surely have checked Erskine May's definition of the technical term "proroguing" before committing himself to the somewhat peculiar definition given on page 3. More significantly, comparative studies require rather more than simply describing in their own terms the institutions of a foreign country. They involve developing concepts that can be applied to both systems. Both Penniman and Ranney compare the information about British election finances provided by Pinto-Duschinsky in chapter 7 with election expenditures in the United States. But whereas Penniman (p. iii) is surprised at how comparatively high are British campaign expenditures, Ranney (p. 20) is surprised at how low they are. The truth is that Pinto-Duschinsky has provided one of the very few attempts to measure the real cost of British general elections (including the value of subsidies-in-kind such as the party political broadcasts that the television networks are constrained to provide free to the political parties), but a true comparison of British and American costs would have involved developing common measures of cost and common definitions that could be applied to both countries—a very different task that Pinto-Duschinsky has not attempted and one that would probably make much less interesting reading.

The most obvious difference between the AEI study and the Nuffield study is that the

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AEI study is a collection of essays by different hands whereas the Nuffield study is essentially the work of its two authors with a few additional contributors. The Nuffield study thus has a unity that is lacking in the AEI study, but the very diversity of the AEI study enables it to appeal to a wider range of audiences. William Livingston, for example, provides in chapter 4 a simple description of the mechanics of the Conservative campaign that would seem too elementary and untheoretical to feature in a Nuffield study. Yet it provides exactly the sort of detailed information that the American student will want and probably need to understand fully the relevant sections of the Nuffield study. Dick Leonard's study of the Labour campaign is closer to the Nuffield style but less inhibited in expressing personal judgments. Ivor Crewe's concluding chapter on "Why the Conservatives Won" reaches very similar conclusions to those of the Nuffield authors but does so with a much greater wealth and sophisticated use of survey data.

Political scientists no less than politicians may on occasion offer an echo not a choice. The reader unlike the voter, however, can buy both. In this case, this would be the right option for the serious student of British politics.

JAMES DOUGLAS
Northwestern University

The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 *by Fouad Ajami. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 220 pp. $19.95.*

In a remarkably insightful analysis, Fouad Ajami captures and explores the most compelling trends in recent Arab political thought. This study is a penetrating, elegantly written critique of the cross-pressures impinging on Arab society, as reflected in the writings of intellectuals and in the political symbols embraced by elites. Although the Arab-Israeli wars of June 1967 and October 1973 are posited as decisive turning points, Israel is incidental to the analysis. The wars are significant merely as catalysts of change in Arab expectations and self-image. The vital frame of reference for Arab self-evaluation is an ambivalent preoccupation with the West, whose dominance is rejected but whose style of life remains seductively appealing.

Arab military defeat in June 1967 led to "anguished self-appraisal" (p. 11), whose results were sober and constructive. Disillusionment with the post-World War II generation of Arab nationalist leaders varied sharply in ideological import. Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser and the Ba'th Party leaders of Syria were criticized by radicals of the left for making too many compromises with tradition instead of fully embracing socialism. Radical Islamic fundamentalists, by contrast, accused these leaders of deviating too far from the traditional fold. The latter critique had greater resonance in society at large, as Ajami observes: "In the aftermath of defeat, the turning of the masses to religion for solace and consolation . . . served as a reminder that God . . . was alive and well in the Arab world" (p. 52).

The cumulative impact of the 1967 and 1973 wars, according to Ajami, was to undermine the appeal of pan-Arab ideology. The author reveals his own conflicted responses to this development in his scathing critique of Egypt under President Anwar al-Sadat. He

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argues that "the Arabs have desperately tried to ignore their fragmentation," but Sadat's separate peace with Israel provided "harsh confirmation of Arab disintegration" (p. 122). Ajami believes that Egypt "is where Arab history comes into focus" (p. 122); yet he is not convincing in setting Egypt forth as a "mirror" of Arab politics. Egypt's style of leadership, demographic composition, and geostrategic location present it with markedly distinctive possibilities and constraints.

Ajami views the October 1973 war as the "great act" that Sadat had to perform to emerge from the shadow of his predecessor, Nasser (p. 95). The war also precipitated a shift in the Arab hierarchy of power, when successful use of the oil weapon sparked Saudi preeminence. Although the Arab oil embargo was psychologically satisfying as a "settling of the great score with the West" (p. 5), the Saudi leadership has sustained an uncomfortably close relationship with the United States. Saudi rulers raise the banner of Islam to legitimize their privileged position, but they are tainted with "cultural dualism," imbibing more of Western culture than they might choose to admit (p. 171). The fundamentalist strain of Islam embodied in the Iranian upheaval bodes ill for Saudi Arabia, whose elite has, according to Ajami, too often succumbed to corruption and luxurious life-styles.

The author warns against interpreting the "resurgence of Islam" at face value, indicating that religious symbols have often been embraced in Arab societies as the only available channel for dissent. Moreover, in unsettling periods of crisis societies are prone to "retreat into their shells" for reassurance (p. 17). Ajami is skeptical, however, that recourse to tradition will offer enduring solutions. His provocative, sometimes cynical commentary on Arab politics as a "chronicle of illusions and despair" (p. 4) suggests no coherent future direction. This sharp observer is obviously pessimistic that a satisfying equilibrium between the Arabs and the international environment with which they are even more actively engaged will emerge in the foreseeable future.

NAOMI J. WEINBERGER
Yale University

The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions *edited by Akira Iriye. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 368 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $9.95.*

Most of the essays in this conference volume reflect Akira Iriye's interest in cultural relations: the "exploration of ways in which ideas, institutions and individuals of one nation contributed to social change, cultural definition, and intellectual discourse in the other" (p. 4). The book has a stellar cast of contributors who, after a sketch of "China in Tokugawa Thought" by Harry Haratoonian, focus on the period from the Meiji Restoration to the end of World War II.

Much of the volume is devoted to the Japanese quest for identity in relation to China and the West. Japan had choices: it might choose the way of the West and dominate China, alone or in combination with one or more Western powers. Those Japanese who retained a residual respect for Chinese culture might prefer cooperation with China against the West to preserve the blessings of Chinese civilization for Asia.

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For China, the range was narrower, but there were choices. As the Chinese attempted to protect themselves against Western imperialism, how might they relate to Japan? Could Japan serve as a model? John Shrecker suggests that the leaders of the reform movement of 1898 identified with the leaders of the Meiji Restoration, viewing the latter as a traditional Confucian *ch'ing-i* or national renovation movement.

Haratoonian and others note that when Chinese and Japanese looked at each other, they saw not reality but some more useful or comfortable version of the "other." What is described is a kind of "Orientalism" in the manner of Edward Said practiced on "Orientals" by "Orientals." Samuel Chu reminds us that the Chinese did not think much about foreigners generally and certainly were not interested in Japan. Those Chinese with a professional responsibility to understand Japan provided their government with good information, but it was without effect.

Far more serious, however, was Japanese contempt for the Chinese people. Despite the discussion of mutual failure to relate constructively, it was the Japanese who tyrannized China and not vice versa. It was the Chinese who had to decide whether and how to collaborate with their Japanese conquerors. Cultural choice remained, but the Japanese defined the options. In the concluding essay, Bunzo Hashikawa surveys the period from about 1885 to 1945 and is struck by the "pervasive inability of the Japanese people to comprehend the Chinese people" (p. 354). Their failure to comprehend Chinese nationalism led to disaster.

Five of the essays explore the thoughts and motives of Chinese who sought Japanese aid or collaborated with the occupation during World War II. Ernest Young offers an interesting discussion of patriotism and the price of foreign aid with particular attention to Sun Yat-sen, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Young is generally sympathetic, concluding that "our ideas of nationalism contain unrealistically high standards of heroism and purity" (p. 139). Madeline Chi has written a neatly balanced essay on Ts'ao Julin—apologetic without attempting to hide his failings. Susan Marsh provides a thoughtful account of Chou Fo-hai, arguing that collaboration to save the people when the government failed was a Chinese tradition. She offers an interesting comparison with the activities of Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i during the Boxer War. Iriye's essay on the *Hsin Min Hui* is a model of how to write about ideas and cultural choices, subjects too long dominated by Mandarins using sociolinguistic jargon to impress each other. Finally, Lloyd Eastman recounts this story of wartime collaboration, economic and political, encouraged by both sides. He demonstrates the usefulness of U.S. documents, both Department of State and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for studying China.

Also worthy of note are articles by Noriko Kamachi and Shumpei Okamoto. Kamachi calls attention to the role of Chinese in Japan during the Meiji era, suggesting that they often served as intermediaries in the transfer of Western technology and skills. Okamoto's subject, Ishibashi Tanzan, was one of those rare Japanese who intuitively understood Chinese nationalism.

Iriye is to be congratulated for putting together a coherent and useful collection. Perhaps in his next effort, he may be able to include scholars from the People's Republic of China. Their response to many of the ideas raised in this book might prove interesting.

WARREN I. COHEN
Michigan State University

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Organizational Behavior in Chinese Society *edited by Sidney L. Greenblatt, Richard W. Wilson, and Amy A. Wilson. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1981. 277 pp. $27.95.*

Scholarship in area studies has long suffered from the criticism that it tends to be parochial, conducted outside of the mainstream of social-science research. Perhaps no area has been more subject to this tendency than Chinese studies. That field began as a separate discipline (sinology), and still today in the study of both China's long imperial history and Mao's revolutionary regime scholarship tends to remain fairly insular. For this reason the motivation behind the conference whose papers are published here—the third in a series run by the same organizers—seems particularly laudable. The editors convened a number of China specialists with the objective of having them bring theories and ideas from the study of organizational behavior in the West to bear on the Chinese organizational settings they were researching. It was hoped that both China scholarship and research on organizational behavior could profit from bringing them together in this way. (All of the essays concern contemporary China.)

Unfortunately good intentions are not enough. The volume under review is disappointing, in terms of the effort to connect Chinese studies research with mainstream social science. Sidney Greenblatt makes a valiant effort, in his introductory chapter, to try to draw out some links between fields. He points out quite correctly, for instance, that work on Chinese organizations, particularly in the post-1949 period, has often stressed the permeability of these organizations to outside pressures and influences, and that this emphasis fits well with Western research on environmental influences on organizational behavior. But the fact remains that almost none of the remaining authors gives more than a passing nod to organizational theory. Instead they go about their Chinese studies as usual. Most of the contributors deal with Chinese organizational life in at least some loose way, but the main intellectual issues dealt with—for example, how much of the Maoist model is being rejected by the current leaders, or what the theory is that lies behind the distinctive Chinese labor-allocation system—are hardly ones that non-China social scientists can relate to easily. It could be argued that a primary reason for this lack of success in linking up to research on organizational behavior was the decision to convene only China scholars, and not a balanced group of organizational researchers and China scholars.

As a consequence of the failure of this volume to achieve its stated purpose, the papers included have to be evaluated primarily in terms of how valuable they will be for people interested in China. Viewed in this light the contributions must be judged very uneven, even by the standards of conference volumes. Some contributions present quite useful descriptions of recent trends in China—for example, Lowell Dittmer's piece on changes in the formal political institutions in China and Victor Falkenheim's article on problems in reforming rural administration—and other papers present informative discussions of organizational dilemmas faced by China's current leaders. But still other pieces, such as those by Charles Cell and Elisabeth Croll, seem to be excerpts from their book-length studies, while a few pieces (those by Charles Hoffman and Stephen Andors) give us superficial readings of Maoist theory that have precious little relationship to real behavior in Chinese organizations. In sum, there are parts of this volume that will be of some in-

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terest, but only within the China field, and the uneven quality of the contributions will limit its appeal even there. We must hope that a more successful effort can be mounted in the future to reduce the parochialism of research on Chinese organizations.

MARTIN KING WHYTE
University of Michigan

Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath *by Joseph Camilleri. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1980. 311 pp. $25.00.*

This comprehensive overview of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to the present is simply the best available treatment of its subject. Most previous general works have been too polemical or too uncritical, either obsessed with the minutiae of events or taken in by the theoretical grand scaffolding of Chinese rhetoric. Camilleri avoids all these pitfalls and achieves a synthesis that is rich in substantive analysis, remarkably well-balanced in its allocation of attention, and fair in its judgments concerning the accomplishments and failures of Chinese diplomacy. His book admirably fills a long-standing need for an intelligent text in a subfield of China studies that is still pouring its monographic foundations.

Camilleri presents no grand theoretical explanation for the evolution of Chinese foreign policy, nor does he devote excessive space to Chinese (Maoist) global schema. Rather he provides a simple but satisfactory trichotomy of Chinese foreign relations into a "Revolutionary Phase" (1949–1968), a "Transitional Phase" (1969–1973) and a "Post-Revolutionary Phase" (1973–) that captures the essence of China's transition from the angry young man of the international system to a junior but rising partner of the status quo enmeshed in relationships with the developed capitalist world.

Within this context, Camilleri presents a judicious analysis of the Sino-American cold war, a nuanced sector-by-sector study of the Sino-Soviet conflict which stresses the failure of both Peking and Moscow to meet each others' mutual expectations, the politics of China's revolutionary diplomacy toward the Third World, and the dramatic reversals of China's policy with respect to the superpowers and to Asian neighbors (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Japan) in recent years. He depicts a Chinese leadership that even in its revolutionary phase acted cautiously for the most part with respect to confronting more powerful adversaries even while turning up the volume of its revolutionary rhetoric. Yet Camilleri is less successful in portraying that side of Chinese policy in which China pressed its power advantage vis-à-vis weaker partners such as Albania and Vietnam.

In a normative sense, he appears to share a moderately critical view of the revolutionary to postrevolutionary transformation of Chinese foreign policy because a status-quo China may be more likely to wallow in ancient disputes than to contribute positively to a resolution of global problems and inequities. He does not partake of the view, however, that the latest turn of the wheel in Peking means that the People's Republic of China is now set on a permanent course in its foreign relations.

Camilleri presents a balanced view of the initiatory and reactive elements in Chinese foreign policy while noting that weakness in the conventional indicators of power has meant that China is perforce more responsive to changes in the international environment than

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contributory to such changes. Yet even he conveys a somewhat exaggerated sense of China's power and position, especially in Asia. What bears further exploration is how a weak and poor China has been as successful as it has in becoming accepted as a major factor in world politics.

Part of the explanation lies in the personalities and institutions of Chinese foreign policy—a topic to which Camilleri gives scant attention. For example, how much of past Chinese success in foreign policy derived from the diplomatic legerdemain of Chou En-lai and his associates? And to what extent does China's embroilment with Vietnam reflect the absence of so skilled and powerful a hand at the tiller? With the exception of a chapter dealing with the postrevolutionary transition, Camilleri tells us very little of the domestic sources of foreign policy or the political processes that produced certain decisions. His is basically a modified state-as-actor focus with the well-known strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. Another shortcoming is the absence of an integrated picture of China's international economic policies.

These last critical comments, however, do not alter the fundamental fact that *Chinese Foreign Policy* is a considerable achievement. It is a book that will find wide use in university courses and merits the respect of specialists in the field as well.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

Political Women in Japan: The Search for a Place in Political Life *by Susan J. Pharr. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. 239 pp. $25.00.*

Susan J. Pharr expresses both a realistic and sensitive perspective regarding Japanese society in general and the Japanese political woman's position in particular. Her book concerns the significance of women's active participation in politics in Japan. It is interspersed with and supported by specific examples and statistics from interviews she conducted with one-hundred Japanese women between the ages of eighteen and thirty-three who were active in some form of volunteer political activity. Pharr's work is also among the first systematic studies specifically examining political women that does not focus on women of the United States.

Pharr begins by looking back on the history of women's participation in politics in modern Japan. She points to some of the complexities that lie in the fact that the granting of suffrage and other political rights to Japanese women during and after the Allied Occupation were forced and did not evolve as a "gradual outcome." Interestingly, for example, Japanese women have become "super-voters" (p. 24), but other types of political activity are not readily accepted as "appropriate female activity" (p. 33). The key problem for Japanese women as well as many other women of the world "has been to translate legal rights into power and to bring customs in line with what the laws say" (p. 5). And Pharr has appropriately chosen to focus on political volunteers as the agents of social change, "at the forefront of the role-redefinition process today in Japan" (p. 7).

In chapter 3 Pharr develops a threefold typology to look at the main kinds of women activists in Japan: neotraditionalists, new women, and radical egalitarians. Through the

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development of this typology Pharr points to the impact the role ideologies of these different types of women have had on Japanese women's political activity. She clarifies that political activism supports role change and encourages "still further change in many political women" (p. 74).

The latter half of *Political Women in Japan* is devoted in part to examining some of the family dynamics at work in political women's lives: it also looks at some of the satisfactions as well as some of the costs of political involvement and how these are coped with by Japanese women. It is interesting that Pharr refers a number of times, for example, to the recurring pattern of a political woman's close relationship with her mother (pp. 115, 128, and 131). These mothers often communicate contradictory messages to their politically active daughters, but at some level there is a satisfaction that they derive from their daughters' adventures (p. 133). In the same vein Pharr talks about a "parental permissiveness" that often is a part of a political woman's family dynamics and that encourages the daughter's role experimentation (pp. 115–16).

I was impressed by Pharr's keen understanding of Japanese society, which is apparent in her book. She seems to be well aware of many of the frustrations and struggles that women—especially women seeking change—in such an institutionalized society frequently experience. Her numerous interviews were conducted in Japanese, often following a number of circuitous and no doubt frustrating introductions in true Japanese style (see appendix A, Supplementary Notes).

This work is well annotated, at times so much so that the annotations get in the way of the flow of what is being said. The case studies Pharr goes into detail about add good spice to an otherwise dry content. I think in order to help explain why Japanese women find themselves where they are today, this study could have delved further back into Japanese history. I also believe that Pharr's concluding outlook on the future of the changing role of Japanese women is overly optimistic.

Perhaps the strongest and most profound aspect of this work, however, lies in its dual nature: although it focuses specifically on the experience of Japanese political women, on a broader and more inclusive scale Pharr gives her readers a glimpse of what it is like to be a political woman—anywhere in the world.

MARTHA HOAGLUND
Pacific School of Religion

Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite-Bourgeoisie, 1905–1970 *by Gavin Kitching. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980. 479 pp. $39.50.*

Gavin Kitching brings two offerings to those concerned with East African development: a detailed economic history of Kenya, and an excursus in Marxist social theory. The author concedes that the two objectives are not fully integrated in his text. Curiously, Kitching affirms that his dominant aspiration is to contribute to the corpus of Marxist thought, though the theoretical analysis of his rich empirical materials consumes but forty pages of a very long book. To this reviewer, the volume is a splendid achievement in its anatomy of economic change, but of only modest value in the theoretical realm.

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The great bulk of the text is devoted to a meticulous reconstruction of patterns of labor use, from the precolonial epoch until 1970. Kitching devoted years of research, in Kenya and Britain, to the search for data. He made extensive use of Kenyan local archives, as well as the work of the now substantial number of scholars laboring in the fields of Kenya's economic history. Readers follow in detail the transformation of Kenya from a predominantly pastoral economy with significant quotients of sedentary agriculture to a mainly commercialized rural economy bound to a swelling urban sector. The superposition of a colonial capitalist economy and white settler farms create new markets for labor, alter the terms of trade between pastoralists and agriculturalists, and gradually transform social relations of production. These trends are pursued through the early years of independence, which Kitching believes are a logical continuation of patterns set by the colonial experience.

The author lavishes a degree of loving attention to the details of the process which may at times overwhelm those readers whose commitment to the topic is insufficiently robust. For the determined, the sheer mass of documentation well rewards a careful reading. Kitching does treat the Kenya economy as a whole, although his data are most exhaustive for the Central (roughly Kikuyuland) and Nyańza (Luo) provinces. Many sparkling insights are found in his delineation of the very complex social division of labor between peasant holdings and commercial farms, between cultivators and herders, between men and women within the household unit, and between city and country. The diversity of situations and complicated exchanges that underlie broader historical patterns of change are sketched with masterly skill. The author is always scrupulous in alerting the reader to the varying solidity of the data upon which his conclusions are drawn.

Throughout this section of the study, the theoretical orientation of the author is unobtrusive; it is mainly reflected in the topical focus on labor use and the disposition of its product. One need not share the Marxist convictions of the author to find the subject important and the findings valuable.

At the theoretical level, the work is less satisfactory. Kitching digs a moat around his theoretical fortress; "I have felt increasingly," he writes, "that the book should be judged above all, by Marxists, as a work of Marxist theory" (p. 6). To claim that only those who worship at the same chapel can cross the drawbridge into his conceptual castle seems peculiar.

Those who approach the sacred texts of Marxism with an agnostic spirit will find two crucial elements to his theoretical scaffolding sadly deficient: his concept of the state, and his use of the term "petite bourgeoisie." The state is said to be central to the Kenyan political economy and is asserted to play the part of "merchant capital" (pp. 413–30). This murky conceptualization remarkably makes no reference to the renewed debate on the state in either Marxist or non-Marxist epistemologies. The "petite bourgeoisie," despite its appearance in the title, sporadic textual references, and the quintessential ambiguity of this label, is first defined only in a single paragraph two pages before the end. It suffices to quote the definition to make evident its opaqueness: "not only [is] Kenya's ruling class . . . a petite bourgeoisie, but . . . Kenya is predominantly a petit-bourgeois society and economy. For it is the hallmark of the petite bourgeoisie that their position within an economy cannot be grasped simply by reference to their role in production alone, or their role in circulation alone, precisely because they are so frequently involved in both dimen-

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sions. Moreover, they can rarely be characterized simply as 'exploited' or 'exploiters' " (p. 453).

Perhaps Marxists will find greater nourishment in the theoretical discussion. All serious students of East African economic history will welcome this volume as an outstanding contribution.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Political Theory and International Relations *by Charles R. Beitz. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 212 pp. Cloth, $16.50; paper, $3.95.*

"Political theory," writes Charles Beitz, "arises from a perception of the possibility of choice" (p. 4). The word "theory" has been used and abused in so many ways in the contemporary literature of international relations that readers may be grateful that Beitz so promptly makes it clear that "choice" is the key word and its clarification the task of the normative theorist. In part one he effectively disposes of the argument that in a Hobbesian world of states the states have no choice but to behave like amoral anthropomorphic monsters. In part two he seeks to delimit, both positively and negatively, the range of choice that his cosmopolitan ethic would afford each state. International distributive justice is the subject of the third and final part.

This compact and scholarly study may be compared with two books written by one of Beitz's predecessors at Swarthmore College, Kenneth N. Waltz. Like Waltz in his first book, *Man, the State and War*, Beitz demonstrates a mastery of the relevant classics in Western political thought. Waltz's most recent book, *Theory of International Politics*, is as specialized in its focus and ambitious in its title as *Political Theory and International Relations*, but the two books are as different as night and day. Modern philosophy of science and the classical tradition in normative theory provide very different refracting lenses through which to peer at politics among nations in the absence of central authority.

The best writing in international relations of the past half-century has not been devoid of normative concerns, but one may ask why a good book such as Beitz's in which these concerns are made explicit has been so long in coming. One answer may be that believers in a utopia of science and reason evaded rigorous analysis of hard *choices* by trying to convert them into difficult but solvable *problems*. A second may be that in the presence of identifiable evil during the years of Hitler and Stalin the choices were not hard at all, and broad assertions about the national interest did not seem to need challenging. A third answer may be that with the waning of Cold War I many scholars wearied of serving as instruments of national policy in a private capacity and chose to escape into methodology and advanced research technology, and a not very well-rooted empiricism that gave full play to both. A fourth may be the conventional separation made in the political science curriculum between the study of politics within states and the study of politics between states and the perception that political theory is part of the domestic half of the discipline.

In this pioneering study Beitz satisfies every legitimate expectation that his preface

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creates in the mind of his reader. He occasionally takes positions that are not essential to his analysis and that leave him open to flank attack. Thus, his stated goal, "to work out a more satisfactory international normative political theory through a critique and revision of orthodox views" (p. vii), carries the questionable implication that realist skepticism in the fashion of Hobbes and Hans J. Morgenthau is *the* orthodox, *the* traditional, and *the* dominant stance of political scientists specializing in international relations. Because Beitz stands so squarely in the voluntarist American tradition of belief in the reality of significant choice, his critique of the realist skeptics is an essential element of his analysis; but he need not have conceded dominance to a "tradition" which in the American study of international relations was more important in the 1950s and 1960s than before or since.

In his occasional assertions of the incompatibility for statesmen, as well as for ordinary men and women, of the dictates of morality on the one hand and prudence, expediency, self-interest, and advantage on the other, Beitz may also be saying either too much or too little. I think he may be giving too short shrift to enlightened self-interest. Everyone bends their efforts toward making the future more like the one they want than it would be if they did nothing. The moral person's interest is in a future in which his moral principles are implemented and his actions toward that end promote his self-respect. As Quincy Wright observed, "Ethics is long-run expediency, and expediency is short-run ethics."

Finally, it does not seem to have been necessary to treat two topics as different as intervention and national self-determination under the rubric "autonomy of states." The rationale for intervention in the case of a new Emperor Bokassah, a new Idi Amin, or a new Dracula is that there are some elementary freedoms that the international system ought to guarantee individuals everywhere and even against their own governments. The rationale for national self-determination is autonomy for peoples, not autonomy for states.

Political Theory and International Relations will be useful to serious students of international relations for many years to come.

WILLIAM T.R. FOX
Columbia University

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

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

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

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